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Preface 
 
This Ph.D thesis consists of three separate articles, which focus on qualifications 
received at workplaces. The articles were written between 2004-2007 at the Danish 
National Centre for Social Research (DNCSR). The DNCSR and the Danish 
Employment Ministry (DEM) financed the research through a Ph.D. stipend. 
Throughout the Ph.D. research I have been enrolled in the Ph.D. program at The 
University of Copenhagen (UC). I also spent 5 months at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
(UPF) in Barcelona, Spain during the Ph.D. period. 
I want to thank DNCSR and DEM for providing me with a stipend and for 
giving me many financial opportunities to participate in courses, conferences, and 
seminars overseas. Furthermore, the DNCSR and The National Labor Market Authority 
(NLMA) have been instrumental in helping me obtain the data I needed for my Ph.d. 
Many of my colleagues at DNCSR have also been very supportive and helpful during 
the Ph.d. period. Jane has especially been a true friend. 
I am also very grateful to my supervisors Mette Ejrnæs and Hans Christian 
Kongsted. Mette and Hans Christian have been a source of inspiration. They have been 
actively involved and always had time for minor and major questions. Their comments 
and suggestions have made me a better economist. 
I would also like to thank UC and the Centre for Applied Microeconomics 
for allowing me to be a part of an inspiring research environment. Moreover, I would 
like to thank Jens Bonke, Lars Pico Geerdsen, Helena Skyt Nielsen, Jeffrey Smith, 
Torben Tranæs and Niels Westergaard-Nielsen for their comments. I am also grateful to 
Natalie Reid who taught me to write better academic English.  
Finally the support and encouragement I have received from family and 
friends, especially from my husband James, has made me believe that a Ph.D. was the 
right choice. The best feeling throughout the Ph.D. period has been to see my daughter 
grow up. Lately, my daughters comments have also been a source of motivation. She 
wanted me to finish my Ph.D. so I would have more time to play with her.  
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Introduction and Summary 
 
Today the common opinion is that the driving force behind increasing participation 
rates, steady employment and competitiveness in a globalized world is education. 
Therefore Governments from developed countries focus on education from early 
childhood to advanced adulthood. The attention on education has resulted in major 
education initiatives in Denmark as well. Apart from the very generous subsidies given 
to formal education (i.e. vocational and further education) a lot of education initiatives 
have been created for adults. Especially, for adults who suffer from unemployment. In 
addition to the many initiatives by the Danish government to upgrade skills in the 
workforce there are also a lot of education and training initiatives at Danish workplaces. 
The results of upgrading skills among the adult workers at workplaces are the focus of 
this Ph.D. thesis. 
The public debate on education among the adult workforce revolves 
around three concerns. The first major concern is the upgrading of skills among a group 
of potentially long-term unemployed workers. The first chapter examines this issue by 
looking at how last workplace experiences influence the risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed. The connection between workplace experience and long-term 
unemployment has not been evaluated in previous studies.  
The second major concern is the continuing upgrading of skills in the 
workforce regardless of formal education. This concern is discussed in chapter two by 
looking at the effect of job-related training (JRT) on employees wage return. Very few 
Scandinavian studies have looked at the effect of extensive JRT on wage returns. 
Furthermore, the potential endogeneity problem between separation and wages is taken 
into account when evaluating the effect of JRT. This has not been done in previous JRT 
studies.  
The third concern is to make formal education possible for many adults. In 
chapter three I evaluate the effect of an adult apprenticeship subsidy (AAS) on the 
attendance rate into vocational education (i.e. formal education). The AAS is an 
extraordinary generous subsidy that only exists in Denmark. Therefore the results are 
important for all the other countries that want to apply a similar subsidy to increase 
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vocational education among the adult population. To sum up this thesis looks at all three 
concerns separately for employees at Danish workplaces. 
Previous literature on education and upgrading of skills show that it is 
difficult to separate the effect of education and JRT from individual specific effects and 
firm specific effects. To separate the effect one needs a lot of good data. This means that 
panel data full of detailed information on observable individual characteristics and 
workplace characteristics is needed. This Ph.D. makes use of several Danish register-
based panel data sets on the Danish population and the Danish workplaces. The Ph.D. 
also combines the panels with surveys among employees and employers. This extensive 
use of data makes it possible to identify the effect of past workplace experiences, JRT 
and education subsidies that is different from previous literature. 
In the following I summarize each chapter and the major conclusions. 
Chapter 1 poses the question: “Does the last workplace experience influence the 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed?”. It examines how individual 
characteristics and the characteristics of the last workplace in the private sector 
influence the likelihood of becoming long-term unemployed. While most studies focus 
on individual characteristics of the long-term unemployed this chapter looks at 
workplace characteristics in conjunction with long-term unemployment. The intuition is 
if a worker obtains some kind of skills or prestige from the last workplace that is in 
demand at other workplaces then the worker is expected to have a lower risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed after a job separation.  
The correlation between observed former workplace experience and the 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed is possible to analyze because of an 
extraordinarily rich Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995-
2001. The data is especially useful because it is possible to disentangle displaced 
workers in the private sector. Thereby the analysis avoids the sample selection caused 
by the correlation between workers’ separation rates and expected job possibilities.  
The results from a multinomial logit model show that displaced workers 
have a high risk of becoming long-term unemployed if they previously worked in 
workplaces with certain characteristics, such as small manufacturing firms with low 
shares of skilled employees. Thus at certain workplaces workers probably obtain 
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additional skills or prestige. This increases their future job possibilities and reduces their 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed after displacement. 
 Chapter 2 explores the question: “Does job-related training increase 
future wages?” The focus is on wage return to the extensive job related training (JRT) 
initiatives taking place at Danish workplaces. The Danish panel data, which includes 
administrative data and survey data on employers and employees, is used to analyse the 
effect of JRT on wages. The information on employees’ participation in JRT in 1995, 
wages, and historical job shifts make it possible to take individual specific effects into 
account and to instrument job separation. To overcome the potential endogeneity 
between wages and job separations by using historical job shifts as an instrument is new 
in the JRT literature.  
The results show that the OLS estimates are consistent even when job 
separation is included as an exogenous variable. Moreover women with vocational 
education who received JRT and then separated to a new job receive a high wage return. 
The JRT has a positive and significant effect on wage return among men and women 
with a vocational education. Surprisingly no wage return to JRT is found among other 
educational groups. Finally the overall wage return to the extensive JRT in Denmark is 
very small compared to international findings. 
Chapter 3 asks the question “Does subsidized adult apprenticeship 
improve the aggregate level of education?” The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate 
the effect of the generous adult apprenticeship subsidy (AAS) on the attendance rate 
into vocational education from 1996-2003. The generous apprenticeship subsidy for 
adults over 25 years of age was introduced in 1997 to address the challenges of 
globalization and the increased demand for skills. The aim of the AAS was to increase 
vocational skill levels among the non-educated in order to fill job vacancies (i.e. prevent 
bottlenecks).  
Through a simple theoretical human capital model, I show that AAS is 
likely to influence education decisions in the whole population. Additionally, a 
simulation of the model illustrates the difficulties of finding an empirical strategy 
capable of evaluating the effect of a subsidy in the absence of an obvious control group. 
The empirical strategy in this chapter is to examine the effect of the subsidy, given the 
exogeneous shift in AAS in 1997, among the unskilled 24 and 25-year-olds by the 
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difference-in-differences estimator used in international educational evaluation studies 
on a rich panel data.  
The results show that the AAS has a significant positive effect on the 
vocational attendance rate among 25-year-old men in 1998. However 25-year-old 
unskilled women were not affected by the subsidy. Additionally, the AAS has no 
significant effect on the attendance rate after 1998. Thus, the results do not 
unambiguously find that a generous AAS increases the attendance rate among the non-
educated, which was originally expected. 
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Chapter 1 
Does the last workplace experience influence the risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Politicians throughout Europe are concerned about a group of 
potential long-term unemployed workers. While most studies 
focus on individual characteristics of this group of workers, this 
study examines how individual characteristics and last workplace 
characteristics in the private sector influence the likelihood of 
becoming long-term unemployed. The study uses an 
extraordinarily rich Danish register-based employer-employee 
panel data set from 1995 to 2001. Therefore it is possible to look 
at the correlation between observed former workplace experience 
and the risk of becoming long-term unemployed. The analysis is 
restricted to displaced workers in the private sector, avoiding the 
sample selection caused by the correlation between workers’ 
separation rate and expected job possibilities. The results from a 
multinomial logit model show that displaced workers have a high 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed if they worked 
previously in workplaces with certain characteristics, such as 
small manufacturing firms with low shares of skilled employees. 
Thus at certain workplaces workers probably obtain additional 
skills or prestige, which increases future job possibilities and 
reduces their risk of becoming long-term unemployed after 
displacement. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout Europe a group of workers are more likely to end up in long-term 
unemployment than other groups of workers. The long-term unemployed have lower 
possibilities of job matching relative to other unemployed individuals, and thereby have 
a higher risk of structural problems in the labour market. In 2001, Denmark had 68.000 
long-term unemployed.1 The government subsidises these people in one of three 
possible states: passive unemployment, participation in active labour market training 
programs or leave-of-absence for training of more than one year. Despite a decrease 
from 95.000 long-term unemployed in 1996 to 68.000 long-term unemployed in 2001, 
the long-term unemployed still make up 2,5 percent of the workforce (see figure 1). 
Having many potential workers who are long-term unemployed is problematic for two 
reasons. First, given recent unfavourable demographic developments, most welfare 
states can not financially afford having any potential workers not working. Second, 
some workers appear to be unwillingly long-term unemployed, because they claim to 
desire working at the given wage in the labour market but remain without a job offer. 
 How individual characteristics and especially how last workplace 
experience influence a worker’s risk of ending up in the unfavourable state - long-term 
unemployment - is precisely the focus of this paper.  
Two factors have to coincide for an employee to end up becoming long-
term unemployed. First, the worker has to separate from a job. Second, the worker must 
not be able to find a job again. Restricting the analysis to workers working in private 
sector workplaces with a minimum of 10 employees ensures the consistency of 
workplace characteristics. Among these private sectors workers the yearly average 
separation rate was close to 20 percent in 1995-2001.2 A separation is when a worker is 
employed at a certain workplace one year and not employed at that workplace the 
following year. Here a workplace is defined as a legally-registered unit at a specific 
address. Thus the separation rate includes intra-firm movements because firms easily 
can contain more workplaces. Due to the fact that workers have to be working for at 
least one year and public benefit and support are taken into account the separation rate 
                                                 
1 Author’s calculations on the Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001 
described in section 3. 
2 Author’s calculations on the Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001 
described in section 3. 
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in this paper is lower than previous Danish studies, which find an average separation 
rate of 30 pct. (Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen 2002). In other words a person 
who receives an unemployment benefit while working and then separates into 
unemployment is not recognized as an separation in this analysis. Regardless, of the 
separation definition, the separation rate in Denmark is relatively high. The reason is 
that Denmark has liberal hiring and firing rules compared to the rest of Europe. Thus, 
the Danish labor market remains secure, because the benefit system is generous 
compared to other European countries.  
Previous literature on long-term unemployed workers has concentrated on 
socio-economic environments and individual characteristics, especially individual 
specific effects (Machin and Manning 1999; Mincer 1991; Portugal and Addison 2000). 
However, the applied definitions on long-term unemployed individuals are very diverse. 
For example, Portugal and Addison (2000) define people with more than 8 weeks of 
unemployment as long-term unemployed individuals, whereas Manchin and Manning 
(1999) define long-term unemployment as more than 1 year of unemployment. Studies 
on US data find that a person’s human capital seems especially important to 
unemployment duration and the risk of becoming long-term unemployed (Machin and 
Manning 1999). Additionally, the majority of the long-term unemployed in Denmark 
have very little or no formal education. Since, research suggests that adult education and 
other initiatives for improving worker’s skills will help the long-term unemployed to 
find a job, most Danish and international political initiatives focus on these factors. 
Often forgotten is one vital fact. A vast majority of the unskilled never become long-
term unemployed. For example, 85 percent of the unskilled employed workers from 
2000 were still employed in 2001, although some of them had changed workplaces. 3 
The percentage of skilled employed workers who were still employed was 90.  
Furthermore, looking at unemployment periods for all workers who 
separated from a job in Denmark between 1995-2001, there exists differences among 
workplace sizes regardless of the employee’s educational background (see figure 2). 
Thus, former workplace experience could shed new light on the risk of becoming long-
term unemployed. Previous literature has already shown that workplace characteristics 
influence different aspects of workers’ job situations, such as separation rates, job 
                                                 
3 Author’s calculations on the Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001 
described in section 3. 
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creation and destruction (Albæk and Sørensen 1998, Davis and Haltiwanger 1992), 
wage transitions (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999), employment mobility 
(Cappellari and Jenkins 2004), as well as payment schemes.  
To my knowledge, no studies have looked at workplace characteristics in 
conjunction with long-term unemployment. The intuition is that workers coming from 
certain workplaces, through which they receive some kind of skills or reputation 
different from their formal education, have better future job possibilities and a lower 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed. 
Past research has revealed a difference between lay-offs and quitting, 
where laid-off workers have high risks of becoming low paid workers in the future, and 
workers who quit have a high risk of becoming high paid workers in the future (Antel 
1985; Hashimoto 1981). Thus seeking to establish if the last workplace has an effect on 
becoming long-term unemployed, it is necessary to know if job separations result from 
either quitting (a decision that the employee makes) or lay-offs (a decision the employer 
makes). Possibly workers who either have a new job offer or expect to get a new job 
quickly are more likely to quit. Conversely workers who have no alternative job offers 
could be likely candidates for lay-offs because they are burnt out, inefficient, or not up-
to-date with their skills, or because they have firm specific skills that are not 
transferable to other workplaces.  
The data makes it possible to isolate a special group of laid-off workers 
who are displaced. The displaced workers are usually associated with three 
characteristics (Fallick 1996). First, the workers are displaced because of structural 
changes, such as demand changes or technological developments. Second, these very 
changes limit the chances for the displaced workers to return to a comparable job. Third, 
the displaced workers are strongly attached to their former sector (e.g industry, 
occupation or location). This paper uses the wide definition for a displaced worker, 
which has been applied by Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) and Browning, Danø 
and Heinesen (2003): a displaced worker is defined as one who separates from a private 
workplace that annually reduces staff by more than 30 percent. In Denmark, from 1995-
2001, more than 25 percent of all separations (among workers with at least one year of 
steady employment in private workplaces with more than 10 employees) result from 
 11
displacement.4 These are the displaced workers I look at when analyzing the influence 
of workplace characteristics on the risk of becoming long-term unemployed.  
The paper is set up as follows: Section 2 explains in detail why workplace 
characteristics can affect the risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Section 3 
describes the rich employer-employee data and some descriptive results. Section 4 
illustrates the multinomial logistic model of seven different exit states after 
displacement. Results regarding the former workplace influence on the risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed appear in section 5. In section 6 conclusions are drawn.  
 
2. The risk of becoming long-term unemployed after displacement 
Despite an extensive amount of literature on long-term unemployment, most literature 
focuses on differences in inflow and outflow rates (Machin and Manning 1999). Fewer 
international studies focus on individual characteristics such as age, education, family 
status and unobserved heterogeneity, and no studies have looked at previous workplace 
characteristics in conjunction with long-term unemployment.5 In this section I first 
illustrate how individual characteristics and business cycles influence workers’ risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. Afterwards, the possible influence of workplace 
characteristics on the risk of becoming a long-term unemployed individual is described. 
 
Individual characteristics and business cycles 
Most researchers and politicians have pinpointed a lack of formal skills as the major 
reason that some workers become long-term unemployed. From the perspective of 
human capital theory, skilled workers should have better job-match possibilities than 
less skilled workers (Mincer 1991). Thus, workers without formal education should 
have a higher risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Addison and Portugal (1987), 
Portugal and Addison (2000), and Obben, Engelbrecht and Thomphson (2002) also find 
that unskilled workers in the US and New Zealand have a relatively high risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed.  
                                                 
4 Author’s calculations on the Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995-2001. 
5 One descriptive Danish study (Hussain and Geerdsen 1998) has looked at the correlation between 
workplace industries and long-term unemployment.  
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  Many studies also show that seniors have a relatively high risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed (Nickell 1979; Portugal and Addison 2000).6 An 
exception is the study by Obben et al. (2002), which finds no positive correlation 
between age and the risk of becoming long-term unemployed in New Zealand. 
However, suppose age is correlated with less productivity because older workers have 
health problems or do not have the latest skills in demand. Then the arrival rate of job 
offers is expected to reduce and thereby the risk of becoming long-term unemployed 
increases among seniors. On the other hand, age and health might not determine long-
term unemployment, but rather preferences for work and search costs. For example, a 
person with poor health may have higher preferences for leisure than a healthy person 
and therefore the person searches less for a job and has a higher risk of becoming long-
term unemployed.  
  A worker’s family situation and partner’s income are often suggested as 
important factors with respect to preferences, economic incentives and search costs for 
job seekers. Addison and Portugal (1987) find that singles have longer unemployment 
durations than couples. Danish studies also show that families consisting of single 
female breadwinners, having at least one child and little education, do not have any 
economic incentives to work (Smith 1998). Therefore, such single female parents have a 
high risk of becoming long-term unemployed. The economic incentive is especially 
absent when the replacement ratio is high. A condition, which is common to welfare 
states that have high unemployment insurance like in Scandinavia.7 However, Nickell 
(1979) also shows that unemployment duration among individuals from the US 
increases when the replacement rate is high.   
  If employers discriminate due to gender, ethnicity or unemployment 
history then the arrival rate of job offers is reduced and that can increase the risk of 
long-term unemployment for the discriminated groups. Discrimination exists when 
employers select employees according to superficial characteristics such as skin colour 
and name, which is strictly based on imperfect information on real human capital. They 
use these characteristics as a proxy for a person’s qualifications, despite the irrelevance 
                                                 
6 Some Danish studies also indicate that age increases long-term unemployment (Arbejdsministeriet 
2001; Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening 2000). 
7 The puzzling thing is that a lot of wage earners in Denmark work even though they lack economic 
incentives. 
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for the job. Addison and Portugal (1987), Portugal and Addison (2000), and Obben et 
al. (2002) find that people of color in the US and New Zealand have a relatively high 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Moreover, Addison and Portugal (1987) find 
that women have an increased risk of becoming long-term unemployed. However, in 
contrast to the last result Obben et al. (2002) find that unemployed women in New 
Zealand have a relatively low risk of long-term unemployment.   
  A majority of studies that analyze long-term unemployment and individual 
characteristics control for business cycles. Business cycles that reduce the demand for 
goods reduce the demand for labour. Long depression periods combined with structural 
changes can therefore cause people who were unemployed in the short run to become 
unemployed in the long run. A high regional unemployment rate is a good indicator of 
bad conditions on the local labour markets and reduced job possibilities. Portugal and 
Addison (2000) also find that long-term unemployment increases when the 
unemployment rate increases. 
  Previous studies clearly show that individual characteristics influence 
long-term unemployment among workers. Thus any analysis of the workplace 
characteristics influence on the risk of becoming long-term unemployed after 
displacement must take these characteristics into account. 
 
Workplace characteristics 
As we have seen, a worker’s individual characteristics and business cycles influence the 
risk of long-term unemployment. Therefore it is expected that being an unskilled senior 
female worker is a disadvantage with respect to long-term unemployment. However, in 
reality most of the potential disadvantaged workers never become long-term 
unemployed. Therefore factors different from observed individual characteristics and 
business cycles must explain why some workers become long-term unemployed and 
some do not become long-term unemployed. Explanations for long-term unemployment 
are also found on the demand side of the labour market. The intuition is that workplace 
experience influences workers’ future job opportunities. If the worker has obtained 
some kind of skills or prestige from the last workplace that is in demand in other 
workplaces, then the worker is expected not to become long-term unemployed after a 
job separation. The fact that about 50 percent of Danish wage earners participated in 
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some kind of job-related training (JRT) in 1998/1999 (OECD 2001) supports the idea 
that a great deal of skills are obtained at today’s workplaces. JRT is very diverse, from 
computer courses to truck licensing courses and team-building courses. The volume of 
JRT in Denmark is also extensive compared to other OECD countries. 
  In the human capital framework, a worker who gains skills or prestige at a 
workplace increases his or her human capital and the arrival rate of job offers. The 
workplace experience – skills and prestige – is assumed to be different from skills 
obtained through the formal educational system. Furthermore, the skills come through 
JRT which includes courses on the job and informal tutoring while working.8 Prestige 
can result from working in well-known companies, such as big concerns or companies 
producing brand names. Prestige can also have negative connotations, such as having 
worked in industries using outdated machinery and tools. JRT and prestige are assumed 
to be financed directly or indirectly by the employer.  
  In contrast to Becker’s traditional division between firm specific human 
capital (paid by the employer) and general specific capital (paid by the employee), this 
study does not divide human capital. Instead, it assumes that all kinds of JRT and 
prestige increase the workers’ human capital, thereby improving their positions with 
respect to other jobs. The reasoning is two-fold: First, many companies pay for general 
training. They presumably offer such training because they expect to benefit from it, 
even though it increases their employees’ job opportunities elsewhere (Weatherall 
2007). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) also show that firms pay for general training when 
the wage structure is distorted due to labor market frictions and institutions. Second, 
gaining non-transferable skills through JRT or prestige that no other workplace 
demands is difficult to imagine. Even if the skills are not directly usable in other firms, 
one would expect that the experience of learning something new would enhance one’s 
learning ability and increase one’s knowledge base.  
  This section focuses on workplace characteristics associated with JRT or 
prestige advantages. Both can increase wage earners job possibilities and thereby reduce 
the risk of long-term unemployment. Workplaces with a lot of employees can invest in 
more training than those with few employees, because they achieve increasing returns to 
scale. The training programs at such big workplaces might also be well known and 
                                                 
8 JRT in this paper includes informal tutoring, which is different from the definition in Weatherall (2007) 
chapter 2 “Does job-related training increase future wage and mobility?” 
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acknowledged by other companies. Sørensen (2000) and Weatherall (2007) find that 
Danish workplaces with many employees on average invest more resources in training. 
Although employees in small workplaces might be trained to handle many different 
situations, employees in big workplaces are expected to be offered more JRT. 
Therefore, employees from large workplaces can expect more job offers and lower risk 
of long-term unemployment.  
  A low rate of staff turnover can increase the employer’s investment in 
training because the new skills stay at the workplace. If a spill-over effect exists, this 
situation could benefit the untrained employees. Even though little staff turnover can 
result in no new skills added at the workplace, workers from workplaces with a low rate 
of staff turnover are likely to get more JRT (Sørensen 2000; Weatherall 2007). Again 
the job offers are expected to increase and the risk of long-term unemployment is 
expected to be reduced.  
  In contrast to workplaces with many part-time workers, workplaces that 
have a high percentage of full-time workers have less total training costs because fewer 
employees need to be trained. Therefore, more training is offered, and the workers 
working full-time can gain both more training and very diverse training, because they 
have many different tasks when working full-time. Thus, coming from a workplace with 
a high percentage of full-time workers is an indirect advantage that reduces the risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. 
  Workplaces may pay high wages because their employees have been 
trained and are productive or because they want to try to compensate employees for 
very demanding jobs (e.g. physical or psychological challenging job assignments). A 
positive spiral exists if high wages are associated with productive workplaces, because 
these workplaces are expected to have resources for training. Therefore high paid 
employees become even more productive. Sørensen (2000) and Brown (1990) find that 
employees who are paid higher wages also receive more training offers. Therefore, 
workers coming from high-paying workplaces are likely to have a lower risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. Furthermore, paying high wages can signal that 
workplaces are productive, thereby giving them a good reputation, with a spill-over 
effect for the employees. At the same time, these workplaces might be productive 
because their employees already are trained, not because the workplace offers training. 
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   Industries undergoing structural change need to retrain their personnel, 
e.g. if most Danish industries outsource unskilled production due to globalisation, one 
would expect unskilled workers to have problems in finding new unskilled jobs and 
long-term unemployment can result.9 Although the overall negative quantitative impact 
of outsourcing is small, Munch (2005) finds that low-skilled workers from outsourcing 
Danish manufacturing firms have an increased risk of becoming unemployed. Other 
Danish studies show that outsourcing has a limited negative effect on the labour market 
apart from the textile industry (Geerdsen et al. 2004, Olsen et al. 2004).  
  Highly innovative industries that use high-tech equipment also need to 
continually retrain their employees. Sørensen (2000) finds that workplaces using 
advanced technology prioritise JRT. Although industries can be associated with 
exceptional physical or psychological demanding jobs, workers from innovative 
workplaces using high-tech tools are expected to constantly obtain new skills, and the 
industry is therefore associated with having qualified employees. Workers from these 
industries therefore have a low risk of long-term unemployment. Furthermore, Jones 
(1999) argues that in a very competitive consumer goods market, firms need extra good 
publicity, which they can achieve by beng socially responsible, by not firing employees, 
and by taking care of employees, e.g. by training offers. Employees are likely to benefit 
from these social initiatives. 
  The workforce composition can influence the training possibilities in a 
workplace. Even though a differentiated workforce offers the possibility of obtaining 
different skills, a homogeneous workforce makes training desirable for the employer 
because of the possibility of increasing returns to scale. In Denmark workplaces 
prioritise training for large groups of workers (Sørensen 2000). Workers at workplaces 
with homogenous workers are expected to gain new skills and therefore they have a 
lower risk of becoming long-term unemployed.  
  Finally goals, expectations and visions will likely influence employers’ 
training decisions. The literature on human resource management and organisation 
theory suggests that organizational structures and processes deeply affect occupational 
choice, skills development and job mobility (Booth and Chatteriji 1989, Lazear 1996, 
Ichniowski and Shaw 2003). Organizational cultures that foster dialogue and dissent are 
                                                 
9 This result might not be perfectly clear if production depends on total workforce structure or capital. 
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likely to increase employees’ understanding of their own capacity and their need for 
further training. Sørensen’s (2000) and Weatherall’s (2007) findings support the idea 
that workplaces offer more training when prioritising their employees’ human 
resources. Therefore, workers at such workplaces have better job opportunities, with 
less risk of becoming long-term unemployed. 
  Thus some workplace characteristics somewhat correspond to investment 
in JRT and gaining prestige. JRT and high prestige are more likely for workers from big 
productive workplaces that pay high wages and have low staff turnover. Furthermore, 
working in industries undergoing structural changes and having both a homogeneous 
workforce and a very reflective, innovative management could increase a worker’s 
informal work-related skills and prestige. Workers from such workplaces have better 
job offer rates and have a lower risk of becoming long-term unemployed. 
 
3. The employer-employee panel data and definitions 
The empirical analysis is based on a rich linked employer-employee panel, combining 
workers and their workplaces in the private sector. The panel data allows one to 
specifically identify employment periods and unemployment periods, and to follow 
workers’ histories from one workplace to another, as well as into unemployment or out 
of the labour force.  
The data consists of two parts. One part is a 10 percent sample of the 
Danish population aged 16 years and more. This panel data from 1994 to 2002 includes 
very detailed information on individual characteristics, such as; age, family status, 
educational skills, personal income and unemployment history. Especially the 
information on unemployment is very precise on a daily basis. The second part is a 
panel on workplaces. The workplace data includes rich information on industry, 
workforce composition, number of employees, etc., from 1980 to 2001. No information 
exists on employers’ goals, organisation structure and management culture. These 
factors are therefore not the focus of the empirical analysis. Statistics Denmark collects 
all the workplace characteristics annually in November. A unique identification of 
individuals and workplaces allows the matching of the two data sets.  Additionally, the 
panel structure allows me to describe the group of long-term unemployed and to analyse 
the transition into becoming long-term unemployed. In the following I describe the 
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selection of workplaces, employees, and long-term unemployed, and I describe variable 
definitions.  
 
Workplace and displacement  
Even though 1.6 million people worked annually in the Danish private sector from 
1995-2001, the analysis in this paper concentrates solely on a specific group of 
displaced workers who worked for at least one year at the same workplace of 10 
employees or more in the private sector. This allows one to separate the laid-off workers 
from the workers quitting and thereby avoids the sample selection caused by the 
correlation between workers’ separation rate and their expected job possibilities. A 
detailed description of the selection follows.  
An assessment of ‘last workplace influence’ on becoming long-term 
unemployed calls for combining certain employment periods with certain workplaces. 
As mentioned in the section 1 a workplace is defined as a legally-registered unit at a 
specific address, but some firms in the service industry are not registered as a workplace 
because the production is not associated with a specific geographical address. An 
example is the house cleaning service in which the employer sits at home and 
coordinates 10 employees, all of whom work in 10 different homes. I excluded workers 
with no physical workplace because all workplace characteristics were missing. 
Excluding these workers reduced the number of observations. However, they appear to 
be similarly distributed by year, age and separation state to the rest of the sample. 
Therefore the exclusion is not a problem with respect to the empirical analysis. A few 
characteristics are missing for a few workplaces. However, instead of excluding such 
workplaces from the analysis for a few missing observations, I have substituted the 
missing values with the average values for workplaces within the same industry, 
geographical area and year. Furthermore, for workplace characteristics to make sense 
the analysis only examines employees from workplaces with at least 10 employees 
annually.  
When assessing the influence of skills obtained at the former workplace 
on someone’s risk of becoming long-term unemployed, it is necessary to look at 
workers who have been employed for a period. For workplace characteristics to matter, 
the assumption is that the workers must be employed for at least one year at the same 
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workplace.10 For each employee, I calculate the employment period by using the 
detailed information on employment periods within the year. In the private sector, 
almost 75 percent of the employees have worked at least one year in one workplace (see 
table 1 columns 1-3). 
From 1995-2001, about 80 percent of workers had worked at least a year 
in the same workplace with at least 10 employees in the private sector stayed in the 
workplace the following year. Whereas, about 20 percent of the workers separated 
(either quitting or are laid-off) each year from 1995-2001 (see table 1 columns 4-6). 
By focusing on labour market status after displacement, I can avoid the 
problem differentiating between lay-offs and quitting. Although an extensive amount of 
literature agrees on a common verbal displacement definition, the literature uses many 
different empirical definitions of displaced workers. The verbal displacement definition 
as mentioned in section 1 consists of three parts - job loss from structural changes, 
limited chances of returning to a comparable job, and strong attachment to the former 
sector. In contrast to most US studies that use the Displaced Worker Survey, where 
workers above 20 years old are asked about job losses in the previous 5 years, this study 
uses the displacement definition of Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) and 
Browning, Danø and Heinesen (2003). A worker who separates from a workplace that 
reduced its workforce by a minimum of 30 percent from one year to another is defined 
as a displaced worker. Due to the fact that the register data on workplaces are very 
detailed, the yearly employment rate information is used to define displaced wage 
earners. Table 1 columns 7-9 show that approximately 28 percent of workers who 
separate from steady employment in the private sector are displaced on a yearly basis 
from 1995-2001. Some of the workers have been displaced more than once in the 
sample period. These individuals are excluded in the estimations, because of the 
overrepresentation of new employment. Table 2 illustrates all the workers who separate 
from their jobs and displays if their previous workplace’s number of employees 
increased or decreased in the period 1995-2001. The majority of workers clearly 
separated from workplaces that reduced their staff by between 0 to 30 percent.  
Throughout the rest of the paper “displaced workers” will refer to workers 
that have at least one year of employment in a private workplace with more than 10 
                                                 
10 Although as it turns out, changing the employment period to six months does not change the final 
results significantly. 
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employees where the workplace has reduced the number of employees by a minimum of 
30 percent from the previous year.  
The displaced worker group consists of six percent of all workers that had 
a steady job in private workplaces with a minimum of 10 employees. The characteristics 
of the workplaces that the displaced workers come from differ slightly from the average 
workplace in the private sector with more than 10 employees (see table 3). Around 80 
percent of displaced workers have worked in industries such as manufacturing, 
wholesale, transportation and finance. The same is true for the rest of the workers from 
similar workplaces. Nevertheless the transport industry and hotel and restaurant industry 
are more common for the displaced workers than for other workers.  As expected, the 
displaced workers on average originate from workplaces with fewer employees and 
have relatively fewer full-time workers. Surprisingly, the displaced workers are from 
relatively high-paying workplaces (except among managers). The workforce 
composition does not differ between workplaces that displace their employees and those 
that do not. 
 
Long-term unemployed 
International studies using detailed register data for long-term unemployment periods 
and participation in active labour market programs for insured and non-insured workers 
are scarce. These studies have used one year of unemployment as a measuring point for 
long-term unemployed (Machin & Manning 1999). I do the same, although the 
definition includes different kinds of unemployment periods. This is due to the fact that 
the available Danish register data on insured and uninsured worker benefits for 
unemployed individuals, participation in active labour market programs, post-
employment periods etc. is very detailed. It is possible to precisely calculate long-term 
unemployment periods from 1995-2001. Workers who are subsidised for reasons of 
unemployment, participation in active labour market programs or educational leave can 
receive monetary benefits only if they make themselves available to the Danish labour 
market. Thus, the long-term unemployed have to conduct a minimum amount of job-
search. Moreover, unemployment should be their main problem, in contrast to people 
receiving welfare benefits for personal problems, sickness, etc. Consequently, as 
previously mentioned, this paper defines the long-term unemployed as people receiving 
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subsidies because of unemployment, participation in active labour market programs or 
educational leave for more than one year.  
The very precise registration of subsidies allows us to observe when a 
person receives unemployment insurance for three months then has a two-week holiday 
break and then resumes receiving unemployment insurance for another nine months. 
For this paper’s analysis it does not make sense to accept a two-week holiday break as 
the end of an unemployment spell. Thus this analysis does not take such small breaks 
into account. Changing the length of the breaks from 14 days to 6 weeks does not 
change the amount of long-term unemployed significantly. Due to the fact that 
mandatory holidays in Denmark are 5 weeks in the observation period this paper 
ignores breaks less than 6 weeks (i.e. one week more than the mandatory holiday laws 
to make sure that all holidays are included). Thus, over an unemployment period, an 
individual can have small breaks and still be considered long-term unemployed. Given 
this definition and given these exclusions, 3,4 percent of workers that had worked at 
least one year became long-term unemployed after being displaced from a private 
Danish workplace with at least 10 employees from 1996 to 2001 (see table 1 columns 
10-12). 
  The percentage of displaced workers becoming long-term unemployed 
decreased from 1996 to 2001, which is a trend similar for all long-term unemployed in 
Denmark. However, the group of previously displaced workers who become long-term 
unemployed distinguish themselves from the rest of the long-term unemployed. Table 4 
shows that the percentage of women among all Danish long-term unemployed is higher 
than among the previously displaced workers who become long-term unemployed. 
Additionally, the percentage of people over 50 and couples without children is higher 
among the long-term unemployed, who were displaced, than among all long-term 
unemployed. The displaced also have a much higher previous income, even though their 
educational level is lower on average than that of other long-term unemployed. This is 
not puzzling because the displaced workers have by definition worked and had a wage 
income in the previous year, while a percentage of the rest of the long-term unemployed 
has not. Finally, the regional unemployment rate is on average lower in regions where 
previous displaced workers who become long-term unemployed live, than in regions 
where the most long-term unemployed live.  
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Transition states and sample period 
In this paper the post-employment labour market states constructed from different 
register sources are defined in the following way for each year: If a person is identified 
as a pensioner, as out of the labour force or as under education by the end of a year, then 
the person receives that status for the whole year. With respect to unemployment, 
participation in active labour market programs and educational leave, the long-term 
unemployed and short-term unemployed is defined by information on subsidised 
periods. The employed are defined as not being in any of these groups and as having at 
least one observed employment period.  
The most precise unemployment information is available from 1995. 
Therefore, the analysis will focus on transitions into long-term unemployment from 
1995 through to 2001. Lack of workplace information after 2001 is the reason for 
restricting the period to 2001. 
 
Variable definitions 
The goal is to assess, taking individual specifics and business cycles into account, 
whether displaced workers from certain workplaces have a higher risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed than others. The hypotheses concerning the former workplace 
characteristics’ influence on the risk of becoming long-term unemployed from section 2 
are implemented empirically as described in Table 5. The table shows that workplace 
observables include industry, number of employees, percentage of different 
occupational groups, average wage for white-collar workers, the average staff turnover, 
and workplace reason for closing. Individual characteristics and business cycles include 
education, occupation, tenure, age, gender family, ethnicity, income, regional 
unemployment rates, and year dummies. Although, variables such as workplace culture, 
leadership, production methods or individual preferences are not observed one ought to 
realise that such characteristics can influence decisions about training, separation and 
future job offers. 
  The simple descriptive statistics in Table 6 indicate that the average 
displaced worker who becomes long-term unemployed is different from the displaced 
worker who becomes reemployed. Among the displaced long-term unemployed 
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individuals, a high percentage had previously been employed in the manufacturing 
industry and in workplaces with low percentages of high-skilled wage earners. 
Furthermore, these workplaces, on average, paid less than comparable industries and 
had low productivity. In contrast, the displaced workers who became reemployed 
originate more from manufacturing, wholesale, financial and transportation industries 
with higher percentages of white collar workers. 
  Differences between the displaced long-term unemployed individuals and 
the displaced reemployed individuals also occur in individual characteristics. The 
reemployed included more men, remarkably fewer seniors, and more employees with 
higher education and managerial experience. In contrast, the long-term unemployed on 
average had more tenure and a higher percentage of immigrants and couples without 
children. Normally, high tenure is associated with many direct and indirect skills. 
However, having a long tenure at the same workplace can also mean that the person is 
burned out and not interested in mobility (i.e. comparable to the age effect). These 
simple descriptive statistics show differences between the displaced workers who obtain 
new employment and those who become long-term unemployed. 
 
4. Empirical model on workplace effects influencing long-term unemployment 
The data set on employers and employees makes an analysis of the correlation between 
previous workplace characteristics and the risk of becoming long-term unemployed 
after displacement possible. As mentioned earlier, the transition from being a steady 
employee, to becoming displaced and later becoming long-term unemployed instead of 
finding a new job is of interest. Figure 4 illustrates the idea visually.  
This study models the employment flow after displacement as an outcome 
of a probability model with seven possible states. The seven states are new employed, 
self-employed, short-term unemployed (10-99 percent subsidised within a year), long-
term unemployed (subsidised more than one year), pension/out of labour force, and 
unknown. Due to the fact that workplace and individual characteristics are annual, 
except for the unemployment and employment periods, a multinomial logit model is the 
best choice. The model’s outcome probabilities are defined as follows: 
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Where Y is the outcome variable that can be equal to J different outcome states (new-
employment, self-employment, long-term unemployment, short-term unemployment,  
education, out of labor force, other) and X consists of a set of observable covariates (e.g. 
age, education, family background, workplace industry, workplace number of 
employees, workplace labour force composition). The unknown parameter vector is β. 
Although the assumption about the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is a 
constraint, section 5.3 shows that this constraint is not a big problem for this study. 
Thus the risk of becoming long-term unemployed is estimated with respect to 
observables. The multinomial logit model including individual characteristics, local 
business cycles and workplace characteristics is called the `extended model´. However, 
for comparative reasons, a multinomial logit model including only individual 
characteristics and local business cycles is also estimated. The latter is named the basic 
model. Individual and workplace specific unobservable characteristics are not taken into 
account because there are not enough workers with multiple displacement histories and 
there are not enough workers in each workplace. 
     
5. Findings: last workplace characteristics influence long-term unemployment 
The point is to learn whether workplace characteristics influence a wage earner’s risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. Where long-term unemployment is the unfavourable 
state and a new job is the favourable state. Consequently, the discussion of the results in 
Table 7 focus on the difference in becoming long-term unemployed and getting a new 
job after displacement.  
 First, I compare the results for individual and local business cycle 
variables in the extended model to previous studies. Second, I discuss the results for the 
workplace characteristics. Third, I compare the extended model to the basic model  
showing that workplace characteristics add an extra dimension to the risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed. 
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Individual characteristics and regional business cycles  
The results from the extended model appear in Table 7.11 As in previous studies, the 
results show that workers’ individual characteristics and the regional economic situation 
influence the risk of becoming long-term unemployed compared to finding a new job 
after displacement.  
According to the empirical findings, having no formal education compared 
to a vocational education or a further education increases a person’s risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed after displacement. This result corresponds with the results of 
Addison and Portugal (1987), Portugal and Addison (2000) and Obben et al. (2002), 
who find that unskilled workers have an increased risk of having long unemployment 
durations. Indeed, skills in form of formal education appear to matter for displaced 
workers’ future job opportunities. However the occupational groups, which also 
indicate a worker’s human capital, are only significant at a 20 percent level. Having 
worked as an unskilled worker, as opposed to a white-collar worker increases the risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. Even though it is plausible that there is a combined 
effect of formal education and occupational group, I exclude the interaction term from 
the model because of insignificance across all exit states.   
The high risk of becoming long-term unemployed found among seniors 
correlates with findings by Nickell (1979) and Portugal and Addison (2000). That 
productivity or preferences for work decrease with age, and thereby reduce the 
likelihood of starting new employment after displacement. 
The results also show a negative correlation between the risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed and being a parent living in a couple and previously having had 
a high income. These results somewhat confirm the findings of Addison and Portugal 
(1987), indicating that economic incentives and family status influence job decisions 
after displacement. 
  Moreover, the results from the extended model show that being either a 
woman or an immigrant increases the risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Again, 
these findings correspond to Addison and Portugal (1987), Portugal and Addison (2000) 
and Oben et al. (2002) with exception of the latter that finds women have less risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed.  
                                                 
11 All the variables included in the final model are significant between at least two exit states 
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Besides the good correspondence between the results of individual 
characteristics in the extended model and other studies, the local unemployment rate has 
the expected counter cyclical effect on becoming long-term unemployed.  
Despite the differences among studies in the definition of “long-term 
unemployment” the significance of the individual characteristics and the regional 
business cycles remain similar to previous findings in Denmark and in the US.  
  
Workplace characteristics  
The central result of the extended model is that many workplace characteristics have 
significant effects on the risk of becoming long-term unemployed after displacement. 
Moreover, the likelihood ratio test for all workplace characteristics equalling zero is 
simultaneously rejected.12 In other words, when the likelihood ratio of the extended 
model is compared to the likelihood ratio of the basic model (in table 8) the extended 
model is preferred.  
  As expected being displaced from a workplace with few employees 
increase the risk of becoming long-term unemployed compared to entering a new job. 
The disadvantage for small workplaces could result either from few skills, ` outdated´ 
skills, or unknown skills. However, Sørensen’s (2000) and Weatherall’s (2007) findings 
on small companies investing relatively few resources in training indicate that the risk 
of long-term unemployment is due to too little training at small workplaces. 
  Instead of showing the expected positive correlation between low rates of 
staff turnover and getting a new job, the results indicate a negative correlation. 
Therefore, coming from a workplace with high staff turnover reduces the risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed after displacement. Apparently workers have to obtain 
new skills or develop new abilities from working with new colleagues and therefore 
reduce their risk of becoming long-term unemployed.  
  Workers from workplaces with a high percentage of full-time workers do 
not have a significantly better chance of becoming reemployed after displacement. 
Apparently the employer’s investment in training is not positively correlated with the 
amount of full-time wage earners involved in each year.  
                                                 
12 Likelihood ratio test value 2(log likelihood of the extended model – log likelihood of basic model) is 
distributed as the χ2 – distribution with 114 degrees of freedom =>  χ2 (114) = 863.674 , Prob> χ2 = 
0.000. 
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  The group of white-collar colleagues with and without managerial 
obligations at the last workplace is important for the risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed. A worker from a workplace with a low percentage of white-collar 
colleagues who are relatively well paid compared to other white-collar workers in the 
same industry and geographical area have a high risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed after displacement. A higher percentage of white-collar colleagues 
evidently increase the possibility of training, thereby increasing human capital and 
increasing the arrival rate of job offers for workers displaced from such workplaces. On 
the other hand, the negative influence of high wages among white-collar workers 
indicates that the high wages that white-collar workers receive mainly are due to very 
demanding job assignments not to improved skills or productivity from training. 
Nevertheless, previous interactions with white-collar workers are important for the risk 
of becoming long-term unemployed.   
 Workers coming from manufacturing industries clearly have a high risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed as opposed to finding a new job. Due to the fact that 
the manufacturing industry in Denmark has outsourced quite an amount of unskilled 
jobs over the last decade, one might expect that such industries, for survival purpose, 
need to train their employees. This increases the industries’ employees’ human capital 
and therefore the employees have job possibilities. On the other hand, one might expect 
that workers from the manufacturing industry have outdated skills because their work 
tasks have been outsourced. This reduces job opportunities after displacement. 
Furthermore, industries that are very innovative and use high-tech equipment are 
expected to invest in training because the working tasks in these industries change 
constantly. Specific results confirm this expectation. On the other hand,  regardless of 
the reason why  a workplace closes (e.g. outsourced, foreign take over or absorption in 
the sister office) the closure does not influence the risk of long-term unemployment for 
the displaced workers. 
 To sum up, the displaced workers have a relatively high risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed if they have previously worked in small workplaces in the 
manufacturing industry. Furthermore, being displaced from workplaces having 
relatively low percentages of white-collar workers and a low turnover rate of employees 
increases the risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Finally, being displaced from 
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workplaces paying white-collar workers relatively high wages increases the risk of 
long-term unemployment. Thus, the composition and level of payment for white-collar 
workers in the previous workplace significantly affects the long-term unemployment 
risk.  
A comparison of the findings from the extended model in this paper to the 
findings on workplace investment in JRT result in a clear common pattern. Some of the 
JRT findings such as Sørensen (2000), Weatherall (2007) and Brown (1990) find that 
the investment in JRT is prioritised in large workplaces that use advanced technology 
and give employees’ human resources a high priority. Additionally, JRT is to a higher 
extent offered to large homogeneous groups of employees at the workplace especially if 
they already have some formal skills (e.g. high percentage of white-collar workers). 
Hence the workplace characteristics that reduce a worker’s risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed are similar to the workplace characteristics that are positively correlated 
with workplaces’ investment in JRT (Sørensen 2000; Brown 1990; Weatherall 2007).  
 
Test of the extended model and prediction  
In the previous section, the findings rely on two assumptions. The first assumption is 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Suppose, for example, that one of the 
transition states is removed from the model; the relative probability between becoming 
long-term unemployed and getting a new job after displacement should not change if 
the IIA is fulfilled. The second assumption is that the extended model - including 
individual characteristics, local business cycles and workplace characteristics - 
describes the transition into long-term unemployment better than the basic model (not 
including workplace characteristics). Fortunately, the following tests and predictions 
show that assuming IIA and the superiority of the extended model is reasonable.  
Under the IIA assumption, no systematic change in the coefficient is 
expected if, for example the transition state `self-employment´ is excluded from the 
model. Therefore, the extended model is re-estimated excluding the self-employment 
outcome and afterwards a Hausman-Mcfadden test against the full extended model is 
performed. The test statistics under the alternative hypothesis of IIA violation is a test of 
systematic differences in the coefficients for all transition states except self-
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employment.13 Table 9 shows that four out of five tests can not reject the IIA 
assumption.   
Even though the extended model seems to fulfil the IIA assumption, it 
might be the case that some outcome categories should be combined (e.g. long-term and 
short-term unemployed as one exit state). Therefore I test if any of the outcome 
categories can be combined by the Wald statistic.14This test is done for all outcome 
categories in pairs and the test results are illustrated in Table 10. The results of the Wald 
tests clearly show that the outcome categories should not be collapsed.  
There are at least three reasons why the extended model is good at 
modelling displaced workers risk of becoming long-term unemployed. First, the 
estimation results in table 7 shows that the multinomial logit model does not have 
problems in finding structure and that most of the coefficients are significantly different 
from the base category (i.e. new employment). Some coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero or the base category which to a certain extent is due to the sample 
size (i.e. the displaced long-term unemployed is relatively small in a 10 percent sample 
of the Danish population). Second, the Hausman-McFadden test of IIA in Table 9 
shows that the assumption of IIA is weakly accepted, which also supports the structure 
of the extended model. Third, the Wald tests in Table 10 illustrated that none of the 
outcome categories should be collapsed, which once more supports the structure of the 
extended model. 
In section 5.1 the likelihood ratio test was in favour of the extended model 
versus the basic model. By looking at the average prediction in a sample - goodness of 
fit - it is possible to see if the estimated model can distinguish between different exit 
states after displacement. Tables 11 and 12 illustrate the goodness of fit for the extended 
model as well as the basic model. The tables show the average predicted exit risk with 
respect to the actual exit state. Not surprisingly do the average predicted values to a 
certain extent correspond to the sample distribution of different outcomes regardless of 
which model results one examines. Notable is that the diagonal (except for the short-
term unemployed) are the highest average predicted values, which indicate that the 
                                                 
13 The test is distributed χ2 and computed as: H=(βno_selfemploed – βfull_model)’(Vno_selfemploed – Vfull_model)-1 
(βno_selfemploed – βfull_model).  
14 The test is χ2 distributed and computed as: W= (βshort-term unemployed – βlong-term unemployed)2/var(βshort-term 
unemployed -βloong-term unemployed).  
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model can separate between the different outcomes. However, the goodness of fit is no 
guidance for choosing between the extended model and the basic model because no 
clear model differences occur.   
Another way to compare the extended model with the basic model is to 
show the predictive power of the two models. A model predicts well if it has few type I 
and type II errors. A type I error is when the model fails to predict a displaced worker to 
be a long-term unemployed individual if the worker is a long-term unemployed 
individual. A type II error is when the model predicts a displaced worker to be a long-
term unemployed individual although he or she is not. For simplicity and 
interpretational comfort the predictions in this paper concerns long-term unemployed 
workers compared to the rest of the workers’ exit states. Consequently this study 
assumes a cut off point that matches the distribution of long-term unemployed workers 
in the sample, which is 3,43 percent out of 22.826 individuals. In other words the 
individuals among the 3,43 percent highest predicted values are expected to become 
long-term unemployed.15 Tables 13 and 14 illustrate the predictive results of both the 
extended and the basic model. Even though it is clear that both models suffer from type 
I and type II errors, the results show that the extended model is better in predicting 
displaced workers to become long-term unemployed individuals than the basic model. 
Suppose the cut of point is different, for example 10 percent, then the correctly 
predicted long-term unemployed will increase. However, changing the cut off point is 
combined with a trade off because the proportion of correctly predicted non-long-term 
unemployed individuals will decline.  
Receiver Operating Cost (ROC) curves is another measure of 
predictability. By using ROC curves the problem of finding the correct cut off point is 
overcome because the curve illustrates the correctly predicted outcomes for all cut off 
points. Figure 4 illustrates the idea of the ROC-curve. On the y-axis is the fraction of 
correctly predicted long-term unemployed and on the x-axis is the corresponding 
fraction of incorrect predicted long-term unemployed. A high fraction of correctly 
predicted long-term unemployed combined simultaneously with a low fraction of 
incorrectly predicted long-term unemployed is best. Therefore the best models should 
be very close to the line called perfect fit. A bad model has a ROC- curve close to the 
                                                 
15 Assuming the outcome is 1 for becoming long-term unemployed and 0 for non-long-term unemployed. 
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diagonal. For comparing different models the Accuracy Ratio (AR) of the ROC-curve is 
applied. AR is calculated as the ratio of the area α below the ROC-curve and the 
diagonal and the area β below the perfect fit line and the diagonal. A high AR indicates 
a well predicted model.  
 Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the ROC-curves for the basic model and the 
extended model. The ROC-curves consist of clusters of observations because the class 
variables are continuous and there are 22.826 observations. Therefore it is difficult to 
see if the extended model is a better predictor than the basic model. Instead I calculate 
the area under the ROC-curve for both models (see table 15). Due to the very uneven 
distribution of long-term unemployed and non-long-term unemployed, neither the 
extended model nor the basic model predicts perfectly. However, the extended model 
including workplace characteristics has an ROC-area of 0.78, which is 0.02 bigger than 
the ROC-area for the basic model that only includes individual characteristics and local 
business cycles. The difference is statistically significant.  
 All tests on the extended model versus the basic model are in favour of the 
extended model. Thus workplace characteristics are important to account for when 
evaluating displaced workers risk of becoming long-term unemployed.  
 
Discussion 
The results of this study clearly show that individual characteristics and workplace 
characteristics influence the risk of becoming long-term unemployed after displacement. 
A concern in all empirical studies is whether or not the observable characteristics 
actually influence the risk of becoming long-term unemployed because it is possible 
that the observables actually are a cover up for some other important factors.  
Previous literature has shown that the job separation decisions are very 
much correlated with workers’ future job opportunities. Thus this study has taken the 
worker specific effect concerning workers risk of separating from a workplace into 
account by just looking at the displaced workers. 
In this analysis one could also worry about other worker specific effects 
and workplace specific effects that are not accounted for in the estimation. For example 
it is possible that initial ability among workers determines if a worker receives training 
and prestige or certain organizational structures and workplace philosophies that 
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determine if workplaces offer training. On the other hand, due to the rich Danish data, a 
lot of potential factors that could influence the risk of ending up in long-term 
unemployment are taken into account. Worries about the variation due to workers and 
workplaces specific effects are left for future research.  
 One might argue that reemployment after displacement might not be the 
ultimate success criteria for a displaced worker. Displacement can cause future wage 
reduction, as well as physical and psychological costs of changing jobs. These factors, 
despite being important are not examined in this paper. 
For many years Danish policy makers have had the impression that certain 
population groups with certain individual characteristics (e.g. no educational skills, 
seniors, and immigrants) have a higher risk of becoming long-term unemployed than 
other population groups. To prevent long-term unemployment authorities have 
encouraged all the unemployed with no education or short education to participate in 
new education either through regular studies or active labor market programs. 
Furthermore, at the end of the 1990’s, Danish policy makers took initiatives to focus on 
JRT at workplaces by subsidizing JRT initiatives, but without focusing on certain 
workplaces or industries.  
  Proof that the extended model is superior to the basic model should give a 
new source of inspiration to prevent workers from ending up in long-term 
unemployment.  Thus more political focus should be on training received at certain 
workplaces. The analysis can inspire new labour market initiatives that focus on work 
conditions for people with short periods of education in certain industries with certain 
characteristics instead of active labour market programs for workers already 
unemployed, which is currently the case.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has two main conclusions based on the very rich Danish register-based panel 
data analysis. First, the findings confirm results in previous literature that show 
individual characteristics can influence the risk of becoming long-term unemployed. 
Especially being older, a woman, an immigrant, having no education or family increase 
a displaced workers risk of becoming long-term unemployed.  
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Second, this analysis contributes to the literature by arguing that former 
workplace influence transitions into long-term unemployment after displacement. The 
importance of the last workplace could be due to skills gained through JRT at the 
workplace or due to prestige from working in a well recognised workplace. The results 
specifically show that being displaced from small manufacturing workplaces with low 
shares of well paid skilled employees and a low turnover rate is a disadvantage and 
increases the risk of becoming long-term unemployed.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Danish workforce more than 16 years of age, 1995-2001 
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Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001 
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Figure 2. The fraction of male workers with no education staying unemployed 
after separating from a workplace with at least 10 employees in the private sector, 
1995-2001. 
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Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
The survivor function –staying unemployed- is calculated over the full sample and 
evaluated at indicated days. By using the Wilcoxon (Breslow) test I test if coming from 
workplaces with different amounts of employees change the survivor function. The test 
statistics is compared with a χ2 – distribution with 2 degrees of freedom (chi2(2)=11.79 
Pr>chi2=0,0027). The test rejects that the survivor function for different sized 
workplaces are equal. 
 
 
Figure 3. The transition possibilities after being displaced  
 
  New wage earner employment 
  Self-employed 
  Short-term unemployed 
Employment(1)    ⇒       Displaced(2)    ⇒ Long-term unemployed (3) 
  Education 
  Pension/Out of labour force 
  Unknown 
(1) Employed at least one year in a private workplace with at least 10 employees 
(2) Number of employees reduced at least 30 percent from the previous year 
(3) At least one year on benefits, due to unemployment, activation or educational leave 
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Figure 4. Illustrating the ROC-curve idea  
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Note: The shade area is not included in the calculation of Accuracy Ratio 
 
Figure 5. The ROC curve for the extended model 
 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001.
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Figure 6. The ROC curve for the basic model 
 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Employees in the private sector with at least 10 employees, yearly 
averages in the period 1995-2001.  
T T -> T+1 T+1 
Employed  Separations  Firm development Displaced once 
 Pct
. 
#  Pct
. 
#  Pct
. 
#  Pct. # 
Steady 
employmen
t 
74 54405
6 
Separate
s 
20 10863
2 
Displace
d 
28 30779 New 
employ. 
81,
6 
18631 
         Self-
employ. 
1,3 283 
         Unempl. 4,3 990 
         Long-
term 
unempl. 
3,4 782 
         Educatio
n 
1,1 238 
         Out of 
labour 
force 
6,9 1576 
         Without 
category 
1,4 326 
         Displace
d twice 
- 7953 
      Other 72 77853 . - 77853 
   Stay 81 43602
4 
 - 43602
4 
 - 43602
4 
Other  
employed 
26 
 
18763
3 
 - 18763
3 
 - 18763
3 
 - 18763
3 
Total 10
0 
73228
9 
 10
0 
73228
9 
 10
0 
73228
9 
 100 73228
9 
Note: At time T I select the group of workers from private workplaces with at least 10 employees, who have been 
working at least one year at the workplace. If the worker is displaced from one year to the next (T-> T+1) he or she 
stays in the sample. The workers status at time T+1 determines the categorisation of the exit state. The final 
displacement sample is reduced because of exclusion of workers displaced more than ones. 
 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
 
Table 2. Yearly percentage change in number of employees at workplaces, where 
workers separated from, 1995-2001.  
Percentage change in numbers of employees from year to year. Percent
Increase 30+ pct 4,52
Increase 0-30 pct 30,8
Decrease 0-30 pct 36,34
Decrease 30+ pct 13,08
Closed workplace 6,74
No employees information in the following year 8,52
Total 100
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 3. All workplaces in the private sector with at least 10 employees, 1995-2001 
Variables  Private workplaces with 
more than 10 employees 
Private workplaces with 
more than 10 employees, 
where they have displaced  
wage earners 
# employees 10-19 employees 17,89  21,94  
 20-99 employees 40,42  40,94  
 100-499 employees 41,69  37,11  
 Total pct. 100  100  
Industry Hotel & restaurant 2,47  5,15  
 Manufacturing etc. 35,78  29,02  
 Electricity 0,93  1,00  
 Construction 7,53  8,24  
 Wholesale 20,09  18,94  
 Agriculture etc. 0,90  0,89  
 Transport 7,80  11,80  
 Finance 15,40  17,94  
 Service (& Int. Org) 9,10  7,02  
 Total pct. 100  100  
Reason for closing Workplace internal absorbed 0,44  3,13  
 Workplace external absorbed 0,90  5,87  
 Other 98,66  91,00  
 Total pct. 100  100  
  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Productivity Productivity 0,654 0,247 0,610 0,254 
Workforce 
composition 
Share of unskilled workers 12,174 16,358 12,567 17,378 
 Share of skilled workers 46,233 27,942 42,782 27,787 
 Share of white-collar workers 17,126 17,410 18,053 19,082 
 Share of managerial staff 14,745 17,147 14,139 17,160 
Wage Workplace average unskilled wage 
difference  
-0,777 32,104 2,163 30,502 
 Workplace average skilled wage 
difference 
0,088 29,712 4,115 33,256 
 Workplace average white-collar wage 
difference 
-1,185 42,732 2,788 43,766 
 Workplace average managerial wage 
difference 
0,563 77,978 0,375 75,248 
Reemployed Reemployment rate 73,839 16,924 67,183 22,460 
Note: The two groups of workplaces are tested significantly different, except with respect to “workplace average 
managerial wage difference”. 
 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 4. All long-term unemployed and the displaced long-term unemployed 
coming from steady employment in private workplaces with at least 10 employees 
Variables  All long-term 
unemployed 
“displaced” long-term 
unemployed 
Individual char. Males  38,16  51,23  
 Females  61,84  48,77  
 Total pct. 100  100  
 <31 years 16,40  15,59  
 31-50 years 48,35  45,02  
 50+ years 35,25  39,39  
 Total pct. 100  100  
 Single 29,36  27,43  
 Single with child 6,94  3,40  
 Couples 36,54  45,25  
 Couples with children 27,16  23,92  
 Total pct. 100  100  
 Basic edu. 44,15  46,42  
 Vocational edu. 38,18  40,91  
 Further edu. 17,67  12,66  
 Total pct. 100  100  
 Danes 89,04  89,45  
 Immigrants 10,56  10,55  
 New Danes 0,40  0,00  
 Total pct. 100  100  
  Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev. 
 A-income total 147168,2 31303,45 226947,3 79321,75 
 Tenure 5,403 3,584 5,634 5,230 
      
 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 5. Controls and workplace characteristics implemented empirically  
Characteristics from section 2.2. Variables in the data 
Individual characteristics and business cycles  
Formal skills Basic education (reference group) 
Vocational training 
Further education 
Occupation Unskilled worker 
Skilled worker 
White-collar worker 
Managerial worker 
Tenure Tenure at workplace (years) 
Seniority Age 15-30 (reference group) 
Age 31-50 
Age 51+ 
Family Status Single (reference group) 
Single parent  
Couple 
Couple and parent 
Gender 
 
Ethnicity 
Man (reference group) 
Woman 
Dane (reference group) 
Immigrant  
Business cycles Regional unemployment rate (Amt) 
Year dummies 
Former workplace characteristics  
Many employees Number of employees 100 + (reference group) 
Number of employees 20-99 
Number of employees 10-19 
A low rate of staff turnover Pct. of the employees from the year before that remained 
High ratio of full-time wage earners Production in man-years devided by number of 
employees  
High wage The difference between the average wage given to 
white-collar employees in the workplace and the average 
wage given to white-collar employees in the industry  
Industries Hotel & Restaurant (reference group) 
Manufacturing etc. 
Electricity and gas 
Construction 
Wholesale 
Agricultural etc. 
Transport 
Finance 
Service 
International Organizations 
Closure Firm bought internal, externale, other or missing 
Source: Weatherall (2007)
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics on displaced workers, 1995-2001.  
Variables  Reemployed  Long-term 
unemployed 
 χ2-test  
equality 
Individual char. Males  65,95  50,77  - 
 Females  34,05  49,23  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  reject 
 <31 years 33,98  15,47  - 
 31-50 years 50,51  46,68  - 
 50+ years 15,51  37,85  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  reject 
 Single 29,98  27,62  - 
 Single with child 2,40  3,58  - 
 Couples 31,76  44,12  - 
 Couples with children 35,86  24,68  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  reject 
 Basic edu. 33,36  46,68  - 
 Vocational edu. 45,62  40,41  - 
 Further edu. 21,02  12,92  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  reject 
 W-E unskilled 20,69  26,09  - 
 W-E skilled 43,57  52,69  - 
 W-E  white collar 22,23  14,07  - 
 W-E managerial 13,51  7,16  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  reject 
 Danes 96,08  89,00  - 
 Immigrants 3,92  11,00  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  Reject 
  Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev. T-test 
equality 
 A-income total 271638,2 149884 224405,3 78745,63 reject 
 Tenure 4,675 4,578 5,939 5,336 reject 
 Regional unemployment 5,874 4,062 6,852 3,991 Reject 
Variables 
 
    Χ2-test  
equality 
Workplace char. 10-19 employees 20,99  23,27  - 
 20-99 employees 41,40  38,49  - 
 100-499 employees 37,61  38,24  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  Accept 
 Hotel & restaurant 4,92  4,73  - 
 Manufacturing etc. 27,07  50,90  - 
 Electricity 1,02  1,41  - 
 Construction 8,38  3,84  - 
 Wholesale 19,61  15,09  - 
 Agriculture etc. 0,79  0,26  - 
 Transport 12,41  7,42  - 
 Finance 19,18  9,85  - 
 Service (int. org) 6,61  6,52  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  reject 
 Workplace internal absorbed 3,17  3,07  - 
 Workplace external absorbed 5,68  6,14  - 
 Other 91,15  90,7  - 
 Total pct. 100  100  accept 
  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. T-test 
equality 
 Ratio of full-time workers 0,619 0,220 0,612 0,225 Reject 
 Share of unskilled workers 12,157 16,510 15,996 19,564 Reject 
 Share of skilled workers 42,116 27,673 47,207 27,997 Reject 
 Share of white-collar workers 29,120 19,610 13,887 15,280 Reject 
 Share of managerial staff 14,743 17,518 10,782 14,015 Reject 
 Workplace average white-collar 
wage difference 
3,661 44,059 0,207 43,349 Reject 
 Reemployment rate 67,497 22,348 71,210 20,653 reject 
 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 7: The extended model. New employment is reference group, 1995-2001. 
  Long-term u. Std. Err.   Short-term u. Std. Err.   Self-employed Std. Err.   
Man ref.   ref.   Ref.   
Woman 0,6292017 0,0855581 *** 0,3625662 0,0768522 *** -0,9642466 0,1706512 *** 
Age 15-30 ref.   ref.   Ref.   
Age 31-50 1,286488 0,124864 *** 0,3911996 0,0907467 *** 0,5306753 0,1673221 *** 
Age 51+ 2,143585 0,1343712 *** 0,7777636 0,1117496 *** 0,4471771 0,2267433 ** 
Single ref.   ref.   Ref.   
Single parent 0,140215 0,2195588  0,1174947 0,202787  0,6419012 0,3926778 * 
Couple -0,0888381 0,0990021  -0,0649174 0,088694  0,0899581 0,1741445  
Couple parent -0,4503722 0,1127221 *** -0,2442556 0,0933938 *** 0,1418598 0,1679637  
Basic edu. ref.   ref.   Ref.   
Vocational edu. -0,2188396 0,085368 *** -0,1185249 0,0750354  -0,0279949 0,1454467  
Further edu. -0,2214746 0,1328986 * -0,2443468 0,1231917 ** -0,229115 0,197332  
W.E. unskil. ref.   ref.   Ref.   
W.E. skilled 0,1145267 0,1105222  0,1126629 0,0962736  -0,427517 0,185832 ** 
W.E. whi.col. -0,1962046 0,1438416  -0,1708068 0,1333331  -0,1207542 0,2262666  
W.E. manager 0,2092589 0,1886425  -0,2303683 0,1787771  0,5555038 0,2299703 ** 
Tenure 0,0017108 0,0081465  -0,0173062 0,0083108 ** 0,0102872 0,0156448  
Dane ref.   ref.   Ref.   
Immigrant 1,128358 0,1307627 *** 0,6952556 0,1292238 *** 0,2250376 0,2702676  
Income(A) -4,43E-06 5,83E-07 *** -1,82E-06 4,51E-07 *** 6,14E-07 2,57E-07 ** 
Regional UI 0,1335611 0,0229076 *** 0,0976216 0,0217294 *** 0,0408993 0,0385823  
1995 ref.   ref.   Ref.   
1996 -0,4202642 0,1594369 *** -0,1559314 0,1414704  0,197608 0,2537448  
1997 -0,2418766 0,1652348  -0,0901825 0,1498598  0,2673739 0,2634232  
1998 -0,0773933 0,1811726  0,0451234 0,1612583  0,2514397 0,2896989  
1999 -0,1412385 0,1994819  0,0361004 0,1770505  -0,0042924 0,3213028  
2000 0,1801801 0,2981863  0,6419876 0,2672153 ** 0,2468671 0,4832693  
No.emp 100+ ref.   ref.   Ref.   
No.emp 20-99 -0,0259092 0,0898916  0,041491 0,0805073  0,3221844 0,174288 * 
No.emp 10-19 0,2538613 0,1103642 ** 0,3109446 0,096381 *** 1,006243 0,1804411 *** 
Hotel & restaurant ref.   ref.   Ref.   
Manufacturing etc. 0,9873956 0,1952957 *** 1,222574 0,1825145 *** -0,079968 0,2973544  
Electricity 0,879844 0,3759997 ** 0,5553113 0,4573751  -31,36082 4886123  
Construction -0,2470216 0,2664871  0,8724579 0,2038902 *** 0,5083548 0,3157936 * 
Wholesale 0,2622327 0,2042328  0,3321716 0,1904567 * -0,1085461 0,2846017  
Agriculture etc. -1,190963 0,7416252 * 0,8980367 0,3107682 *** 0,9419132 0,4057836 ** 
Transport -0,0113959 0,2310327  0,0866555 0,2163787  -0,3150583 0,340449  
Finance 0,092983 0,2224478  0,218971 0,209373  0,1960403 0,2949197  
Service 0,1322402 0,2347264  0,5414847 0,2162402 ** 0,2644679 0,318429  
Ratio full-time w.e. -0,2052592 0,2580361  0,1906102 0,1064012 * -0,9461731 0,3935732 ** 
Pct.skilled emp. 0,0004273 0,0030656  -0,0016327 0,0024728  -0,0088098 0,0042155 ** 
Pct.manager -0,0140028 0,0043692 *** -0,0075334 0,0036207 ** -0,0215194 0,0056862 *** 
Pct.unskilled emp. 0,0035019 0,0031863  0,0033127 0,0026325  -0,0149776 0,0048532 *** 
Pct.white collar emp. -0,0075638 0,0039649 * -0,0221446 0,0036641 *** -0,01412 0,0054761 *** 
Av.wage dif. Whi.col. 0,0044145 0,0010006 *** 0,0020708 0,0009194 ** -0,0010111 0,0015359  
Pct. reemployed 0,0047603 0,0022433 ** 0,0003488 0,0017424  -0,007029 0,0031045 ** 
Internal absorbed ref.   ref.   Ref.   
External absorbed 0,2510562 0,26563  0,3672714 0,2349214  0,7853126 0,5019383  
Other 0,1461015 0,2201684  0,1343184 0,1971956  0,2429031 0,4570774  
Constant -4,760801 0,4534903 *** -4,08172 0,4082536 *** -3,601324 0,7369304 *** 
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 Continued Education Std. Err.   Out of Labor Force Std. Err.   No category Std. Err.   
Man ref.   ref.   ref.   
Woman 0,1704787 0,1437238  0,4783565 0,0610758 *** 0,0134372 0,1296913  
Age 15-30 ref.   ref.   ref.   
Age 31-50 -0,6807569 0,2707217 ** -0,007639 0,0806699  0,0916532 0,1440156  
Age 51+ -30,42967 1002580  1,441145 0,0844497 *** 0,289463 0,1920579  
Single ref.   ref.   ref.   
Single parent -0,7821477 0,7325537  0,2934434 0,1808553 * -0,3783551 0,4044694  
Couple 0,2152844 0,1673133  0,1610802 0,072098 ** -0,3905351 0,1458981 *** 
Couple parent -0,6835957 0,2721625 ** 0,0650547 0,0828259  -0,620878 0,1530085 *** 
Basic edu. ref.   ref.   ref.   
Vocational edu. -0,096936 0,1834329  -0,1473733 0,0628057 ** -0,0291642 0,1352984  
Further edu. 0,3576159 0,2463856  -0,0333092 0,0912307  0,3082329 0,171965 * 
W.E. unskil. ref.   ref.   ref.   
W.E. skilled -0,2642311 0,1743747  -0,2844845 0,0777263 *** -0,3978938 0,1646115 ** 
W.E. whi.col. -0,5077023 0,3113765 * -0,4207682 0,1008646 *** -0,5096536 0,2085771 ** 
W.E. manager 0,1286812 0,3468145  -0,1795232 0,125234  -0,7100157 0,2480199 *** 
Tenure -0,1397693 0,05739 ** 0,0147091 0,0061438 ** -0,0400038 0,0162116 ** 
Dane ref.   ref.   ref.   
Immigrant -0,7472671 0,3801065 ** 0,651524 0,1088167 *** 0,8177899 0,2001377 *** 
Income(A) -0,0000178 1,55E-06 *** -2,35E-06 3,58E-07 *** 5,95E-07 2,84E-07 ** 
Regional UI 0,16315 0,0421427 *** 0,0663854 0,0169859 *** 0,0563204 0,0366835  
1995 ref.   ref.   ref.   
1996 0,7216069 0,3089008 ** -0,0438997 0,1148285  0,5558664 0,2550139 ** 
1997 0,8076691 0,3212709 ** 0,0695582 0,1189612  0,6718519 0,2634891 ** 
1998 1,218597 0,3462822 *** 0,0820774 0,1314644  0,6351554 0,2876167 ** 
1999 1,202484 0,3768602 *** -0,0719624 0,1449653  0,2284927 0,3272717  
2000 1,901699 0,5670406 *** 0,1577431 0,2157781  0,4791271 0,4759631  
No.emp 100+ ref.   ref.   ref.   
No.emp 20-99 -0,1060066 0,1824119  -0,1828563 0,0659994 *** -0,1669278 0,1345854  
No.emp 10-19 -0,0527243 0,205828  0,0107694 0,0787385  0,0682737 0,1629568  
Hotel & restaurant ref.   ref.   ref.   
Manufacturing etc. 0,3846668 0,2708424  0,3358914 0,1292318 *** 0,7032847 0,3098589 ** 
Electricity -29,0853 3785772  0,2291691 0,2869659  0,633679 0,6632897  
Construction 0,5593833 0,3891464  0,0652528 0,1596751  0,2881988 0,3676216  
Wholesale -0,009282 0,2336472  0,0499936 0,1298789  0,2216987 0,3166142  
Agriculture etc. 0,6385717 0,4839659  -0,2715438 0,339222  1,404067 0,4660323 *** 
Transport 0,7049859 0,2962486 ** 0,1219219 0,1457853  0,5135579 0,3314301  
Finance 0,2954307 0,2512588 ** 0,0021126 0,1407039  0,2629513 0,3303818  
Service 0,4098838 0,274814  0,4306703 0,141504 *** 0,2136956 0,3696963  
Ratio full-time w.e. -1,734668 0,4871071 *** -0,587107 0,1796918 *** 0,1444489 0,1569085  
Pct.skilled emp. -0,002896 0,0042993  0,001132 0,0020559  -0,0018977 0,0042765  
Pct.manager 0,0004496 0,0069108  -0,0049837 0,0027664 * -0,0013806 0,0054192  
Pct.unskilled emp. 0,0040049 0,0049713  -0,0041201 0,0022577  -0,0119104 0,0051278 ** 
Pct.white collar emp. 0,0021617 0,0065304  -0,0079615 0,0026761 *** -0,009066 0,0052118 * 
Av.wage dif. Whi.col. 0,0017476 0,0019284  -0,0010308 0,0007915  0,0012821 0,0013825  
Pct. reemployed 0,0033891 0,0037286  -0,0026871 0,0014944 * 0,0018499 0,0029344  
Internal absorbed ref.   ref.   ref.   
External absorbed 1,71856 0,7557436 ** 0,0067086 0,1876489  0,4988842 0,3432329  
Other 0,9940085 0,7237286  -0,1130519 0,1532054  -0,1826359 0,3009289  
constant -3,159772 0,9534126 *** -2,090547 0,3074217 *** -4,420342 0,6711094 *** 
Note: No. obs = 22826 ; Log likelihood = -15578.063 ; Pseydo R2 =0.1075 Source: Danish register-based employer-employee 
panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 8. The basic model 
 Long-term unemployed Short-term unemployed Self-employed 
  Coefficient Std. Err.   Coefficient Std. Err.   Coefficient Std. Err.   
Man ref.   ref.   ref.   
Woman 0,516816 0,0812574 *** 0,1530326 0,0724299 ** -0,8791556 0,165288 *** 
Age 15-30 ref.   ref.   ref.   
Age 31-50 1,32404 0,1230237 *** 0,4493884 0,0901595 *** 0,2880542 0,1600194 * 
Age 51+ 2,172798 0,1317167 *** 0,8229573 0,1102284 *** 0,2300145 0,2174575  
Single ref.   ref.   ref.   
Single parent 0,1518846 0,2178361  0,2071723 0,2001838  0,5509128 0,3878797  
Couple -0,0493018 0,0980232  -0,0187785 0,0879428  -0,0233709 0,1702971  
Couple parent -0,372671 0,1117212 *** -0,1536185 0,0928927 * 0,0397464 0,1634922  
Basic edu. ref.   ref.   ref.   
Vocational edu. -0,2914432 0,0837519 *** -0,1758994 0,0737552 ** -0,0034003 0,141834  
Further edu. -0,3200595 0,1298846 ** -0,3346931 0,1196589 *** -0,3643651 0,1950868 * 
W.E. unskil. ref.   ref.   ref.   
W.E. skilled 0,172708 0,0973647 * 0,1564604 0,0832057 * -0,5736566 0,1609584 *** 
W.E. whi.col. -0,540813 0,1312303 *** -0,7303446 0,1217856 *** -0,5464625 0,1983598 *** 
W.E. manager -0,2175264 0,17508  -0,6146187 0,1658897 *** 0,1201973 0,205483  
Tenure 0,0162426 0,0075656 ** -0,0080475 0,0077422  -0,0212899 0,0150907  
Dane ref.   ref.   ref.   
Immigrant 1,199304 0,1281165 *** 0,7320752 0,1269598 *** 0,3239416 0,2644097  
Income(A) -4,38E-06 5,43E-07 *** -2,07E-06 4,26E-07 *** 3,50E-07 3,00E-07  
Regional UI 0,0842411 0,021862 *** 0,0405804 0,020785 * 0,0409874 0,0378075  
1995 ref.   ref.   ref.   
1996 -0,3241946 0,1410861 ** -0,1908196 0,1283375  0,4351415 0,2343922 * 
1997 -0,1861278 0,1451312 ** -0,2231712 0,1355039 * 0,4907071 0,2438535 ** 
1998 -0,0495913 0,1576006  -0,1449985 0,1453307  0,3296433 0,2713522  
1999 -0,1515008 0,1747901  -0,2257489 0,1603474  0,167514 0,3033167  
2000 -0,1241584 0,2730831  0,0311026 0,2487164 * 0,306607 0,4643412  
Cons -3,779111 0,2863779 *** -2,707542 0,2564642 *** -4,350279 0,4655894 *** 
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Continued Education Out of labour force No category 
  Coefficient Std. Err.   Coefficient Std. Err.   Coefficient Std. Err.   
Man ref.   ref.   ref.   
Woman 0,1617905 0,1383707  0,4571623 0,0583633 *** -0,0490626 0,1250393  
Age 15-30 ref.   ref.   ref.   
Age 31-50 -0,5857854 0,2688368 ** -0,031672 0,0791606  0,1097404 0,1414675  
Age 51+ -29,4411 645737  1,405456 0,0823029 *** 0,3092081 0,1903565 * 
Single ref.   ref.   ref.   
Single parent -0,8402656 0,7300108  0,3133839 0,1797616 * -0,3351029 0,4010183  
Couple 0,2338975 0,1661357  0,1489508 0,071387 ** -0,3900413 0,1456837 *** 
Couple parent -0,6833143 0,2700364 ** 0,0557666 0,0820181  -0,5988034 0,1521538 *** 
Basic edu. ref.   ref.   ref.   
Vocational edu. -0,1240868 0,1815915  -0,1753962 0,0620779 *** -0,0277172 0,134703  
Further edu. 0,3574909 0,239395  -0,0442148 0,0897818  0,3635054 0,16914 ** 
W.E. unskil. ref.   ref.   ref.   
W.E. skilled -0,4533973 0,1516159 *** -0,2234053 0,0683959 *** -0,2472066 0,1431745 * 
W.E. whi.col. -0,6134514 0,2868331 ** -0,6070304 0,0912842 *** -0,5588702 0,1852883 *** 
W.E. manager 0,1045638 0,31943  -0,2490325 0,1152623 ** -0,6639484 0,2238841 *** 
Tenure -0,1742046 0,055236 *** 0,0113883 0,0058109 ** -0,0306524 0,015276 ** 
Dane ref.   ref.   ref.   
Immigrant -0,6438074 0,3754182 * 0,6976322 0,1075297 *** 0,8018431 0,1985835 *** 
Income(A) -0,0000187 1,50E-06 *** -3,08E-06 3,51E-07 *** 5,50E-07 2,57E-07 ** 
Regional UI 0,1714485 0,041037 *** 0,0629897 0,0164572 *** 0,0361816 0,0354665  
1995 ref.   ref.   ref.   
1996 0,7076908 0,2822609 ** 0,0611365 0,1035572  0,6084813 0,2329508 *** 
1997 0,7900721 0,2974052 *** 0,1704509 0,1069591  0,7158619 0,2390376 *** 
1998 1,284572 0,3189574 *** 0,1756627 0,1174666  0,6990837 0,259831 *** 
1999 1,198878 0,3505008 *** -0,0194912 0,1308252  0,2316504 0,2980806  
2000 1,977589 0,5418573 *** 0,1756084 0,2014459  0,3808592 0,4428485  
Cons -2,315342 0,5479706 *** -2,600384 0,2073219 *** -4,327422 0,439826 *** 
No. obs = 22826 ; Log likelihood = -16009.901 ; Pseudo R2 =0.0828 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
 
 
Table 9:  Test of IIA, H0: The difference in coefficient are not systematic 
 Values of χ2 with 39 df Prob > χ2 
Short-term unemployed 47.65 0.1613 
Long-term unemployed 52.48 0.0732 
Education 3.5 e-5 0.0000 
Out of labour force 50.81 0.0975 
No category 23.75 0.9741 
 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 10:  Test of combining categories, H0: All coefficient except intercepts 
associated  with  given pair of  outcomes are 0 
  Values of χ2 with 39 df Prob > χ2 
Self-employed- Short-term unemployed 302.127 0.0000
 Long-term unemployed 428.001 0.0000
 Education 347.520 0.0000
 Out of labour force 345.717 0.0000
 No category 159.740 0.0000 
 Wage earner 253.216 0.0000
Short-term unemployed- Long-term unemployed 204.180 0.0000
 Education 366.586 0.0000
 Out of labour force 324.864 0.0000
 No category 180.369 0.0000 
 Wage earner 535.569 0.0000
Long-term unemployed- Education 364.985 0.0000
 Out of labour force 259.161 0.0000
 No category 305.304 0.0000
 Wage earner 877.042 0.0000 
Education- Out of labour force 264.543 0.0000
 No category 314.859 0.0000
 Wage earner 401.688 0.0000
Out of labour force- No category 244.741 0.0000
 Wage earner 1062.281 0.0000 
No category Wage earner 145.225 0.0000 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 11. Goodness of fit for the extended model 
      Predicted 
 
Actual 
Wage 
earner 
Self-
employed 
Short-term 
unemployed 
Long-term 
unemployed 
Education Out of 
labour 
force 
No 
category 
Wage earner 0.832 0.807 0.759 0.708 0.724 0.737 0.796 
Self-
employed 
0.012 0.030 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.014 
Short-term 
unemployed 
0.040 0.042 0.067 0.069 0.045 0.053 0.049 
Long-term 
unemployed 
0.029 0.029 0.054 0.085 0.025 0.056 0.038 
Education 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.091 0.010 0.010 
Out of labour 
force 
0.062 0.064 0.084 0.110 0.083 0.115 0.071 
No category 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.022 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
 
Table 12. Goodness of fit for the basic model 
      Predicted 
 
Actual 
Wage 
earner 
Self-
employed 
Short-term 
unemployed 
Long-term 
unemployed 
Education Out of 
labour 
force 
No 
category 
Wage earner 0.828 0.825 0.785 0.733 0.737 0.745 0.808 
Self-
employed 
0.013 0.017 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.014 
Short-term 
unemployed 
0.041 0.040 0.053 0.058 0.048 0.053 0.044 
Long-term 
unemployed 
0.031 0.031 0.046 0.068 0.026 0.056 0.035 
Education 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.082 0.010 0.010 
Out of labour 
force 
0.063 0.060 0.082 0.111 0.081 0.111 0.070 
No category 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.019 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 13. Predicting long-term unemployment by the extended model 
 Predicted long-term unemployed Predicted NOT long-term unemployed 
Long-term unemployed 18.67  2.89 
NOT long-term unemployed 81.33 97.11 
Total  782 22044 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
 
Table 14. Predicting long-term unemployment by the basic model 
 Predicted long-term unemployed Predicted NOT long-term unemployed 
Long-term unemployed 14.71  3.03 
NOT long-term unemployed 85.29 96.97 
Total  782 22044 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
 
Tabel 15. ROC area for the extended model and the basic model 
 Obs ROC area Std. Err 
Extended model 22826 0.7769 0.0093 
Basic model 22826 0.7600 0.0089 
H0: Area(extended model)= Area(basic model) 
χ2 (1) 27.02  Prob> =0.0000 
Source: Danish register-based employer-employee panel data set from 1995 to 2001. 
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Chapter 2 
Does job-related training increase future wages?  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In addition to the many initiatives by the Danish government to 
upgrade formal skills in the workforce there are also a lot of 
education and training initiatives at private firms. Nearly 40 
percent of Danish employees received job related training (JRT) 
at their workplace in 1995 and the percentage has dramatically 
increased over the last 10 years.16 The employee’s wage return to 
JRT is the focus of this paper. Given a unique Danish panel data 
including administrative data and survey data on employers and 
employees the effect of JRT on wages is analysed. The 
information on employees’ participation in JRT in 1995, wages, 
and historical job shifts make it possible to take individual 
specific effects into account and to instrument job separation. To 
overcome the potential endogeneity between wages and job 
separations by using historical job shifts as an instrument is new 
in the JRT literature. The results show that the OLS estimates are 
consistent even when job separation is included as an exogenous 
variable. Moreover women with vocational education who 
received JRT and then separated to a new job receive a high 
wage return. The JRT has a positive and significant effect on 
wage return among men and women with a vocational education. 
Surprisingly no wage return to JRT is found among other 
educational groups. Finally the overall wage return to the 
extensive JRT in Denmark is very small compared to 
international findings. 
                                                 
16 Author’s calculations on the JRTDS data from 1994 to 2004 described in section 5. 
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1. Introduction 
The Danish government and many other European governments have focused on the 
importance of formal education and schooling. At the same time Danish firms are 
investing more and more money in upgrading the skills of their employees through job 
related training (JRT). In 1995 nearly 40 percent of Danish employees received JRT.17 
The share and the money invested in JRT has increased over the last 10 years and today 
Denmark has one of the highest JRT rates among OECD countries (OECD 2005). 
However, only one other study (AKF 2006) has briefly investigated the effect of JRT on 
wages in Denmark. The effect of JRT on wage return is the focus of this paper.  
   More than 40 years ago Shultz (1961), Mincer (1958) and Becker (1962) 
set up a theoretical framework explaining how investment in human capital increases 
future wage income. Becker (1962) extended the framework by making the distinction 
between two kinds of human capital. One is general human capital that is transferable 
between employers. Therefore the employee pays all the cost and also gets the whole 
pay off in terms of general skills. The other is the firm specific human capital that is not 
transferable among different firms. Therefore, the employers and employees share the 
cost and the pay off.   
Some empirical results confirm that the wage return to JRT is positive 
such as Parent (1999). Others find that only specific kinds of JRT result in a positive 
wage return (AKF 2006; Bartel 1995; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998; Lynch 1992; 
Regnér 2002). There also exist studies that argue that most training among employees 
has a big element of generality that other employers in the labor market demand and the 
employers still pay most of the training costs (Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998, 1999; Xu 
2005). Studies that show no substantial effect of JRT on wage return and studies that 
show that a lot of JRT is general and firm sponsored fit the extended human capital 
framework that takes imperfections into account (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). 
Acemoglu and Pischke’s model predicts that due to compressed wage structures and 
distortions on the labor market the return to JRT is reduced and in some cases 
eliminated. Furthermore their model illustrates that (depending on the cost function of 
training) employers might have less incentive to finance JRT or that they might have an 
incentive to sponsor general training. Finally, the model predicts that employees 
                                                 
17 Author’s calculations on the JRTDS data from 1994 to 2004 described in section 5. 
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receiving JRT will separate less in a labor market with a compressed wage structure 
than in fully competitive labor markets.  
Very few studies have looked at the wage return to JRT in Scandinavia 
(AKF 2006; Evertsson 2004; Regnér 2002; Schøne 2001). However, the list of JRT 
studies in the US and the UK is long (Bartel 1995, Blanchflower and Lynch 1992, 
Frazis and Loewenstein 2005, Krueger and Rouse 1998, Lengermann 1999, 
Loewenstein and Spletzer 1995, 1998 and 1999, Lynch 1992, Parent 1999, Veum 1995). 
Previous studies have shown that the effect of JRT on future wages can be empirically 
difficult to analyze. In most situations if an ordinary Mincer wage equation is estimated 
the estimates will be biased due to selection with respect to training. The problem 
occurs when employees with certain characteristics (e.g. high aptitude, many skills) 
receive JRT and the same characteristics are correlated with a high wage independent of 
receiving JRT or not. This results in an estimated effect of JRT that is biased. This 
problem has to be accounted for when evaluating JRT. The selection into JRT is always 
looked at from the employee’s side. However the employer’s preference for offering 
JRT is decisive for an employee to receive JRT. Therefore it is interesting to see if the 
employees who actually enter JRT also are the employees who employers prioritise in 
terms of JRT offers. 
Many JRT studies have included job separations as an exogenous variable, 
which seems problematic when previous job mobility literature show the opposite 
(among others: Gibbons and Waldman 2004; Gibbons and Katz 1991; von Wachter and 
Bender 2006). Job mobility studies have shown that job leavers who leave voluntarily 
tend to benefit from a separation whereas the employees who leave involuntarily 
experience the opposite. Once again it depends on what kind of workers is evaluated 
(e.g. young or old) (von Wachter and Bender 2006).  
Thus an evaluation of the effect of JRT on wage return demands a lot of 
data if both the training selection and the potential job separations selection are taken 
into account. Lack of good JRT data might be the reason why so few studies have been 
undertaken in Scandinavia. This paper can take into account individual fixed effects and 
the potential job separation selection by a first difference wage regression where job 
separation decisions are instrumented through job separations histories. The empirical 
strategy is only possible because of the availability of good Danish longitudinal micro 
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data (in this paper referred to as JRTDS). The JRTDS combines two surveys, one for 
employees and one for employers, and a panel of administrative data. The data set has 
four advantages. First, the detailed information on the length and cost of JRT makes it 
possible to clearly define JRT. Second, the existence of a reliable panel of tax recorded 
wages makes it possible to take individual specific effects into account. Third, the 
employer survey makes it possible to check if employers’ preference for offering JRT 
corresponds with the employees who actually enter JRT. Thereby a different insight to 
the selection into JRT is illustrated. Fourth, the historical information on job separations 
within the last 5 years of the employee’s career is a good indicator for an employee’s 
likelihood of switching jobs. At the same time it is reasonable to assume that the history 
is orthogonal to the wage increase at the current workplace. Thus, historical job 
separations are a good instrument for job separations.  
JRT is defined in many different ways in the literature. If an employee 
participated in any kind of job related education within the last year he or she is defined 
as a JRT participant in this paper. The JRT can take place both inside and outside the 
workplace, where a workplace is a legally-registered unit at a specific address. The JRT 
does not include the informal training that an employee receives while completing job 
assignments (e.g. an employee is taught to work a machine by a fellow colleague). It is 
possible that the employee finances some of the training costs, but in general more than 
85 pct of all Danish JRT is financed by the employer. Finally JRT in Denmark includes 
shorter education courses and training, but not long-term formal educations (e.g. 
apprenticeships). 
 The paper is set up as follows: Section 2 explains the theories behind JRT. 
Section 3 gives an overview of previous empirical JRT evaluations. The Danish labor 
market and JRT are described in section 4. Section 5 describes the rich Danish register 
data. Descriptives statistics are illustrated in section 6. In section 7, the empirical 
strategy is discussed. Section 8 contains the empirical results on the wage return to JRT. 
Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. The theory behind JRT 
In labor economics it is fundamental to look at the relationships between wages and 
human capital. Becker’s (1962) traditional human capital theory is often used to explain 
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the returns to JRT. However, the traditional human capital predictions are far from 
supported by previous empirical studies and today’s labor markets also do not fit the 
framework perfectly. Therefore new training frameworks that question the assumptions 
of full information and flexible wages have come forward (Acemoglu and Pischke 
1999). Due to the fact that most previous studies relate their empirical results to the 
traditional human capital framework that framework is first described. Afterwards the 
extended human capital framework with labor market distortions is applied and 
discussed.  
 
Traditional general and specific human capital theory 
The traditional human capital theory explains that increased experience and human 
capital result in an upward sloping wage curve over an employee’s lifetime (Shultz 
1961; Mincer 1958; Becker 1962). The conclusion is that more human capital means 
higher productivity and consequently higher earnings. A human capital increase in the 
form of JRT is therefore expected to increase the wage return. 
Originally Becker (1962) analyzes the wage effect of two kinds of human 
capital in a perfectly competitive labor market without wage distortions and other labor 
market imperfections. One kind of human capital is general and transferable between 
firms. The transferability gives the employee the incentive to pay for all the training 
costs and afterwards receive all the returns to training. The other kind of human capital 
is assumed to be firm specific and is not transferable among different firms. The 
specificity gives the employers and employees the incentive to share the costs and the 
return to training. Becker’s idea is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure clearly shows the 
three conclusions of the traditional model. First, if nobody invests in training then no 
wage increase occurs over time (see black line).18 Second, investment in either general 
or firm specific training decreases the employee’s wage income during the training 
period and increases future wages. However, the employee who receives firm specific 
training only receives a wage increase if he or she stays at the same firm. Third, the 
employees receiving general training expect the largest wage growth after training 
because they neither share the pay-off or the training costs with the employer (see 
dashed line).  
                                                 
18 Wage increase due to experience is not illustrated in the figure. 
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JRT in a labor market with wage distortion and imperfections 
Acemoglu & Pischke (1999) among others have questioned the traditional human 
capital theory concerning a perfectly competitive labor market without any distortions. 
Acemoglu & Pischke (1999) illustrate the difference between training in a perfectly 
competitive labour market and labor markets with imperfections and compressed wage 
structure by Figure 2.  
Figure 2 shows that in a perfectly competitive labor market the employee 
is paid a wage equal to the marginal product of his skills, f(JRT) (i.e. the thin black 
line). f(JRT) is also the wage the employee can receive in other firms. Now suppose 
there exist a separation cost, C, of making a job-change. The cost could simply be due 
to the outside employer’s lack of information regarding the employee’s training 
experience outcome. The cost reduces the employee’s wage outside the current firm to 
f(JRT)-C (i.e. the dashed line). The current firm can make the employee stay at the firm 
by paying him or her f(JRT)-C. Thus the current workplace benefits from the separation 
costs, because if the employee is only paid f(JRT)-C, then C is the profit of the firm. In 
this example the separation cost is not a function of the training. Therefore the employer 
has no incentive to invest in further training because the profit stays the same.  
Now look at Figure 2 and the line for the compressed wage structure 
where the separation cost is a function of training, C(JRT). It is assumed that the 
separation cost increases with respect to training, thus C’(JRT)>0. The intuition is that 
the most skilled employees (i.e. employees who have received the most JRT) have the 
highest separation costs because the more courses (and maybe even more specific 
courses) the more difficult it is for the outside firms to evaluate the value of the courses. 
The employees outside wage option is then f(JRT)-C(JRT) (i.e. the thickest black line). 
Compared to the perfectly competitive labor market, the employer’s profit increases 
with the employee’s training level. Thus, the employer has an incentive to increase the 
training level of his or her employee to increase profits. 
From Figure 2 three conclusions are drawn. The first conclusion that 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) draw is that a compressed wage structure allows 
employers to benefit from investing in JRT even when it is general. The reason is that 
the compressed wage structure prevents employees from receiving the full return of 
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general training in other firms. Therefore he or she stays at the current employer if the 
current firm offers the market wage (i.e. a wage below the employee’s marginal 
productivity). Thus the employer benefits from offering general training and paying the 
employee the outside market wage. The second conclusion is that labor market 
imperfections (similar to separation cost and a compressed wage structure) reduce an 
employee’s return to training. Finally given a separation cost, employees separate less 
from their current employer.    
 
Different labor market imperfections and a compressed wage structure 
In the following I discuss how different labor market distortions can cause a compressed 
wage structure and thereby make the set up by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) the most 
realistic. A distorted labor market can be due to search frictions and the monopsony 
power of the employer. Suppose an employee can only search for another job by 
quitting the job he or she has and then search for a new job (i.e. on the job search is not 
possible). Then an employee’s expected outside option is reduced if there exists a risk 
of becoming unemployed. The reduced expected return compresses the wage structure 
and the return to training for the employee, but it increases the profits for the current 
employer. Furthermore it will improve the monopsony power of his or her own 
employer if the employee realizes that the outside employers will not pay the full return 
to training because they have some kind of monopsony power. This forces the wage 
structure to become compressed. The search friction and monopsony power of the 
employer reduce the wage return of training and the preference for separation among 
trained employees.  
 Suppose that training courses are commonly accepted and well-known 
among employers but the employee’s ability to apply the course is unknown to the 
outside employer. Then the outside employer is insecure of the actual marginal 
productivity of a newly trained employee. The employee could be a high ability trained 
employee who has the ability to apply the training, but the employee could also be a low 
ability trained employee who does not have the ability to apply the training. Thus the 
outside employer will then pay a return to training that takes into account the risk of 
getting a low ability employee who can not apply the training received earlier. Once 
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again, the outside wage is compressed and the current employer does not have to pay 
the full marginal product to keep his trained employees.  
Unions often play a very important role in wage settings with respect to 
wages, training, tenure, experience etc. There might be strict rules about what kind of 
wage benefits employees can get with specific training skills on top of all the rules on 
promotions, hourly wage, holidays etc. In some countries the employer and employee 
unions agree on minimum wages or wage floors as well. A minimum wage means that 
the cost of training can be difficult to transfer to the employee and the wage structure is 
distorted. Here the unions distort the flexibility of the wages especially downwards. 
Again the return to training will be reduced and the employee will separate less likely. 
Maybe the employee even receives less training because the minimum wage makes it 
impossible to transfer the training cost to the employee.  
 Until now the compressed wage structure inside a workplace has been 
caused by the distortion in the outside wages. However, the compressed wages can also 
be a result of wage policies inside a workplace. Here the explanations are generally 
found in the literature on personnel economics, where employers set wages to avoid 
adverse selection. An example is efficiency wages where the employer does not know 
the employee and takes into account that some employees shirk. Thus, the wage starts at 
a low level but increases until there is an incentive not to shirk (Lazear 1998). Thus the 
employer does not pay the marginal product of training, and the wage structure is again 
distorted. The results are again a lower wage return to training, less job separations and 
maybe less training.  
 To sum up, the predictions of the extended human capital model are 
different from the traditional human capital model in four ways. First, an employee can 
receive general training from an employer due to the separation costs. This is not 
possible in the traditional model. Second, as in the traditional model the employee’s 
wage return increases with training. However, given the separation cost the wage return 
is lower in the extended model than in the traditional model. Third, the employee in the 
extended model has a reduced incentive to separate from the current employer due to 
the separation costs. Fourth, the employee might receive less training in the extended 
model than in the traditional model because the costs of training are not transferable due 
to a high wage floor for example. 
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The existence of labor market imperfections and a compressed wage 
structure clearly change the traditional conclusion for training in Becker’s standard 
human capital framework. Even though most JRT studies have used the traditional 
human capital framework when evaluating their empirical results as I show in section 3, 
the extended human capital model with labor market distortion and a compressed wage 
structure might be more appropriate for the evaluation on JRT in Denmark. It will be 
possible to see if this is true after the description of the Danish labor market and Danish 
JRT in section 4.      
 
3. Literature review on JRT 
Previous studies on the wage return to JRT have focused their empirical analysis on the 
traditional human capital theory background material. Therefore, two areas of the JRT 
evaluation process have been the centre of attention. First, area is the JRT definition and 
the separation between general and firm specific training. Second area is the biased 
estimate of JRT due to the correlation between individual training heterogeneity and 
wages (i.e. training selection). In the following I illustrate how previous studies have 
taken the just described areas into account and the ambiguous empirical results of the 
effect of JRT on wage return. Furthermore the lack of attention paid to the potential job 
separation endogeneity in the JRT literature is commented upon.   
 
Different JRT definitions 
The JRT literature is characterized by using different words for the same thing and then 
at the same time not defining JRT in exactly the same way with respect to JRT duration, 
costs and substance (see appendix 1). Thus JRT includes (as defined in previous 
literature) on-the-job training, off-the-job training, formal training, seminar training, 
company training, courses, and apprenticeships, etc.  
A number of studies use the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youths 
from 1979 (NLSY79). Therefore a lot of JRT definitions are based on the information 
included in that data (Blanchflower and Lynch 1992, Frazis and Loewenstein 2005, 
Krueger and Rouse 1998, Lengermann 1999, Loewenstein and Spletzer 1995, 1998 and 
1999, Lynch 1992, Parent 1999, Veum 1995).  In the first studies on the NLSY data, 
JRT only included duration spells of at least 4 weeks (Lynch 1992; Loewenstein and 
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Spletzer 1999; Parent 1999). Moreover, studies from the UK and Norway did not have 
information on short JRT spells (Arulampalam and Boot 2001; Blundel et al. 1996; 
Booth et al. 2003; Evertson 2004). In an evaluation of JRT it is problematic if all short 
spells are treated as non-participants, because instead of evaluating the effect of JRT, 
one would evaluate the effect of long JRT spells compared to employees with no JRT 
and short JRT spells. Arulampalam and Booth (2001) also show that it is important to 
have each training incidence because when they look at training spells of more than 3 
days it is the incidence of training and not the number or length of training spells that 
has an effect on the wage return. 
Other JRT studies use an employee’s opinion about the length of required 
JRT for a specific job as a proxy for the amount of JRT the employee has received (e.g. 
Schøne 2001). This definition is problematic to use when evaluating JRT, because it is 
difficult to define when JRT took place and if it took place at all. Thus making an 
evaluation on the wage return to actual JRT is impossible especially because before and 
after wage information is difficult to define (i.e. it is impossible to know which wage is 
received before the JRT and which wage is received after the JRT).  
Especially studies from the US, the UK and Germany include 
apprenticeship training in their JRT definition (Lynch 1992, Parent 1999, Blundell et al. 
1996). In some countries such as Denmark including apprenticeship in JRT is 
inappropriate because an apprenticeship education is part of the formal educational 
system and is generously subsidized by the Danish authorities.  
Many previous studies make empirical analyses based on the traditional 
human capital theory described in section 2. Therefore the studies divide JRT into 
general and firm-specific training. The division in many cases relies on where training 
takes place. In US studies for example, firm-specific training (i.e. on-the-job training) 
takes place in the firm and general training (i.e. off-the-job training) takes place outside 
the firm (Lynch 1992; Blundell et al. 1996; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999; Parent 
1999; Veum 1995; Xu 2005). The geographical division between general and firm 
specific human capital is problematic. Suppose that big firms have more employees 
needing the same kind of training than small firms. Thus the big firms would probably 
save money by paying the cost of hiring a teacher in house instead of paying the 
transportation cost, maintenance cost etc. for all the trainees taking a course outside the 
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firm. Thus, firm size influences whether JRT takes place at the firm. The context of the 
JRT training doesn’t influence whether JRT takes place at the firm. 
Obviously the changing JRT definitions can result in different empirical 
results, which make it challenging to compare different study results.  
 
Overcome the selection bias in JRT participation 
Studies on the effect of JRT on wage return indicate that if employees who receive 
training also receive high wages due to high aptitude, then the estimated effect of JRT 
on wage returns in a simple Mincer wage equation becomes biased.    
 To combat the JRT selection previous studies have instrumented the JRT 
(see appendix 1 table B: Parent 1999; Xu 2005). Intuitively these studies have used 
variables that affect the probability of training participation, but do not affect the wages 
other than through their effect on JRT participation. For example Parent (1999) uses the 
employees deviation from the stock of training with-in job means to calculate employee 
job training participation risk. Whereas, Xu (2005) uses among others the spouse’s 
training experience in estimating the employees training participation. Thus he assumes 
that an employee’s spouse preference for JRT is correlated with an employee’s 
preference for JRT and not correlated with the employee’s wage return. Suppose JRT is 
necessary if the spouse chooses a certain income path and that income path certainly 
must influence the employee’s possibilities with respect to his or her own income path. 
For example if a couple has children one would expect that one of them would try to 
work hard in order to obtain a high income and the other would try to work less (i.e. low 
income) in order to take care of the family. Thus it is difficult to see how the spouse’s 
JRT decision does not influence the employee’s wage return. 
Others have first looked at the correlation between JRT and observable 
characteristics. Then they have instrumented the training risk by assuming a certain 
functional form for the risk of training with respect to observables (see appendix 1 table 
B: Lynch 1992; Veum 1995). Many studies have found the same observable socio-
economic characteristics to be correlated with JRT (see appendix 1 table C). Thus 
studies in the Netherlands and the US find that both young women and men are more 
likely to receive JRT (Lynch 1992; Maximiano and Oosterbeek 2006). Furthermore 
studies from the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden find that well educated 
 64
employees receive more JRT (Altonji and Spletzer 1991; Arulampalam and Booth 
2001; Blundell et al. 1996; Evertsson 2004; Krueger and Rouse 1998; Lynch 1992; 
Maximiano and Oosterbeek 2006; Veum 1995). Altonji and Spletzer (1991) find that 
more US women than US men receive JRT. On the other hand, Lynch (1992) finds that 
US women are more likely to receive off-the-job training but less likely to receive on-
the-job training. Finally Maxiamo and Oosterbeek (2006) find that women in the 
Netherlands are more willing to train than men. Even though there is a clear correlation 
between socio-economic observables and JRT, assuming a functional form of the 
observables to instrument the likelihood of receiving, JRT does not seem plausible 
because the identification is through the functional form. 
Another way to approach the selection problem is to assume that selection 
into training is due to individual aptitude where aptitude is independent of time. Then 
looking at wage growth (i.e. wages before and after receiving JRT) for each employee 
would difference out the individual specific fixed effect. Several studies from the US 
and the UK have analyzed the effect of JRT on wage growth (see appendix 1 table A: 
Booth et al. 2003; Hamil-Luker 2005; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998 and 1999; Lynch 
1992; Veum 1995).  
Additionally some studies have claimed that the selection into JRT is due 
to both a time independent person specific fixed effect and a time dependent person 
specific effect. Thus the studies from the US, the UK and Norway instrument or predict 
the selection of employees into JRT in the wage growth estimation (see appendix 1 
table A: Arulampalam and Booth 2001; Krueger and Rouse 1998; Schøne 2001; Veum 
1995). Whereas Krueger and Rouse (1998) use an exogenous shift in subsidy to JRT 
programs to estimate the training probabilities, others use the probability of entering 
training as an instrument (i.e. the functional form is what determines the selection). 
Again, choosing a random functional form does not seem like a logical way to 
instrument the likelihood of receiving JRT. However, an exogenous shift in subsidy is 
workable, but often not possible for the time periods analyzed.  
Previous studies have also found a correlation between JRT and the 
likelihood of job separations (see appendix 1 table D: Krueger and Rouse 1998; 
Loewenstein and Spletzer 1997; Lynch 1991; Parent 1999). Suppose that workers who 
choose to separate from workplaces also try to receive more JRT because that improves 
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their wage bargaining situation in a new job.19 Thus there might be a combined effect of 
JRT and separations (i.e. an interaction effect).  
Previous studies have looked at a combined effect of receiving JRT at the 
previous employer or the current employer as mentioned above, but the focus has been 
on finding the wage return to different kinds of JRT and not the separation decision. 
Thus an employee’s job separation has been included as an exogenous variable. 
However, there exists a large literature set on job mobility and wage return as well as 
the potential endogeneity problem with respect to job separations (among others: 
Gibbons and Waldman 2004; Gibbons and Katz 1991; von Wachter and Bender 2006). 
In a JRT framework suppose that an employee decides to quit his or her job because he 
or she is promised a better wage somewhere else and not the other way around where 
the employee separates and then receives a higher wage. Then there clearly exists an 
endogeneity problem with respect to job separations and wages. This potential 
endogeneity problem has not been taken into account in previous JRT studies. 
 
Previous results on wage return to JRT 
Most empirical studies find that JRT has a positive return no matter if the measured 
outcome is wage or wage growth (see appendix 1 table A and B). However, the average 
estimated return to training has been ambiguous. Perhaps it is because the JRT concepts 
and the JRT environment vary a lot from study to study. One extreme is Xu (2005) who 
finds a log of wage return to JRT in 1994 in China of 1 percent.  The other extreme is 
Parent (1999) who finds that the incidence of JRT increases the log of wage return by 
14 percent in the US. The training return is significantly reduced when the return is 
measured by wage growth (see appendix 1 table B: Booth et al. 2003; Hamil-Luker 
2005; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998 and 1999; Lynch 1992). However, some of the 
previous studies’ results are difficult to interpret because they do not include first 
differences of the explanatory variables (e.g. Hamil-Luker 2005; Loewenstein and 
Spletzer 1998 and 1999; Lynch 1992). It is noticeable that Veum (1995) is the only 
study that finds no effect of JRT using the simple first difference regression model. 
Furthermore it is understandable that the wage return in the first difference estimations 
                                                 
19 Another example of the interaction effect is a firm specific effect, where firms with high separation 
rates also offer a lot of JRT.  
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are smaller than in the simple wage regressions, because the wage growth estimations as 
described earlier account for individual specific effects.  
Even though most studies find positive returns to JRT, the return to JRT 
are different with respect to kinds of JRT, the duration of JRT, the timing of JRT, job 
shifts and trainees personal characteristics. For example, Arulampalam and Booth 
(2001) in the UK and Veum (1995) in the US show that it is the training incidence that 
initiates a wage return and not the duration of training. This is in contrast to the 
traditional human capital theory model where the duration of training is positively 
correlated with the wage increase.  
Dividing JRT into general and firm specific training is essential in the 
traditional human capital theory, but the empirical results are very mixed. As already 
mentioned most studies use the geographical situation of the JRT to separate between 
general and firm specific training. The empirical results of Lynch (1992) and Xu (2005) 
confirm the original human capital theory. Lynch (1992) finds that both off-the-job 
training (i.e. general training) at the previous firm and on-the-job training (i.e. firm 
specific training) at the current firm have positive wage effects. Furthermore on-the-job 
training at the previous firm has no effect. Additionally, Xu (2005) finds that only off-
the-job training has a positive wage effect.  
Other studies find no clear evidence of the traditional theory’s division 
between general and specific human capital. For example Parent (1999) finds that all 
on-the-job training at the previous workplace has a positive wage effect too. Instead 
Blundell et al. (1996) show that women obtain no wage increases by taking on-the-job 
training. 
Even though some studies show that the division influences the return to 
training differently, and authors claim the results thereby give an indication of the effect 
of general training and firm specific training as the traditional human capital theory 
predicts, the results are clearly ambiguous. An obvious reason why some studies do not 
find clear evidence on different kinds of human capital is that the assumptions about a 
perfectly competitive labor market without wage distortions and labor market 
imperfection are not valid in labor markets such as the US and Europe.  
 Instead some empirical findings support Acemoglu’s and Piscke’s (1999) 
extended human capital model with labor market distortions and a compressed wage 
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structure. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) actually claim that on-the-job training 
includes general training. Furthermore, Lowenstein and Spletzer (1998) show that most 
JRT is paid by the employer among young Americans, even when the training is 
general. However, the more general the JRT is, the less likely it is that the employer 
finances the JRT. These findings support the extended model’s conclusion that 
employers earn a profit by offering general training to their employees, which is in 
contrast to the traditional human capital model.  
As mentioned earlier some studies find no wage return to JRT, which 
again supports the model just described (see appendix 1 table A and B: Krueger and 
Rouse 1998; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1998; Lynch 1992). Finally for example Parent 
(1999) finds that trained employees are less likely to leave their current employer. This 
is in accordance with the extended human capital model prediction.  
 Clearly the empirical results from previous JRT studies support and reject 
predictions from the traditional human capital model and the extended human capital 
model. 
  
4. The Danish labor market and JRT 
The effect of JRT on wage return at least in theory depends on the labor market in 
which JRT occurs. In this section the Danish labor market is described and afterwards 
the extensive amount of Danish JRT taking place is illustrated.  
 
The Danish labor market 
The Danish labor marked is characterized by a so-called flexicurity model, where the 
labor market is flexible because it is easy to fire and hire employees (like in the US) and 
at the same time there exists a highly developed social security system (like in the other 
Nordic countries). Given the generous social security system, the influential labor 
market organisations, high income taxes, and a minimum wage floor, the wage structure 
is very compressed.20 So overall, the Scandinavian countries have a very compressed 
wage structure compared to the US or the UK.  
                                                 
20 Additionally the participation rate is relatively high among both genders in Denmark. Especially 
Danish women’s participation rate is relatively high compared to other developed countries. Since 1994 
the female participation rate has been at least 76 percent.  
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The unions play an important role in the wage determination of Danish 
jobs. In 1995 more than 80 percent of the workforce was a member of a union 
organization. Even though the percentage has decreased over the last decade the 
organization degree is still above 75 percent. The employee’s unions and the employer’s 
union are two of the players in the Danish tripartite labor market model. In this setting, 
the employer’s union and employee’s union discuss wage and working condition 
regulations. “The State” only interferes if problems occur regarding the centralised 
collective bargaining agreements. Until 1995 the central collective bargaining 
agreements occurred every second year. Since then it has become more flexible within 
each subdivision of employer’s and employee’s unions (that were involved in the 
original bargaining negotiations). This tripartite model and the existence of other labor 
market institutions clearly distort the free movement of wages and labor. Thus, the 
standard human capital theory assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets with 
fully flexible wages and no imperfections does not hold for the Danish labor market. 
The share of skilled employees in the Danish work force has increased 
dramatically over the last decade. In 1995 around 60 percent of the adult population 
between 25-64 years of age had an upper secondary education (OECD 1997).21 Thus the 
adult population was skilled but not as highly educated as the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Norway, Switzerland and the US. The US had more than 80 percent of their 
adult population with an upper secondary education. By 1999 the share of people with 
an upper secondary education in Denmark increased to 80 percent (OECD 2001). Thus 
Denmark entered the group of countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland and the US) with the highest skilled adult population.  
 Figures 3 and 4 show clearly that the share of people with tertiary 
education (i.e. Danish vocational education and further education) have increased since 
1994.22 Therefore the educational level among the adult Danish population has 
increased. The educational development follows the Danish policy-makers intention of 
improving the educational skills in the Danish workforce to meet globalization 
requirements. Therefore, formal education is generously subsidized in Denmark (for a 
detailed description of the formal education system see Weatherall (2007)). The formal 
                                                 
21 In the Danish system upper secondary education is high school + 
22 In OECD terms tertiary education include vocational and further education. 
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educational framework is very different from the JRT framework that is initiated by 
employees and employers.  
 
The Danish JRT  
In addition to the investment in formal education, Danish policy makers have been 
encouraging firms to invest more in training their current employees (both with and 
without a subsidy from the Danish Government). This kind of education and training is 
what OECD calls “job-related continuing education and training”. Denmark’s 
participation rate in job-related continuing education and training is about 50 percent 
among 25 to 64-year-olds in 1998/1999 (OECD 2001). The Danish participation rate is 
the highest among OECD countries. In the workforce, the participation rate is highest 
among adults with a tertiary education. In Denmark, 29 percent of the population with a 
lower secondary education participated in job-related continuing education and training 
in 1998/1999. 51 percent participated among the people with an upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary education. Finally, 70 percent participated among the 
people with a tertiary education. Highly educated women in Denmark had an especially 
high participation rate compared to men. The mean hours women used on job-related 
training were high as well relative to men.23  
Among the Danish employees the participation rates in job-related 
education and training are 52 percent among men and 58 percent among women, which 
is still the highest among all employees in OECD countries in 1998/1999. Although, the 
mean number of hours employed participants use on job-related education and training 
is relatively high (111 hours) it is lower than the mean number of hours used in other 
countries such as Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.  
This paper focuses to a certain extent on what the OECD refers to as “job-
related continuing education and training” among the employed. More precisely an 
employee is defined as a JRT participant if he or she has participated in any kind of job-
related education or training within the last year. The JRT participant group is further 
described in section 6.  
                                                 
23 No comparable OECD numbers are available for Denmark from 1994-1997. Instead within a 4 –week 
period 15 percent of Danish men (13 percent) and women (17 percent) received job-related continuing 
education and training. 
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The compressed wage structure in Denmark, the generous formal 
education system, and the extensive and broadly defined JRT program are important to 
have in mind when comparing the empirical results of this paper with empirical results 
on JRT in other countries.  
 
5. Combined survey and administrative data on JRT 
An analysis of the effect of JRT on wages demands a lot of data. First, very detailed 
information on training duration, training costs, and training contents is necessary to 
define JRT. The costs or the geographical situation of the JRT are especially used often 
to define general and firm specific training. Second, longitudinal wage information is 
necessary to separate the training effect and the effect of individual heterogeneity on 
wages. Third, job separation information that is not correlated with wages is needed to 
solve the potential endogeneity problem between job separations and wages. Most of 
the necessary information is contained in the two surveys and in the longitudinal 
administrative data that form the job-related training data set (JRTDS). 
 
The JRTDS 
The JRTDS comprises three data sets. The first data set is a sample of the panel data set 
called The Danish Work Environment Cohort Study (DWECS). DWECS uses a split 
panel design. The 1990 panel is a random sample of the population from 18-59 years of 
age as of October, 1st, 1990. This population was re-interviewed in 1995 and 2000 
irrespective of participation in previous rounds. To correct for the aging and migration 
of the 1990 panel, additional random panels were collected in 1995 and 2000, in order 
to ensure that the samples in 1990, 1995 and 2000 all were representative samples of the 
whole population. In the 1995 survey, employees were interviewed about JRT. This 
information is applied in this paper. The 1995 sample consists of 5127 employees.  
The employee survey contains an extensive amount of variables covering 
various themes such as occupational exposures, health, job specifics, industry specifics, 
BMI, occupations, occupational accidents, labor market status and specifics about JRT. 
The JRTDS is especially good because it contains precise records on training duration 
within a year, whereas for example the US NLSY79 in its early stages only had 
information on training periods for more than 4 weeks. Another advantage of the 
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Danish data is the detailed information on course financing and the information on 
courses. A minor disadvantage is that the Danish survey only has information on JRT in 
1995 and the data does not include many JRT observation years. Thus it is possible to 
evaluate the effect of JRT in 1995 when there is precise information on the length of 
JRT, the cost of JRT, the employee’s job situation, and the employer’s characteristics.  
The JRTDS also contains information about employees’ historical job 
changes. This information is relevant when analysing the wage effect of JRT among the 
employees that either stay in the current firm or separate from a firm. The already 
mentioned potential endogeneity problem of job separations and wages can be 
overcome if the separation selection can be instrumented. In other words, if there is a 
variable that can explain the likelihood of separating from a job and the variable at the 
same time is not correlated with wage growth then the variable can be used as a valid 
instrument. The JRTDS includes employees past records on job separations. Thus, the 
individual risk of separating from a current job can be instrumented by the individual’s 
history of job changes.  
Another source of information is a register panel data set from Statistics 
Denmark from 1994 to 2004, which contains records on all employees from the 
DWECS. The data contains detailed information on socio-economic characteristics such 
as; age, family status, educational skills, personal income, wages, social transfers and 
unemployment histories. Additionally, there is detailed information on employees’ 
workplaces and when employees switch workplaces. All variables are recorded annually 
except for unemployment history. The unemployment and activation histories are 
reported as spells on a daily basis. The precise unemployment histories and 
occupational status make the exact categorization of full time employed wage earners 
possible.  
The detailed administrative records on wage incomes from 1994 to 2004 
are also very valuable. Compared to self-reported wages in surveys, the administrative 
records are easier to compare across individuals because the information comes from 
the official tax forms across time. In surveys, employees often remember wages 
differently, because some remember net wages, some remember the gross wages and 
others remember wages including pensions and other benefits. Finally, the panel 
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structure makes it possible to look at wages before and after JRT and thereby take 
individual fixed effects into account.  
The last source of data is an employer survey where employees state their 
workplace in 1995. The workplaces were also interviewed in the following year, which 
was 1996. The workplace survey contains information about management, strategies 
and practices related to maintaining and qualification upgrading of employees. The 
information on qualification upgrades includes JRT. The data is used as a supplement to 
illustrate how workplace preferences for offering JRT match the employees that actually 
receive JRT. The information on workplace investment in JRT can describe which 
employees are most likely to receive JRT.  
 
Final sample of JRTDS 
To evaluate the effect of JRT on wage growth only a sample of the extensive data just 
described is selected. Given that JRT information exists in 1995 the immediate effect of 
JRT can be measured by looking at wages in 1994 and 1996. Thus the panel data period 
is restricted to three years from 1994 to 1996. Wage growth is only possible to measure 
if an individual receives a wage before and after receiving JRT. Therefore only the 
fulltime employed in 1994, 1995 and 1996 are selected. As previously described the 
return to JRT is expected to change with a job separation, and therefore the employees 
who either stay in the same workplace for three years or switch workplace the year after 
potentially receiving JRT (i.e. work in a new workplace in 1996) are selected. The 
described selection results in a final sample consisting of 3347 employees. 1791 are 
men and 1556 are women. 
 
6. Descriptives on Danish JRT, wages, and job separations 
This section illustrates the distribution of JRT among full-time employees and shows 
that even though previous studies have separated between general and firm specific 
training it does not make sense in a Danish context. Furthermore I use simple statistics 
to see if the theoretical and empirical claim - JRT increases the wage return - holds for 
the Danish data. Finally, due to previous studies claim of selection problems the 
likelihood of receiving training and separating from a job is analysed. As an extension 
workplaces’ JRT offers are compared to the employee’s likelihood of receiving JRT, 
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because the selection into training is dependent on the employee’s and the employer’s 
preferences for JRT. 
 Given previous studies results that wages and JRT are strongly correlated 
with gender and educational background all the following descriptive statistics are made 
separately for gender and education.  
 
JRT distribution 
As described in section 5 the analysis uses a sample of Danish employees who are full-
time employees from 1994 to 1996 and who either stay at the same workplace for three 
years or change workplaces in 1996. Table 1 shows the selected sample include 
employees who on average receive more JRT, have a higher wage income, but not wage 
growth, and who separate less from their workplaces compared to average employees.  
The following description focuses on the characteristics of the selected 
sample of employees. Table 2 illustrates that over 55 percent of Danish men and over 
60 percent of Danish women received JRT in 1995. Clearly more women receive JRT 
than men. The majority of women and men receive 1 to 10 days of JRT within the year. 
Furthermore, over 10 percent of the employees who receive JRT receive over 20 days of 
training within a year.  
Table 2 also illustrates the positive correlation between the percentage of 
employees receiving training and educational skills. Thus, among the group of 
employees with further education, 74 percent of men and 83 percent of women receive 
JRT within 1995. Whereas among the non-educated only 47 percent of men and 45 
percent of women received JRT. 
JRT includes education and training both inside and outside the 
workplace, but JRT does not include the informal training that an employee receives 
while doing his or her job assignment. Thus, the often used geographical criterion for 
separating general and firm specific training is not possible with the Danish data. 
Instead the cost information with respect to JRT could be used as a criterion. Following 
the traditional human capital theory then, JRT is firm specific when the workplace pays 
for some of the training expenses and JRT is general if the employee pays for all the 
training. In the Danish sample more than 85 percent of all JRT is financed totally by the 
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employer.24 At the same time most of the employees claim that there skills can be 
applied in other workplaces. Therefore it does not seem appropriate to separate between 
general and firm specific JRT by JRT expenses. 
 
Wages and JRT 
International studies in section 3 and the theoretical models in section 2 illustrated a 
positive correlation between JRT and wages. The simple statistics in Table 2 support to 
some extent the theory, because employees who receive more than one day of JRT have 
on average higher yearly wage income. However, it does not support the theory that the 
employees who receive only one day of JRT have an average yearly wage income less 
than the employees who receive no JRT. The correlation between JRT and average 
wage growth are similar to correlation between yearly wages and JRT. One exception is 
the low wage growth among women who receive between 11 and 20 days of JRT. 
Among educational groups the employees who receive JRT also on average receive a 
higher yearly wage except for the men with further education. The wage growth is even 
more puzzling, because only men and women with a vocational education and women 
with no education have on average a higher wage growth when receiving JRT.  
Studies have shown that empirical estimates of the effect of JRT can be 
biased due to the correlation between individual heterogeneity and wages (i.e. training 
selection). In table 3 columns 2 and 3 show the likelihood of receiving JRT among men 
and women. The results indicate that both young women and men are more likely to 
receive JRT. The employees that have a further education are more likely to receive 
JRT. Not surprisingly working in a high paying occupational group (i.e. often the most 
educated) increases an employee’s probability of receiving JRT, too. For women only 
the just mentioned characteristics influence the likelihood of receiving JRT, whereas 
men are influenced by more socio-economic and workplace characteristics. Clearly 
men, living as a couple with long employment experiences, and working in big private 
industry workplaces such as wholesale, finance and services are more likely to receive 
JRT. The characteristics that influence the likelihood of receiving JRT among Danish 
employees are also found in other countries. For example, the positive effects of long 
work experiences and big companies or departments are especially found in other JRT 
                                                 
24 Previous studies found that most JRT is financed by employers (Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999) 
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studies (appendix 1 table C: Blundell et al. 1996; Lynch 1992; Maximiano and 
Oosterbeck 2006). However, many previous studies find that union membership 
increases the likelihood of receiving JRT. For Danish employee unions, membership 
has no significant effect.  
The selection into training is most likely analyzed by looking at employee 
information. However, an employee’s decision with respect to JRT and job separations 
depends on the decisions of their employer, too. Suppose the employee wants to receive 
JRT but his or her employer will not finance it. According to the above results the 
employee would either not take the JRT, maybe pay for the JRT himself or herself, or 
simply quit the job due to lack of JRT.  This employee-employer interaction influences 
the selection into JRT and thereby also the return to JRT. Therefore it is interesting to 
look at the preferences for offering JRT among employers, which is the main focus in 
the following descriptive paragraphs. 
Table 4 clearly shows that workplaces to a higher extent prioritize JRT 
offers to employees from skilled occupational groups. Furthermore, more skilled 
occupational groups are offered longer periods of JRT and more money on JRT.  
 A simple OLS regression among interviewed workplaces illustrates the 
correlation between the average number of JRT days offered and workplace specific 
characteristics. Table 5 contains the OLS regressions for all workplaces and separate 
regressions for; workplaces that offer a minimum of one day of JRT, workplaces that 
have all occupational groups represented in their workforce, and workplaces that offer a 
minimum of one day of JRT and have all occupational groups in their workforce.  The 
results are similarly independent of the selection criteria. Workplaces with affiliates, 
many employees, and a high percentage of skilled employees in industries such as 
construction and services offer more days of training. Furthermore workplaces that take 
many human management initiatives such as yearly employer-employee meetings, 
organizational changes for helping the employees, reduction of routine job tasks, and 
reduction of physical and psychological hard work offer a significantly higher amount 
of JRT days.  
Table 6 illustrates the OLS regressions of workplaces offering JRT 
separate for four occupational groups. The results are nearly identical to the results of 
JRT days offered to all employees in a workplace. Additionally, the results show that 
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the average wages of certain occupations are positively correlated with JRT offers 
among the highly skilled occupational groups (e.g. managers and high paid wage 
earners) but not among other occupational groups.   
 The analysis of JRT offers among workplaces support the findings for 
employees. Thus the employees who are more likely to receive JRT are also the 
employees that workplaces prefer to sign-up for JRT offers. 
 
Job separation and JRT 
On average, close to 30 percent of Danish employees separate from their jobs every 
year (Weatherall 2007). In this paper’s sample of fulltime employees who have been 
employed for a minimum of three years the separation rates are a lot lower – 15 percent 
among men and 9 percent among women. It is not surprising that the job separation rate 
is low because the sample does not include all the employees who separate into 
unemployment or who have temporary contracts and change jobs frequently (i.e. more 
than every second year).  
Table 7 shows that the average amount of JRT and wage growth are 
different among employees who stay in the same workplace and employees who switch 
workplaces. Men separate more often from their workplaces than women. Furthermore, 
men and women who have a vocational education have on average received more JRT 
before they separate. The same is true for women with further education. In contrast 
non-educated women who separate from their workplaces have on average received less 
JRT. The statistics also clearly show that men and women who separate from their 
workplace have on average a higher wage growth. It is not clear if it is the separation 
that causes the wage increase or if it is the expectations of a future wage increase that 
causes the separation (i.e. endogeneity problem). 
 The likelihood of separating from a workplace is illustrated in Table 3. 
Danish men are more likely to separate if they are young, unskilled and have short 
tenure. Furthermore working in big private companies for the hotel and restaurant 
industry increases the probability of separating from workplaces. In contrast very few 
socio-economic and workplace characteristics influence the separations for women. The 
results in Table 3 show surprisingly that single women are less likely to separate from a 
workplace than single women with kids. Furthermore women from relatively small 
 77
private companies are more likely to separate from a workplace. These findings are 
related to the specific sample of full time workers from 1994-1996 that is selected for 
the analysis. 
  The descriptive statistics indicate that there are correlations between 
wages, JRT, and job separations. It is therefore necessary to take these relationships into 
account and consider possible selection problems when picking an empirical strategy in 
the following section. 
 
7. Empirical model – individual fixed effect and job separation endogeneity   
The theoretical models in section 2 showed that investment in JRT increases the 
productivity of the employee and thereby the wage supposedly increases. The traditional 
human capital theory also shows that the division between firm specific and general 
training can influence the wage return to JRT for employees who separate from one firm 
to another. Finally, the extended human capital theory illustrated that the wage return to 
JRT declines and maybe even disappears in an economy with compressed wage 
structures. Job separations also decline with respect to JRT due to the existence of a 
separation cost.  
The empirical model is supposed to capture the predictions from the 
human capital theories. However, as the literature review clearly showed the selection 
problem due to individual specific effects with respect to JRT and job separations are 
important to account for in the empirical setup, because it is the key to reducing the bias 
of the JRT estimates.  
First consider a simple Mincer wage equation in the following way: 
 
(1) 11101 96)log( +++ ++++= itititit XJRTDw εγβαα  
 
Where log of wages for employee i  at time t+1 (i.e. 1996) is a function of receiving 
JRT, JRT, and some socio-economic characteristics, X, such as experience, tenure, 
occupation etc. In this setting ε  is the independent error term and 9610 Dαα +  are the 
constant term consisting of a constant and a time dependent constant in 1996. The 
estimated β  is the effect of receiving JRT in 1995 on log of wages in the following 
year.  
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Obviously employees and firms only invest or receive JRT if they expect 
the employee’s productivity to increase, which also means that wages increase. As 
previously mentioned, an individual specific aptitude that is not contained in any of the 
X’s could exist. Thus the estimated effect of JRT might then capture the individual 
specific aptitude instead of the JRT effect (i.e. the simple Mincer equation would 
estimate a positive JRT effect). The estimated β becomes biased because it captures the 
effect of JRT. For example the high paid wage earner already has a high wage due to an 
individual specific effect.  
As mentioned earlier a way to take care of selection that is independent of 
time is looking at wage growth (i.e. before and after receiving JRT). Thus, the problem 
in previous studies of finding an instrument is overcome. So a bias caused by an 
individual specific fixed effect is easily overcome by estimating the effect of JRT by 
using a first difference log wage equation, as follows: 
 
(2) )()()()log()log( 1111111 −+−+−+ −+−++=− ititititititit XXJRTww εεγβα  
 
In other words, in this analysis the log wage increase from 1994 to 1996 is a function of 
a time trend factor 1α , the JRT received between 1994 and 1996 (i.e. JRT received in 
1995) and the difference in observed characteristics between 1994 and 1996 and an 
independent error term. Note that JRT is equal to zero in 1994.  
One could argue that the selection into JRT is time dependent. Therefore it 
is necessary to take the selection of training into account (in the first difference 
estimation as well). By not taking selection into account in the wage growth equation, 
β  would again be biased just like in the simple Mincer equation.  
As described in section 3, previous studies have tried to take training 
selection and individual fixed effects into account simultaneously, but for two reasons it 
is not done here. First, it is not obvious that the selection into JRT is time dependent if 
one thinks about the individual specific effect as an unobserved aptitude for 
implementing the JRT. Second, even if it is time dependent it is difficult to find a good 
instrument. Assuming that a random functional form of observable characteristics can 
identify the likelihood of receiving JRT it is not reliable as argued in section 3. On the 
other hand using an instrument such as Xu(2005) (described in section 3) is feasible if 
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the instrument fulfils two assumptions; correlation with the endogenous variable and the 
orthogonality of the error term. Moreover, Kruger and Rouse’s (1998) use of an 
exogenous change in the JRT program as an instrument is feasible. However, neither a 
good instrument nor an exogenous change is possible in this analysis of the Danish JRT 
in 1995.  
In a job separation situation as earlier mentioned two things have to be 
taken into account. First, as previously indicated it is plausible that there is a combined 
effect of JRT and job separations. Therefore an interaction-term of JRT and job 
separation is included in the model. Second, a potential endogeneity problem exists 
when looking at separations and wage return.  
The endogeneity problem can be overcome if the separation can be 
instrumented. Good instruments are characterized by satisfying two requirements. First, 
the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous variable and because more 
instruments are used it is important to see if the instruments are jointly valid. Second, 
the instruments must be orthogonal to the error term. In other words the instrument is 
not supposed to influence the outcome variable (wage return) other than through the 
endogenous variable (job separation). As explained in section 5 the JRTDS includes 
employees past records on job separations. Thus the individual risk of separating from a 
current job can be instrumented by the individual’s history of job changes. Clearly it is 
necessary to instrument both the job separation variable and the interaction term 
between job separations and JRT. Then the wage growth regression accounting for 
individual fixed effects and the separation selection is estimated in the following way: 
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Where the incidence of separation is estimated in the following way: 
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In equation (3) the change in socio-economic factors are included, )( 11 −+ − itit XX . 
Compared to the simple Mincer wage equation the variables included in equation (3) are 
changes in the socio-economic variables, and not the level. Thus the changes affect the 
wage growth and not the level. Variables such as; experience, tenure, occupation group, 
working industries and working sector have often been included in previous studies. 
Here it does not make sense because first of all the sample is full-time employees 
working in 1994, 1995 and 1996. Therefore experience changes for all employees in the 
sample for two years. Second, tenure is strongly correlated with job separations, 
because all the employees that separate will have no tenure or negative tenure. Third, a 
change of occupational group could change the wage growth, but it does not really help 
explaining the causality of JRT and wage growth. Fourth, changing jobs from one 
industry or sector to another industry or sector could affect the wage growth because the 
different industries and sectors have different wage growth rates. However, in the 
sample hardly any of the employees who separate from their jobs change industry or 
sector. Therefore it is not relevant to include these variables. Instead, only the change in 
the local unemployment rate is included in the equation (3). The local unemployment 
rate affects the employee’s job opportunities and the employers hiring opportunities as 
well as the wage growth in the local areas.   
To sum up, this paper estimates the return to JRT by taking individual 
fixed effects into account and by instrumenting the employee’s likelihood of job 
separations in order to solve the potential endogeneity problem.  
 
8. Empirical results 
The results of the empirical model just described are illustrated in Tables 8 and 9. The 
results contain a simple first difference wage regression on JRT, a first difference wage 
growth regression on JRT and job separations, and finally the first difference wage 
growth regression where job separation is instrumented by past job separations. As 
illustrated in the descriptive section 4, it is sensible to look at the results separately for 
gender and educational background.  
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Instruments 
The reason for instrumenting the job separation decision stems from an assumption that 
an endogeneity problem exists between wage growth and job separations. If 
endogeneity exists then the estimated coefficients will become biased. To overcome the 
endogeneity problem good instruments as explained in section 7 can help.  
Even though the instruments are valid it might be the case that an ordinary 
least square estimator of the regression without the instruments would yield consistent 
estimates and it is therefore reasonable to test the endogeneity assumption. The tests of 
the instruments and the endogeneity are illustrated in Table 10 for both men and 
women. Table 10 illustrates the tests for models both with and without an interaction 
term.  
 In this analysis the first requirement means that the endogenous variables 
(i.e. job separation and/or the interaction between job separation and JRT) have to be 
correlated with the instruments (i.e. number of job separations since 1991; number of 
job separations since 1991 squared; interaction between number of job separations since 
1991 and JRT; interaction between number of job separations since 1991 squared and 
JRT). The relevant test statistics would be from the first stage reduced form equation of 
the endogenous variables on the instrument (see table 10). The test of the strength of the 
instruments is accepted among men with vocational education, because of the relative 
high F-values and first stage estimations are accepted. However, the instruments are 
valid for the models both with and without the interaction term. The instruments do not 
seem valid for all other educational groups among men and women. The number of 
observation is quite small for all educational groups except for men with vocational 
education. A small number of observations can explain why the instruments do not 
show up as valid for educational groups different from men with vocational education. 
Because the instruments only are accepted among men with a vocational education it 
only makes sense to look at the rest of the test statistics for these men.  
In models including at least two instruments it is possible to test for 
overidentification. The Sargan-test tests for joint validity of the instruments (i.e. 
overidentification). Clearly the null hypotheses can not be rejected among men with 
vocational education. Thus the excluded instruments are jointly valid independently of 
including the interaction term. 
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 Finally the additional endogeneity test has been performed through the 
Du-Wu-Hausman test. The test results show that separation is exogenous. Therefore the 
OLS estimator is consistent for men with vocational education. So the interpretation of 
the results should be based on the OLS estimates because the OLS produces lower 
standard errors compared to the IV estimator even if one is looking at models with the 
interaction term.  
 The largest number of observations and reliable test results are among 
men with vocational education. Therefore the test results from this population group are 
applied to the rest of the population. Thus because the test results indicate that 
conclusions should be drawn on the OLS estimates this is done for all men and women 
within all educational groups. 
  
Job separations 
The descriptive statistics indicated a positive correlation between job separations and 
wages. The empirical results in Tables 8, 9, 11 and 12 show a positive effect of job 
separation among men with vocational education. The effect is nearly 3 percent (p-value 
of 18 percent). Even though as the test showed conclusions should be drawn on the OLS 
results it is interesting to look at the IV results for men with vocational education where 
the instruments were valid. Both the JRT effect and the separation parameters increase 
when instrumenting the separation decision, but the parameters are not significant. Thus 
a bigger sample is needed to make further conclusions.   
A job separation among men with further education also increases the 
wage growth significantly. Dependent on the inclusion of the interaction term or not the 
wage return increases between 10 to 15 percent if the employees change jobs. It is 
noticeable that separation affects wage growth in a group where JRT has no effect on 
the wage growth.  
Whereas the combined effect of job separations and JRT do not show up 
among men and women with no education and further education. This effect is found 
among women with a vocational education. The wage return actually increases by 
nearly 17 percent if a woman receives JRT and separates from the job afterwards.  
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For the people without an education and women with further education, 
separations have no effect, but again these results could be due to the small number of 
observations.  
 
The effect of JRT 
The estimated wage returns to JRT with respect to educational background are 
illustrated in Table 8 for men and Table 9 for women. As just discussed the instrumental 
approach does not improve the first difference wage growth estimates. Therefore the 
conclusions will be drawn on the results from the OLS estimations of wage growth.  
The results clearly show that only men and women with a vocational 
education receive a positive return to JRT. JRT has a 3 percent significant and positive 
effect on an employee’s wage growth from 1994 to 1996. Although for women the JRT 
effect is between 2 and 4 percent dependent on the inclusion of the interaction between 
JRT and job separation.  
All other educational groups among men and women are not getting any 
immediate wage return out of receiving JRT. Among employees with a further 
education or no education, JRT affects the wage return insignificantly negative. This 
result is surprising because section 5 showed that employers preferred offering JRT to 
the most skilled employees and the most skilled employees also received the most JRT. 
Thus, one would expect that employees with further education would also receive a 
high wage return from training.    
 All the results estimate the effect of the incidence from training. Now, 
suppose that the length of JRT is important for the wage return of JRT and that the 
vocationally trained received the longest spells of JRT, which is the reason why they 
receive the highest wage return. That could explain the positive results among men and 
women with a vocational background. However, dividing the JRT up into the length of 
JRT within a year, the estimation results in Tables 11 and 12 support the above findings 
and do not show some new surprising causalities. The men and women with vocational 
education receive a positive and significant wage if they receive between 1-5 days of 
JRT. The men’s wage return to JRT is also positive if the JRT duration is 6-10 days. For 
all other educational groups among men and women the wage return to JRT is hardly 
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ever significant, but if it is significant then the return is negative. Thus the differences in 
wage return among educational groups are not explained by the duration of JRT.   
 
Discussion 
Even though JRT is extensive in Denmark for men and women with different 
educational backgrounds, it is surprising that there is only a significant wage return to 
JRT for employees with in a vocational education. In studies from the US and the UK, 
JRT has a significant effect among all employees independent of educational 
background.  
There could be several reasons for the difference in the JRT wage return 
among educational groups and international results. First, because the analysis 
distinguishes between educational groups and gender the number of observations in 
each group becomes small. Therefore some of the insignificant results might become 
significant with more observations. 
Second, as previously argued the Danish wage structure is very 
compressed compared to the US and the UK. Therefore the wage return to JRT is 
expected to be lower in Denmark. Among educational groups the wage structures could 
also be more or less compressed. Looking at the Danish centralised collective 
bargaining agreements for the time period analyzed two main wage systems agreements 
occurred. One was the minimal wage system, where the central bargaining agreement 
resulted in a minimum wage but the individual wages were determined at the local 
workplaces. The other system was the normal wage system, where the central 
bargaining agreement resulted in fixed wage structures for the whole agreement period. 
In its simplest form the normal wage system resulted in no wage flexibility with in a 
workplace except with respect to tenure and job specific assignments. The normal wage 
system was common for the unions for many of the workers with further education, 
whereas the minimal wage system was common for all other education groups. Thus the 
workers with further education seemed to work under a more compressed wage system 
than workers with vocational education and no education. This can explain why no JRT 
effect is observed among workers with further education and an effect is observed 
among the workers with vocational education. Previous studies on wages and the 
influence of JRT or for example motherhood show considerable variations by education 
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level, too (Lynch 1992; Anderson et al. 2002). Thus different wage structures might 
also exist among education levels in other countries as well. 
Third, by looking at the union agreement for office and trade (HK: most 
employees with a vocational education) and the union agreement for lawyers and 
economists (DJØF: most employees with a further education) one might get the 
impression that the wage return to education and training is more formalized among the 
first group. Thus the formalization of the monetary value from JRT causes automatic 
wage return, which means it is not necessary to negotiate on a yearly basis among HK 
employees and employers (as is the case among DJØF employees and employers).  
Finally, there could be other pay-offs to receiving JRT that is not 
measured in wage growth. Suppose that attending a JRT course during work hours is 
better than working. Maybe the course even increases your efficiency. Being more 
efficient may lead to improvements in family and work-life. So the employees do not 
improve wages, but improve their life utility (Quality of Life). This scenario could be 
more relevant among the highly educated (versus those with vocational education).    
The results on separations and a potential endogeneity problem is no cause 
for alarm for all previous JRT studies that treat job separation as an exogenous variable, 
because the test results showed that the OLS estimates were consistent. It is not obvious 
how the results fit into a labor market with a compressed wage structure by looking at 
the separation results regarding men and women with different educational levels. 
However the results support the suspicion that there could be different wage structures 
within different educational levels.  
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper posed the question whether JRT increases future wages. Whereas most JRT 
studies investigate the JRT predictions of the traditional human capital theory (with no 
labor market distortions) this analysis focuses on the JRT and separation predictions of 
the extended human capital theory (with labor market distortions) because the later fits 
the Danish labor market framework better. The empirical results are also more in line 
with the predictions of the extended human capital model with a compressed wage 
structure. 
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Given a unique Danish panel data the empirical wage return model can 
take individual fixed effects into account. Furthermore this JRT study can (as one of the 
first studies) instrument the potential endogeneity between wages and job separations by 
the employee’s historical job separation profile. 
The empirical results are ambiguous within education levels and gender 
groups. JRT has a positive and significant effect on the wage return among men and 
women with a vocational education. Surprisingly no wage return to JRT is found among 
other educational groups. The descriptives clearly show that employees with further 
education participate more often in JRT and employers also prefer offering JRT to the 
most skilled employees. Therefore it is puzzling that employees with further education 
receive no wage return to JRT. Moreover the overall wage return to extensive JRT in 
Denmark is small compared to international findings. This result supports the extended 
model prediction where the wage return to JRT is expected to be small or even zero in a 
compressed wage setting.  
The empirical results on job separations clearly show that women who 
have received vocational education and JRT combined with a job change receive 
relatively high wage increases. On the other hand, men with a vocational education who 
separate from jobs receive a relatively small positive wage growth. Interestingly men 
with further education receive a relatively large wage return to job separation. At the 
same time the JRT has no significant effect among these men.  
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Appendix 1. Literature review 
 
Table A: JRT studies where the outcome variable is wage growth 
Author Data and training definition Method Result 
Arulampalam & 
Booth 2001 
UK: NCDS longitudinal survey on 
1765 young men born march 1121 
and employed in 1981 and 1991. 
Training is work related training 
lasting minimum 3 days between 
1981-1991. 
IV (instrumenting training and number of 
training incidence  through a hurdle negative 
binomial on personal characteristics) 
LS: log (gross hourly wage1991, deflated)-
log(gross hourly wage1981) 
RS: etnicity, disability, firm type, firm size, job 
type, regional ui, highest qualification, training, 
number of training incidence. 
+ training 
0 number of   
training incidences 
+ high education 
Bartel 1995 A panel from 1986-1990 of 3800 
professional employees personal 
records from 1 manufacturing 
firm.  
Training includes core training, 
corporate employee development 
program, technical programs 
IV (instrumenting training through relative wage 
status) 
LS: salary growth 
RS: training, education, length of service in firm, 
change of length of service, occupation dummies, 
year dummies. 
 
Murphy and Topels two-step wage growth 
equation taking into account personal fixed effect 
(using wage differences) and training selection 
(using predicted training probability).  
Overall: 
+ training  
Core programs: 
- training 
 
Blundell, 
Dearden & 
Meghir 1996 
UK: NCDS longitudinal survey on 
2781 person born in march 1958 
and employed 1981. 
Training is non-government 
work-related training courses min 
14 days or 100 hours. 
Quasi-difference model (controlling for 
unobserved fixed effects and productivity 
chocks) 
LS: log(hourly wage1991)-log(hourly wage1981) 
RS: ojt (current and previous), oft (current and 
previous), other training, qualifications, number 
of job changes, regions, occupation, union 
membership, employer size, sector 
Men: 
+ oft > 
+ ojt 
+ job change  
Women: 
+ oft (current) 
+ not changing job 
Education:  
+ ojt (0 level men) 
+ oft (0 level men) 
+ voc. training (0 
level women) 
Booth, 
Francesconi & 
Zoega 2003 
UK: BHPS 950 men born after 
1936 full time employed at the 
survey dates (1991-96). 
Training: Work-related training to 
improve or increase skills in 
current job (not introduction 
training) 
First differences 
LS: annual growth in log (hourly wage) 
RS: changes in union, changes in training and 
interactions training-union, changes in 
(education, tenure,  marital status residential 
location, firm size, current occupation, sector, 
employer, industry, local ui) 
+ training 
+ union 
+ union*training 
Hamil-Luker 
2005 
US: NLS 1977-87 3663 women + 
NLSY79 1988-98 4056 women   
Training: more than 20 hours 
Growth  model 
LS: log hourly wage growh rate 
RS: ojt, oft, race, age, education, experience, 
service occupation, children 
Women no high 
school: 
+ ojt 
Krueger & 
Rouse 1998 
US: Longitudinal data 2 firms 
1991-94 (manufacturing 642 
employees, service 239 
employees) 
Training to low-skilled subsidized 
by the federal government 
IV (instrumenting training through shift)  
LS: log(hourly wage 1991,92,94 or 95) 
RS: Training/ training(1994,95), age, tenure, year 
dummies. 
 
Manufacturing:  
+ train (0,005)  
+ train (IV 0,007) 
Service:  
0 train 
+ train(IV 0,007) 
Lengermann 
1999 
US: NLSY 1979-1993 
Training at least 4 weeks until 
1988. From 1988 any training 
program or ojt designed to 
improve job skills, help finding a 
job, or learn a new job -> construct 
training spells 
Fixed effect 
LS: log wage yearly differences 
RS: years received training 
+company training  
+ formal training 
+ long spells 
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Loewenstein & 
Spletzer  1998 
US: NLSY 1988-1991 
Training: current and previous 
and different kinds and duration. 
Any training program or ojt 
designed to improve job skills, 
help finding a job, or learn a new 
job 
Fixed effect  
LS: log (wage) – log(wage) 
RS: employer paid training (incidence, spells, 
current and previous years), tenure, years, afqt, 
race, gender, age, marital status, children, urban 
city, smsa, local ui, multiple-site firm, number of 
previous jobs, part time work, government 
employment, industry, occupation 
Current year: 
+ formal training 
0 everything else 
Previous years 
other employer: 
+ seminar  
+ business school, 
vocational institute 
etc. 
Loewenstein & 
Spletzer  1999 
US: NLSY 1992-1994 9362 
person-year obs and The Employer 
Opportynity Pilot Project (EOPP) 
1982 1527 employers) 
Training any training program or 
ojt designed to improve job skills, 
help finding a job, or learn a new 
job. 
Log wage growth equation (NLSY employees , 
EOPP estimated wages, but don’t show the 
estimates  refers to Loewenstein & Spletzer 
(1998)) 
 
 
+ general skills 
Lynch 1992 US: NLSY 1979-83, 3064 non-
college graduates.  
Training at least 4 weeks. 
Training program or ojt designed 
to improve job skills, help finding 
a job, or learn a new job 
First difference estimator 
LS: log(hourly wage1983)-log(hourly wage1980) 
RS: Experience, Tenure, Otj, Ofj, 
Apprenticeship, Job-change, Union(1983-1980) 
 
0 otj 
+ oft , apprenticeship  
+ jobchange (0,07) 
+ union (0,13) 
Low skilled women: 
+ jobchange 
Schøne 2001 Norway: FlexCSSD match 
employer-employee data 1995-96 
(1266 firms 103418 wage earners) 
& NSOE survey 1989-93 1352 
private employees. 
Training: predicted required 
training for a certain job 
First difference (Firm level with firm specific 
effects. 
LS: log (hourly wage1996)-log (hourly 
wage1995) 
RS: tenure, experience, education, women share, 
firm size, industry 
Individual: 
+ training 
Firm level: 
0 training 
Veum 1995 US: NLSY79 1986-90. 4614 
persons 21-29 years  
Training: all types of training   
Fixed Effect  (selection term for training) 
RS: Log (hourly wage1990)-log (hourly 
wage1986) 
RS: training (company, apprenticeship, oft, 
business, vocational, correspondence, seminar, 
other), change in tenure, change experience, job 
change, change in firm size, change in union 
membership, change in citysize 
All (- selection) 
0 training 
All (+ selecton)  
+ company training 
+ seminar training 
+ job change 
Men and women 
similar except for  
seminar training 
 
 
Table B: JRT studies where the outcome variable is wage 
Author Data and training definition Method Result 
AKF  Denmark: VEU 1996 & 2000. 
Fulltime employed the quarter 
before training. 
Training: course participants in 
Statistic Denmark registeer  
Matching 
Hourly wage, Yearly wage income 
Further education 
courses: 
+ training 
Vocational courses: 
+ training 
Formal courses: 
0 training / - 
Bassanini 2006 EU:ECHP Employed workers  
25-54 years of age in 15 
countries 1994-00 
Training: the past year 
LS: Gross hourly wage 
RS: training, fixed effect, age, age2, tenure, 
tenure2, firm size, public sector, occupation, 
permanent contract, log hours worked, log hours 
worked 2, number of previous job, reason of job 
change 
Overall: 
+ training 
(Except training at 
previous employer: 
women, more than 35, 
low educated) 
Booth, 
Francesconi & 
Zoega 2003 
UK: BHPS 950 men born after 
1936 full time employed at the 
survey dates (1991-96). 
Training: Work-related training 
to improve or increase skills in 
current job (not introduction 
training) 
Fixed effect 
LS: log (hourly wage) 
RS: union,  training, interactions training-union, 
education, experience, tenure,  marital status 
residential location, firm size, current 
occupation, sector, employer, industry, local ui) 
+ union 
+ union*training 
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Evertsson  
2004 
Sweden: Swedish Survey of 
Living Condition 1994-98. 
10721 employees (part time and 
fulltime same employer for 3 
years receiving training).  
Training financed or arranged 
by employer at least 1 week. 
OLS wage regression 
LS: annual earnings 
RS: industry, education, tenure, experience, 
experience squared, work hours, occupation, 
family status (insert endogenous 
variables:person and work specific 
characteristics) 
Men & Women: 
+ training (0,04) 
No major differences 
between different kinds 
of training. 
Men> women 
 
Frazis & 
Loewenstein 
2005 
US: NLSY 1979-2000 12686 
14-21 in 1979. EOPP Cross 
Sectional  Data 
Training at least 4 weeks until 
1988. From 1988 any training 
program or ojt designed to 
improve job skills, help finding 
a job, or learn a new job  
LS: Log wages on training  
RS: dummy, linear, quadratic, cube root, log, 
dummy+linear, fourier series 
+ employer-financed 
training (also when 
heterogeneity is 
included) 
 
 
Loewenstein & 
Spletzer  1998 
US: NLSY 1988-1991 
Training: current and previous 
and different kinds and duration. 
Any training program or ojt 
designed to improve job skills, 
help finding a job, or learn a 
new job 
LS: log (wage)  
RS: employer paid training (incidence, spells, 
current and previous years), tenure, years, afqt, 
race, gender, age, marital status, children, urban 
city, smsa, local ui, multiple-site firm, number of 
previous jobs, part time work, government 
employment, industry, occupation 
Current year: 
+ seminar  
Number of spells same 
employer: 
+ formal company 
training 
+ seminars outside work 
Number of spells other 
employer: 
+ seminars  
+ business school, 
vocational institute etc. 
Loewenstein & 
Spletzer  1999 
US: NLSY 1992-1994 9362 
person-year obs and The 
Employer Opportynity Pilot 
Project (EOPP) 1982 1527 
employers) 
Training any training program 
or ojt designed to improve job 
skills, help finding a job, or 
learn a new job. 
LS: Log wage 
 
Ojt is general 
+ formal training at 
current employer 
+ formal training at 
previous employer 
Lynch 1992 US: NLSY 1979-83, 3064 non-
college graduates.  
Training at least 4 weeks. 
Training program or ojt 
designed to improve job skills, 
help finding a job, or learn a 
new job  
Heckmann two-stage procedure 
LS: Log(hourly wage1983) 
RS: Previous otj, oft, apprenticeship, Current 
complete and uncomplete ojt, oft, 
apprenticeship, Training selection (mills ratio), 
experience, tenure, school, ui-rate, SMSA, male, 
nonwhite, healthy, married, union, number of 
jobs, industry and occupation dummies 
Previous employer: 
+ Oft   
+ Apprenticeship  
0 Ojt  
Current employer: 
+ Otj 
 
 
Parent 1999 US: NLSY 1979-91 5649 
individuals 14-21 in 1978. 
Employees (at least 6 month 
within last year)  
Training at least 4 weeks. 
Training program or ojt 
designed to improve job skills, 
help finding a job, or learn a 
new job. 
 
IV-GLS  
LS: log (hourlywage 1979) 
RS: Previous otj, oft, apprenticeship, experience, 
tenure, race, gender, marital status, union, 
metropolitan statistical area urban/rural, health, 
regional ui, number of jobs, regions. 
Instrumenting training, experience & tenure 
(through deviation from job-match mean and 
deviation from individual means) 
Firm specificity (Proportional hazard rate) 
Current employer 
+ Training  
Previous employer 
+ Training. 
 
Regnér 2002 Sweden: Swedish Level of 
Living Survey. Employed 18-65 
age. 2636 persons 
Training: Training necessary 
for the job. To what extent is it 
usable in other firms 
LS: log (hourly wage) 
RS: training (length), tenure, tenure2, 
experience, experience2, married, woman, 
private, education, union, work environment, 
manager, firm size, job matching, interaction 
tenure-training 
All: 
+ general human capital 
+ specific human capital 
General>Specific 
Women, public sector: 
+ specific human capital 
Men, private sector: 
0 specific human capital 
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Veum 1995 US: NLSY79 1986-90. 4614 
persons 21-29 years  
Training: all types of training 
Two-step Heckman procedure (training risk) 
RS: Log (hourly wage1990) 
RS: training (company, apprenticeship, oft, 
business, vocational, correspondence, seminar, 
other), male, nonwhite, education, ability score 
(AFQT), tenure, experience, job held, firm size, 
union, ui, citysize, married, health 
All (without selection) 
0 training 
All ( with selection) 
+ company training 
+ seminar training 
+ education 
0 job held 
Men 
+ seminar training 
Women 
+ company training 
+ seminar training 
Xu 2005 China: State and Life Chances 
in Urban China 1949-1994. 
4073 families 
Training: Retrospective 
information up till 7 spells 
Heckman two-stage procedure  
RS: log of wage.  
Excluding restriction: number of children & 
spouse’s training experience 
+ off-job training 
(0,0119)  (0,0107). 
0 firm specific. 
 
 
Table C: JRT studies where the outcome variable is JRT 
Author Data and training 
definition 
Method Result 
Altonji & 
Spletzer 1991 
US: NLSH72 
3181 persons 
Training: incidence, 
duration 
Probit estimation 
LS: 0-1 training received 
RS: experience, experience2, 
education, aptitude, hours of 
subjects, occupations 
OLS 
LS: number of hours training 
received 
RS: see above 
Incidens of training: 
Women>men 
Duration of training: 
Men > women 
More training: blacks, secondary 
education (aptitude minor effect).  
 
 
Arulampalam 
& Booth 2001 
UK: NCDS longitudinal 
survey on 1765 young men 
born march 1121 and 
employed in 1981 and 
1991. 
Training is work related 
training lasting minimum 3 
days between 1981-1991. 
Negbin II hurdle 
LS: number of training incidences 
RS: married, kids, ethnicity, 
disability, schooling scores, 
highest education, occupation, 
private school,  firm type, firm 
size, union membership, training 
prori 
Many training incidences: married, few 
kids, low ui, bad reading score, high 
education, big/”small” company, priori 
training courses 
 
Bartel 1995 A panel from 1986-1990 of 
3800 professional 
employees personal records 
from 1 manufacturing firm.  
Training includes core 
training, corporate 
employee development 
program, technical 
programs 
Logit (probability of training) 
RS: relative wage status, new 
starter, education, length of 
service in firm,  tenure in job,  
recruiting (agency, college, write 
in), year dummies, occupation  
Tobit procedure (days of training)  
RS: same (taking the relative 
status –wage pct. in an 
occupation group- in to account)  
Training (core & technical) 
+ relative status (the stars and starters) 
Training (employee development)  
- relative status (the remedial) 
 
 
Blundell, 
Dearden & 
Meghir 1996 
UK: NCDS longitudinal 
survey on 2781 person born 
in march 1958 and 
employed 1981. 
Training is non-
government work-related 
training courses min 14 
days or 100 hours. 
Probit (likelihood of training) 
RS: age, log wage first job, 
sector, employer size, social 
class, training before 1981, 
number of jobs, education (all the 
variables from 1981) 
High risk: high educated, previously 
trained, high social class, public sector, 
uniom member, large firms. 
Men more likely to take employer provided 
training 
Evertsson  2004 Sweden: Swedish Survey of 
Living Condition 1994-98. 
10721 employees (part time 
and fulltime same employer 
for 3 years receiving 
training).  
Training financed or 
arranged by employer at 
least 1 week. 
Logit (Risk of receiving training) 
 
Multinomial logit (Risk of 
receiving general / firm specific 
/industry specific training) 
High risk: men, high educated 
/socioeconomic status high, long tenure, 
long experience, full time working, not a 
women with presence of small children, in 
public administration 
Men participate more in general specific 
training 
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Krueger & 
Rouse 1998 
US: Longitudinal data 2 
firms 1991-94 
(manufacturing 642 
employees, service 239 
employees) 
Training to low-skilled 
subsidized by the federal 
government 
Probit (likelihood of training) 
RS: age, female nonwhite, 
married, education, tenure, work 
shift, log hourly wage1992, 
production worker, department 
size, job bids 1992, vacation 
1992, performance 1992 
 
Manufacturing: Highest probability of 
training – more education, bidding for job 
openings, low wage 
Service: Highest probability of training – 
more than 4 years tenure, low paid, 
workers in first shift, large departments.  
 
Lynch 1992 US: NLSY 1979-83, 3064 
non-college graduates.  
Training at least 4 weeks. 
Training program or ojt 
designed to improve job 
skills, help finding a job, or 
learn a new job  
Probit (Risk of receiving training) 
RS: male, nonwhite, tenure, 
experience, education, union, ui, 
married, previous training 
Low risk of Oft: young, male, long tenure, 
occupations(professional and technical 
staff, service workers).  
High risk of Ojt: white, male, unionized 
with long experience, in areas with low UI, 
occupations (managers, ales, clerical, craft) 
Maximiano & 
Oosterbeek 
2006 
Netherlands: Monitor Post-
initial Education 2005. 
Employed 16-65. 
Training: participation 
within the last year 
Probit (risk of participating) 
LS: 0-1 training participation 
RS: age, gender, children, 
immigrant, schooling, firm size, 
industry, job permanent, tenure, 
hours contract. 
Willingness to train 
RS: age, gender, children, 
immigrant, schooling, firm size, 
industry, job permanent, tenure, 
hours contract. 
High risk of training: young, well 
educated, permanent job, more work hours, 
less tenure large firms, industries 
(education, health, financial ) 
Employees very willing to train: women, 
with children, many years of schooling, 
from large firms, specific industries 
(education, health) 
Veum 1995 US: NLSY79 1986-90. 
4614 persons 21-29 years  
Training: all types of 
training 
Probit (likelihood of training 
(company, apprenticeship or oft) 
RS: Male, nonwhite, education, 
ability score (AFQT), tenure, 
experience, job held, firm size, 
union, ui, citysize, married, health 
High risk of  company training: well 
educated, high ability, long experience, 
many jobs held, from big firms, union 
member and low local ui 
High risk of  oft training: well educated, 
high ability,  many jobs held and low local 
ui 
High risk of  apprenticeship training: not 
college graduates, high ability,  many jobs 
held, union member 
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Table D: JRT studies looking at separations and promotions 
Author Data and training definition Method Result 
Blundell, 
Dearden & 
Meghir 1996 
UK: NCDS longitudinal survey 
on 2781 person born in march 
1958 and employed 1981. 
Training is non-government 
work-related training courses 
min 14 days or 100 hours. 
Quasi-difference model (fixed effects and 
productivity chocks) 
LS: log(hourly wage1991)-log(hourly 
wage1981) 
RS: promotion, tenure, ojt (current and 
previous), oft (current and previous), other 
training, qualifications, number of jobchanges, 
regions, occupation, union membership, 
employer size, sektor 
Men 
+ promotion 
+ training (smaller) 
Women 
+ promotion 
+ training (smaller) 
Evertsson  
2004 
Sweden: Swedish Survey of 
Living Condition 1994-98. 
10721 employees (part time 
and fulltime same employer for 
3 years receiving training).  
Training financed or arranged 
by employer at least 1 week. 
Logit (Risk of receiving promotion after 
training) 
 
High risk: men 
Low risk: women from 
health care industry 
 
Krueger & 
Rouse 1998 
US: Longitudinal data 2 firms 
1991-94 (manufacturing 642 
employees, service 239 
employees) 
Training to low-skilled 
subsidized by the federal 
government 
Probit (likelihood of turnover)  
LS: not observed in 1994 or 1995 
RS: training, age, tenure, female, nonwhite, 
married, education, work shift, job bids 1992, 
job upgrades 1992 
Ordered probit (likelihood of jobbids or 
jobupgrades) 
Manufacturing & Service: 
training no significant effect 
on separations. (but less 
likely to be laid off) 
Training participants bid for 
more jobs and gets more 
upgrades 
Parent 1999 US: NLSY 1979-91 5649 
individuals 14-21 in 1978. 
Employees (at least 6 month 
within last year)  
Training at least 4 weeks. 
Training program or ojt 
designed to improve job skills, 
help finding a job, or learn a 
new job. 
Hazard model (Cox’s partial Likelihood 
Approach) on spells at employer 
RS:Previous otj, oft, apprenticeship, 
experience, tenure, race, gender, marital status, 
union, metropolitan statistical area urban/rural, 
health, regional ui, number of jobs, regions. 
Taking individual heterogeneity into account 
Less likely to leave when 
training at current employer. 
Increased mobility when 
training at previous 
employer. 
 
 
Source: Weatherall (2007) 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Illustration of the traditional human capital theory 
Source: Weatherall(2007) 
Figure 2. Illustration of the extended human capital theory 
Source: Weatherall(2007) 
JRT 
f(JRT) 
f(JRT) 
w(JRT)=f(JRT)-C 
w(JRT)=f(JRT)-C(JRT) 
No firm-sponsored training 
firm-sponsored training
Wage 
No training 
Firm-specific 
training. 
General 
training 
Time 
Training period 
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Figure 3. Highest education among men 15 years of age or more from 1994 to 2005 
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Source: Statistics Denmark Data Bank (1994-2005) 
 
Figure 4. Highest education among women 15 years of age or more from 1994 to 
2005 
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Source: Statistics Denmark Data Bank (1994-2005) 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Comparison of final sample and full sample 
  Final sample Full sample 
Percentage receiving JRT in 1995 58 49 
Percentage women 45 48 
Percentage job separation in 1996 12 29 
Average wage in 1996 (DKK) 244917 202886 
st.dev 103140 112012 
Average wage growth 1994-96(DKK) 20210 23590 
st.dev 40855 66597 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on JRT in final sample 1994-1996 
    Men  Women 
    
Pct Wage 96
(DKK)
Wage 94-96
(DKK)
Pct Wage 96 
(DKK) 
Wage 94-96
(DKK)
JRT 0 days 44,99 263677,2 20365,484 38,11 184322,19 15687,495
  123896,89 44327,828 61855,286 36114,304
 < 1 day 1,17 254816,89 14664,947 2,24 179482,6 12515,7
  64708,272 12243,764 54869,455 37766,373
 1-5 days 24,35 292813,26 23980,647 31,1 205783,62 17948,825
  113663,51 44759,708 55351,672 32786,035
 6-10 days 13,72 295486,5 22264,901 15,06 223334,59 21592,015
  106498,64 49075,23 67459,648 31168,448
 11-20 days 9,15 295353,31 26299,223 7,76 233305,47 14953,288
  111396,82 42296 70210,609 23845,884
 >20 days 6,61 284717,48 25737,009 5,74 233868,45 24225,104
  88374,066 60793,137 54323,109 34320,379
 Total 100 279321,39 22337,475 100 203407,99 17642,433
     116194,87 45949,927  63540,803 33536,226
Education Non-educated 53,5 235493,74 168171,12 20547,346 18626,428
  77085,489 51869,182 43995,881 36235,475
 Non-educated JRT 46,5 264988,62 195114,99 44,82 19930,419 20264,097
  88286,723 54699,992 42453,31 33986,621
 Total 100   
 Voc.educated 50,37 249585,4 187286,25 16916,468 11013,377
  63175,216 62420,006 33574,265 35733,516
 Voc. educated JRT 49,63 275759,34 206015,85 59,46 24383,997 17739,421
  99242,457 60453,471 39621,047 30535,234
 Total 100   
 Fur. educated 26,44 370262,18 228182,41 32678,973 20228,886
  249510,04 68048,953 70415,994 35777,465
 Fur. Educated JRT 73,56 329885,31 234892,36 82,63 25830,304 19087,42
  118955,75 61145,036 57819,705 31776,696
  Total 100        
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
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Table 3. Probit estimations for receiving JRT 1995 and job separations in 1996 
 Likelihood of JRT Likelihood of separation 
 Men Women Men Women 
Age -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.000 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.007] 
Danish ref. ref. ref.  ref. 
Immigrant 0.170 0.204 0.285 -0.086 
 [0.236] [0.249] [0.273] [0.322] 
Single ref. ref. ref.  ref. 
Single parent 0.412 0.104 0.398 0.485 
 [0.352] [0.173] [0.398] [0.208]** 
Couple 0.119 0.092 0.029 0.131 
 [0.099] [0.113] [0.118] [0.157] 
Couple and parent 0.141 0.039 -0.020 0.012 
 [0.091] [0.110] [0.108] [0.153] 
No education     
Vocational education 0.046 0.224 -0.090 0.042 
 [0.081] [0.090]** [0.103] [0.128] 
Further education 0.330 0.470 0.120 0.089 
 [0.113]*** [0.136]*** [0.137] [0.176] 
Unskilled w.e.     
W.e. low pay -0.044 -5.461 -0.069 -0.091 
 [0.170] [0.463]*** [0.201] [0.463] 
W.e. middle pay -0.213 -5.763 -0.010 -0.097 
 [0.162] [0.447]*** [0.193] [0.449] 
W.e. high pay -0.457 -6.050 -0.137 -0.198 
 [0.156]*** [0.433]*** [0.190] [0.452] 
Top manager -0.647 -6.579 -0.372 -0.400 
 [0.182]*** [0.440]*** [0.226]* [0.479] 
Experience 0.033 0.011 0.001 -0.023 
 [0.013]** [0.011] [0.015] [0.015] 
Tenure -0.003 0.007 -0.016 -0.026 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]** [0.008]*** 
Union member 0.081 0.138 -0.075 0.132 
 [0.105] [0.149] [0.125] [0.204] 
Private sector     
Municipality/region 0.076 0.009 -0.446 -0.477 
 [0.137] [0.142] [0.177]** [0.173]*** 
State -0.261 -0.236 -0.264 -0.277 
 [0.134]* [0.170] [0.165] [0.208] 
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continued 
Hotel and restaurant     
Manufacturing 0.137 -0.548 -0.602 -0.481 
 [0.343] [0.394] [0.357]* [0.458] 
Construction -0.076 -0.524 -0.228 -0.303 
 [0.366] [0.615] [0.381] [0.765] 
Wholesale 0.606 -0.366 -0.101 -0.527 
 [0.350]* [0.400] [0.364] [0.470] 
Transportation 0.536 0.108 -0.118 0.284 
 [0.359] [0.430] [0.377] [0.488] 
Finance 0.703 0.069 0.052 -0.083 
 [0.360]* [0.400] [0.372] [0.458] 
Service / international org 0.746 0.175 -0.295 -0.058 
 [0.358]** [0.403] [0.378] [0.460] 
Electricity / agricultural 0.664 -0.063 -0.634 -0.342 
 [0.412] [0.564] [0.495] [0.731] 
>100 employees     
20-99 employees -0.305 -0.049 -0.208 -0.148 
 [0.077]*** [0.093] [0.098]** [0.130] 
10-20 employees -0.481 -0.089 -0.127 -0.001 
 [0.113]*** [0.125] [0.135] [0.162] 
<10 employees -0.489 -0.158 0.143 0.312 
 [0.129]*** [0.128] [0.147] [0.155]** 
Constant 0.188 6.463 0.420 -0.526 
 [0.405] [0.000] [0.444] [0.693] 
Observations 1618 1341 1618 1341 
log likelihood -1002.58 -763.53 -626.87 -380.57 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.08 
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
 
 
Table 4. Employers opinion on JRT in 1996 
    
Unskilled 
 
skilled/ 
low pay 
Skilled/ 
midle pay 
Manager/ 
high paid 
Prioritize JRT A lot 31,51 40,78 53,26 56,46 
 To an extend 28,93 32,92 32,51 30,23 
 Less  21,97 17,83 10,15 9,62 
 Not at all 17,59 8,47 4,08 3,69 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
Ave. JRT days   3,05 4,3 5,25 6,49 
Ave. cost JRT (DKK) 1069,09 1743,33 2950,91 4329,41 
Ave. wage (DKK) 14158,16 17069,68 18766,8 26950,35 
st.dev   2434,42 2950,618 3638,301 7042,225 
Source: JRTDS the employer survey 1996 
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Table 5. OLS estimations on average JRT days in different workplaces 1996 
 all  Offering JRT Having all 
employee 
groups 
represented 
Offering JRT 
and having all 
employee 
groups  
Private ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Public 0.092 0.068 -0.013 -0.379 
 [0.274] [0.291] [0.520] [0.557] 
Main office ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Affiliates 0.238 0.401 0.189 0.374 
 [0.260] [0.272] [0.392] [0.408] 
single firm -0.756 -0.512 -0.747 -0.415 
 [0.257]*** [0.272]* [0.397]* [0.416] 
Hotel & restaurant ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Manufacture 0.730 0.518 0.384 0.689 
 [0.598] [0.731] [0.938] [0.991] 
Electricity 1.840 1.586 1.578 2.452 
 [1.089]* [1.201] [1.431] [1.532] 
Construction 1.495 1.680 2.183 2.566 
 [0.704]** [0.842]** [1.082]** [1.144]** 
Wholesale 0.115 -0.186 1.047 1.208 
 [0.630] [0.761] [1.036] [1.089] 
Agricultural 0.252 0.003 0.609 0.557 
 [1.008] [1.177] [1.749] [1.763] 
Transport 0.996 0.737 0.134 0.629 
 [0.671] [0.811] [1.086] [1.169] 
Finance 1.322 0.784 0.573 0.652 
 [0.840] [0.951] [1.933] [2.059] 
Service & intern. org. 1.726 1.188 2.099 2.334 
 [0.625]*** [0.757] [1.039]** [1.102]** 
Other 2.107 1.489 1.718 2.060 
 [0.945]** [1.049] [1.475] [1.562] 
no. employees -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.00004 
 [0.0003]** [0.0003] [0.0004]* [0.00039] 
(no. employees)^2  0.00000007 0.00000002 0.00000006 0.00000001 
 [0.00000004]* [0.00000004] [0.00000004] [0.00000005] 
% managers 2.546 2.642 -0.603 -0.534 
 [0.498]*** [0.534]*** [1.082] [1.114] 
% skilled/midle pay 2.468 2.590 0.660 1.232 
 [0.379]*** [0.413]*** [0.746] [0.782] 
% skilled/low pay 2.385 2.532 1.793 2.183 
 [0.465]*** [0.515]*** [0.762]** [0.800]*** 
Human management 0.438 0.242 0.535 0.385 
 [0.058]*** [0.065]*** [0.101]*** [0.111]*** 
Good economy 0.115 0.078 0.125 0.018 
 [0.087] [0.094] [0.137] [0.146] 
Constant 0.518 2.060 1.261 1.995 
 [0.711] [0.873]** [1.223] [1.301] 
Observations 2883 2467 1056 931 
R-squared 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: JRTDS the employer survey 1996 
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Table 6. OLS estimations on average JRT days in workplaces offering JRT within 
different employment groups 1996 
 
Manager/  
high pay 
Skilled/ 
middle pay 
Skilled/ 
low pay 
Unskilled 
 
Private ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Public 0.162 0.313 0.137 0.210 
 [0.326] [0.305] [0.461] [0.363] 
Main office ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Affiliates 0.298 0.268 0.170 -0.017 
 [0.293] [0.281] [0.370] [0.317] 
single firm -0.670 -0.767 -0.758 -1.004 
 [0.293]** [0.280]*** [0.363]** [0.312]*** 
Hotel & restaurant ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Manufacture 0.339 0.496 0.536 0.439 
 [0.852] [0.736] [0.738] [0.640] 
Electricity 1.598 1.885 1.186 1.368 
 [1.293] [1.237] [1.263] [1.220] 
Construction 1.628 1.604 1.345 1.623 
 [0.979]* [0.863]* [0.831] [0.804]** 
Wholesale -0.082 0.092 0.458 0.093 
 [0.885] [0.767] [0.823] [0.690] 
Agricultural 0.687 0.042 0.366 0.159 
 [1.338] [1.293] [1.223] [1.117] 
Transport 0.738 0.858 0.446 0.373 
 [0.930] [0.813] [0.890] [0.743] 
Finance 0.793 1.223 0.239 1.580 
 [1.082] [0.972] [2.129] [1.411] 
Service & intern. org. 1.614 1.719 1.600 1.803 
 [0.884]* [0.766]** [0.838]* [0.697]*** 
Other 2.160 2.144 2.414 1.876 
 [1.212]* [1.063]** [1.401]* [1.154] 
no. employees -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 [0.0003]*** [0.0003]** [0.0004] [0.0004]* 
(no. employees)^2  0.00000010 0.00000006 0.00000006 0.00000006 
 [0.00000004]** [0.00000004] [0.00000004] [0.00000004] 
% managers 2.273 1.899 2.118 1.334 
 [0.585]*** [0.578]*** [0.928]** [0.696]* 
% skilled/midle pay 2.476 2.098 2.117 2.128 
 [0.472]*** [0.446]*** [0.630]*** [0.485]*** 
% skilled/low pay 2.688 2.444 2.841 2.110 
 [0.593]*** [0.562]*** [0.595]*** [0.584]*** 
Human management 0.382 0.367 0.594 0.395 
 [0.070]*** [0.066]*** [0.086]*** [0.073]*** 
Good economy 0.063 0.131 0.068 0.162 
 [0.101] [0.096] [0.121] [0.105] 
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continued 
Wage manager/high pay 0.00004    
 [0.00002]**    
Wage skilled/middle pay  0.00009   
  [0.00003]***   
Wage skilled/ low pay   -0.00003  
   [0.00004]  
Wage unskilled    0.00006 
    [0.00004] 
Constant 0.18652 -0.68938 0.81076 0.19155 
 [1.04836] [0.99926] [1.20127] [1.00777] 
Observations 2283 2434 1332 1915 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: JRTDS the employer survey 1996 
 
Table 7. JRT and separations among employees in final sample from 1994-96 
 Men Women 
  
% 
 
% JRT 
 
Wage 96 
(DKK) 
Wage 94-96 
(DKK) 
%
 
% JRT 
 
Wage 96 
(DKK) 
Wage 94-96 
(DKK) 
Non- educ. 85,25 46,62 250209,49 19519,114 91,08 45,5 180522,62 18518,659 
   86092,191 42037,418   55122,702 33740,326 
Non- educ. 14,75 45,76 243425,56 24545,288 8,92 37,84 177433,05 27960,027 
Separate   68467,615 49766,929   51537,641 47477,672 
Voc.educ. 86,16 47,9 262276,49 19378,658 90,63 58,86 196494,2 14874,951 
   80962,507 36049,251   59507,897 30183,872 
Voc. Educ.  13,84 60,36 264429,38 28364,243 9,37 65,31 217089,06 16348,347 
Separate   101466,61 40928,476   79771,496 52666,235 
Fur. Educ. 82,45 73,18 342038,97 22206,397 90,57 82,19 233229,33 18410,079 
   173227,98 50873,189   62689,317 31395,074 
Fur. Educ.  17,55 75,34 333621,62 53177,616 9,43 86,84 238505,79 27696,158 
Separate   115869,41 92874,934   59709,45 40899,471 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
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Table 8 Estimation of wage growth among men in final sample 1994-96 
Method Ols ols ols 2sls 2sls 
Endogenous    separate separate JRT*sep 
Instrument 
      
js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
No education      
JRT -0,023 -0,024 -0,024 -0,019 0,402 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.057] [0.375] 
separation  0,042 0,041 1,508 2,661 
  [0.040] [0.060] [1.006]# [2.289] 
local ui  0,006 0,006 0,012 -0,025 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.026] [0.043] 
JRT*separation   0,002  -2,812 
   [0.077]  [2.431] 
Constant 0,111 0,124 0,124 -0,075 -0,372 
 [0.017]*** [0.031]*** [0.030]*** [0.165] [0.442] 
Observations 400 400 400 400 400 
R2 0 0,01 0,01 -5,47 -9,49 
Vocational education 
JRT 0,031 0,031 0,029 0,024 0,066 
 [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.016]* [0.017]# [0.046]# 
separation  0,026 0,018 0,137 0,353 
  [0.019]# [0.026] [0.144] [0.318] 
local ui  -0,016 -0,016 -0,016 -0,015 
  [0.009]* [0.009]* [0.007]** [0.007]** 
JRT*separation   0,013  -0,326 
   [0.037]  [0.354] 
Constant 0,068 0,012 0,013 -0,001 -0,02 
 [0.008]*** [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.041] 
Observations 802 802 802 802 802 
R2 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,02 -0,11 
Further education 
JRT -0,014 -0,016 -0,006 -0,014 -0,03 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.025] [0.090] 
separation  0,103 0,146 0,004 -0,149 
  [0.037]*** [0.092]# [0.455] [0.396] 
local ui  0,005 0,005 0,002 -0,001 
  [0.013] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012] 
JRT*separation   -0,057  0,101 
   [0.101]  [0.508] 
Constant 0,102 0,099 0,093 0,107 0,124 
 [0.027]*** [0.036]*** [0.039]** [0.050]** [0.065]* 
Observations 416 416 416 416 416 
R2 0 0,03 0,04 0 -0,08 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
# significant at 20%; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
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Table 9. Estimation of wage growth among women in final sample 1994-96 
Method ols ols ols 2sls 2sls 
Endogenous    separate separate JRT*sep 
Instrument 
      
js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
No education      
JRT -0,03 -0,031 -0,027 -0,019 0,074 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.038] [0.139] 
separation  0,066 0,086 0,567 0,784 
  [0.064] [0.094] [0.435]# [0.395]** 
local ui  0,032 0,032 0,041 0,045 
  [0.017]* [0.017]* [0.021]* [0.022]** 
JRT*separation   -0,051  -1,177 
   [0.116]  [1.749] 
Constant 0,147 0,248 0,248 0,231 0,221 
 [0.026]*** [0.065]*** [0.065]*** [0.073]*** [0.075]*** 
Observations 415 415 415 415 415 
R2 0 0,01 0,01 -0,16 -0,24 
Vocational education 
JRT 0,04 0,038 0,023 0,016 0,031 
 [0.017]** [0.017]** [0.017]# [0.039] [0.126] 
separation  0,021 -0,088 1,083 0,437 
  [0.044] [0.075] [1.046] [0.752] 
local ui  -0,011 -0,012 0,011 -0,003 
  [0.009] [0.009]# [0.028] [0.017] 
JRT*separation   0,168  -0,009 
   [0.091]*  [1.306] 
Constant 0,062 0,022 0,029 0,011 0,018 
 [0.012]*** [0.034] [0.034] [0.064] [0.062] 
Observations 523 523 523 523 523 
R2 0,01 0,01 0,03 -2,37 -0,34 
Further education 
JRT -0,01 -0,011 -0,015 -0,019 -0,039 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.024] [0.026] [0.064] 
separation  0,041 0 0,31 0,186 
  [0.035] [0.055] [0.311] [0.363] 
local ui  0,012 0,012 0,018 0,02 
  [0.011] [0.011] [0.012]# [0.014]# 
JRT*separation   0,047  0,24 
   [0.068]  [0.648] 
Constant 0,097 0,136 0,138 0,135 0,149 
 [0.020]*** [0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.040]*** [0.058]** 
Observations 403 403 403 403 403 
R2 0 0,01 0,01 -0,21 -0,38 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
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Table 10. Test of instruments and endogeneity of job separations on wage return  
  No education 
  Men Women 
Method 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 
Endogenous Separate separate JRT*sep separate separate JRT*sep 
Instrument js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
Observations 400 400 415 415 
R2 (first stage) 0,007 0,015 ; 0,114 0,028 0,036 ; 0,047 
F (df) [2, 395] [4, 393] [2, 410] [4, 408] 
F-value [1,26] [1,49 ;  2,94] [4,63] [3,17 ; 0,41] 
Sargan  
(χ2  df) [1] [2] [1] [2] 
P(Sargan) 0,78 0,77 0,7 0,88 
Du-Wu-Ha 
(χ2  df) [1] [2] [1] [2] 
P(Du-Wu-Ha) 0 0 0,205 0,12 
  Vocational education 
  Men Women 
Method 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 
Endogenous Separate separate JRT*sep separate separate JRT*sep 
Instrument js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
Observations 802 802 523 523 
R2 (first stage) 0,03 0,033 ; 0,125 0,008 0,009 ; 0,048 
F (df) [2, 797] [4, 795] [2, 518] [4, 516] 
F-value [9,13] [5,22 ; 7,22] [0,73] [0,44 ; 0,23] 
Sargan  
(χ2  df) [1] [2] [1] [2] 
P(Sargan) 0,56 0,7 0,06 0 
Du-Wu-Ha 
(χ2  df) [1] [2] [1] [2] 
P(Du-Wu-Ha) 0,425 0,527 0,059 0,648 
  Further education 
  Men Women 
Method 2sls 2sls 2sls 2sls 
Endogenous separate separate JRT*sep separate separate JRT*sep 
Instrument js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
js1991 js1991^2 js1991 js1991^2  
JRT*js1991 JRT*js1991^2 
Observations 416 416 403 403 
R2 (first stage) 0,011 0,019 ; 0,067 0,016 0,019 ; 0,027 
F (df) [2, 411] [2, 409] [2, 398] [4, 396] 
F-value [0,77] [1,21 ;  0,97] [2,06] [1,33 ; 0,48] 
Sargan  
(χ2  df) [1] [2] [1] [2] 
P(Sargan) 0,21 0,4 0,78 0,9 
Du-Wu-Ha 
(χ2  df) [1] [2] [1] [2] 
P(Du-Wu-Ha) 0,822 0,676 0,334 0,553 
 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
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Table 11. Estimation of wage growth among men in final sample 1994-96 
  
No 
education 
Vocational 
education 
Further 
education 
0 JRT ref. ref. ref. 
< 1 day -0.077 0.013 -0.032 
 [0.026]*** [0.019] [0.040] 
1-5 days -0.024 0.047 -0.015 
 [0.028] [0.030]+ [0.030] 
6-10 days -0.006 0.024 -0.009 
 [0.035] [0.014]* [0.036] 
11-20 days -0.053 0.013 0.023 
 [0.028]* [0.016] [0.036] 
> 20 days -0.014 -0.001 -0.006 
 [0.042] [0.018] [0.046] 
Job separation 0.041 0.018 0.146 
 [0.060] [0.026] [0.092] 
Regional ui 0.006 -0.016 0.005 
 [0.007] [0.009]* [0.013] 
JRT* job 
separation 0.004 0.016 -0.055 
 [0.078] [0.037] [0.101] 
Constant 0.125 0.011 0.094 
 [0.030]*** [0.031] [0.039]** 
Observations 400 802 416 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% + significant at 16% 
 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
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Table 12. Estimation of wage growth among women in final sample 1994-96 
  
No 
education 
Vocational 
education 
Further 
education 
0 JRT ref. ref. ref. 
< 1 day -0.276 0.088 0.069 
 [0.153]* [0.100] [0.092] 
1-5 days -0.048 0.035 -0.019 
 [0.040] [0.021]* [0.027] 
6-10 days 0.061 -0.011 -0.010 
 [0.051] [0.024] [0.026] 
11-20 days -0.008 -0.002 -0.037 
 [0.048] [0.026] [0.026]+ 
> 20 days -0.023 0.053 -0.001 
 [0.052] [0.053] [0.028] 
Job separation 0.086 -0.088 0.000 
 [0.095] [0.075] [0.056] 
Regional ui 0.031 -0.013 0.013 
 [0.016]* [0.009] [0.011] 
JRT* job 
separation -0.070 0.163 0.046 
 [0.114] [0.089]* [0.068] 
Constant 0.243 0.027 0.140 
 [0.063]*** [0.033] [0.039]*** 
Observations 415 523 403 
R2 0.03 0.04 0.02 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% + significant at 16% 
 
Source: JRTDS panel data 1994-1996 
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Chapter 3 
Does subsidized adult apprenticeship improve the aggregate level of 
education?  
 
 
Abstract 
  
Denmark introduced a very generous apprenticeship subsidy for 
adults over 25 years of age in 1997 to address the challenges of 
globalization and the increased demand for skills. The aim of the 
adult apprenticeship subsidy (AAS) was to increase vocational 
skills levels among the non-educated in order to fill job 
vacancies (i.e. prevent bottlenecks). The purpose of this paper is 
to evaluate the effect of the AAS on the attendance rate into 
vocational education from 1996 to 2003. Through a simple 
theoretical human capital model, I show that AAS is likely to 
influence education decisions in the whole population. 
Additionally, a simulation of the model illustrates the difficulties 
of finding an empirical strategy capable of evaluating the effect 
of a subsidy in the absence of an obvious control group.  This 
paper empirically examines the effect of the subsidy, given the 
exogeneous shift in AAS in 1997, among the unskilled by the 
difference-in-difference estimator used in international 
educational evaluation studies on a rich panel data. The results 
show that the AAS has a significant positive effect on the 
vocational attendance rate among 25-year-old men in 1998. 
However 25-year-old unskilled women were not affected by the 
subsidy. Additionally, the AAS has no significant effect on the 
attendance rate after 1998. Thus, the results do not 
unambiguously find that a generous AAS increases the 
attendance rate among the non-educated. 
 110
1. Introduction 
Due to increased globalization and international competition, developed countries 
compete by upgrading the skills of their labor force (OECD 2006). One method of 
development is to upgrade skills through adult apprenticeship programs for non-
educated adults, a particularly vulnerable group with high unemployment risk. The 
focus of this paper is on skill upgrading through an adult apprenticeship subsidy (AAS).  
Denmark and many other OECD countries have initiated many programs 
to increase the education level in the population. In contrast to other countries nearly all 
people involved in vocational or further education in Denmark are entitled to a very 
generous subsidy or wage. Furthermore vocational education in Denmark is mainly 
obtained through an apprenticeship. The apprenticeship program is a common way of 
receiving vocational skills in Denmark, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. On the other 
hand, in countries such as the UK, the US and various EU countries, apprenticeship 
programs play a rather small role.  
The Danish AAS was introduced in 1997. To my knowledge, no other 
OECD country has ever introduced such a generous AAS. The AAS increase on average 
an apprentice’s income by more than 30 percent. The Danish AAS is offered mainly to 
unskilled people over 25 years old, independent of their family background or income, 
so that they can receive a vocational education, which helps prevent bottlenecks in the 
labor market. An AAS is only available to people starting an apprenticeship in an 
industry listed as a “bottleneck” industry by the regional labor market board. In all 
regions (see sample list in appendix A) vocational fields with a high proportion of 
female students (e.g. office and trade, food and domestic production and healthcare) 
rarely make the list. This paper conducts separate empirical analyses for women and 
men because of the clear gender differences in potential subsidy areas.  
The history of the AAS program is that the subsidy became permanent 
after a successful one-year tryout period. Figure 1 shows that, except for 1997, at least 
2500 persons start an apprenticeship with an AAS every year.25 About 10 percent of all 
people over 25 in an apprenticeship position receive AAS. More than 70 percent of all 
subsidized apprenticeships in 1997 and 1998 are men. Although, the gender distribution 
has become more balanced over the years, in 2004 men still comprise the majority. 
                                                 
25 A late approval date in 1997 may explain the highest number of new starters in 1998, as section 2 will 
discuss in detail. 
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Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the overall number and share of new apprentices 
increased slightly in 1997-1999. That a reasonable share of the apprenticeships were 
subsidized and that the number of people starting apprenticeships increased in 1997 and 
1998 led the authorities to claim that the AAS was a success (PLS Consult, 1999).  
This paper questions the “success claim” after 1998 by examining whether 
the AAS increases apprenticeships among people over 25 years old at the expense of 
apprenticeships among people under 25 years old. Figure 3 supports the claim by 
showing that the apprenticeship attendance rate among unskilled men increases for 25-
year-olds but not for 24-year-olds in 1998, the year in which the subsidy was expected 
to be fully introduced. Figure 4 shows that age does not appear to influence the 
attendance rate for 24-year-old and 25-year-old women to the same extent as for men. 
Another obvious question to ask is whether it is a ‘success’ if the AAS 
made people who would have continued their academic education change to a 
vocational education instead. By simulating a simple human capital model with and 
without an AAS, this paper shows the relevance of both questions. The simulation 
results can also illustrate the complications arising from an empirical evaluation of a 
subsidy, given the lack of a perfect or obvious control group. 
Previous empirical studies have evaluated the incentives and the returns to 
apprenticeships in Germany (Harhoff and Kane 1997), the Netherlands (Smits and 
Zwick 2004), Austria (Soshice 1994), Switzerland (Wolter and Mühlemann 2006), the 
US and the UK (Elbaum and Singh 1995).  However, due to the non-existence of AAS 
in other countries, no studies have ever evaluated the effect of an AAS on the enrolment 
into vocational education. Instead, several international studies have looked at the effect 
of subsidies to college students. In a Danish study an increase in student aid increases 
the demand for college, but the increase is a lot less than found in other studies (Nielsen 
et al 2006). For example, US studies show that generous college subsidies to 
disadvantaged families increase enrolment into colleges significantly (Dynarski 1999, 
Manski & Wise 1983, Angrist 1993). These positive results of educational subsidies on 
college enrolment suggest that a generous AAS would increase the enrolment into 
vocational training. Introducing an AAS is expected to influence not only the 
individual’s choice of skill level but also government spending, income and wage 
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distribution, which should also indirectly affect firm demand for labor. 26  However, this 
paper will only empirically evaluate if the AAS initiative increases the attendance rate 
of vocational education among non-educated adults (i.e. the direct effect).  
The empirical analysis applies the different eligibilities among age groups 
and the introduction of the subsidy in 1997 on a rich Danish register panel from 1995 to 
2004. The age-specific eligibility means that an AAS applicant has to be at least 25 
years old. Groups above and below 25 years of age are represented in the Danish data. 
The AAS was first available in 1997, and the Danish data includes information on 
people receiving AAS and people not receiving AAS before and after 1997. Combining 
the facts and the available data makes it possible to identify the effect of AAS, by 
comparing the unskilled 25-year-olds who are eligible for an AAS with the non-eligible 
unskilled 24-year-olds from 1996 to 1998. One could argue that comparing all age 
groups above and below 25 years of age would capture the AAS effect better. However, 
doing so would jeopardize the identification strategy because the 20-year-olds are not 
obviously comparable to the 30-year-olds. Thus the empirical analysis focuses on the 
subsidy effect among the group of unskilled (who have delayed their studies), who are 
suddenly exposed to the possibility of a subsidy. Therefore the results revolve around an 
empirical partial analysis and should not be confused with the total effect of an AAS. 
  Countries such as the US, the UK and Germany treat apprenticeship 
programs as a good way of improving the skills of the non-educated. The question is if 
an AAS is the best way to improve vocational skills among the non-educated adults. As 
the results of this paper’s empirical AAS evaluation are vital to the evidence on whether 
or not the AAS works in Denmark, this paper contributes to the international public 
debate on using subsidies to improve vocational skills in developed countries for the 
purpose of increasing future employment. 
The paper is set up as follows: Section 2 describes Danish students 
financing possibilities when they take vocational or further education (i.e. short and 
long continued academic pursuits). Section 3 uses an extended theoretical human capital 
model to illustrate the effect of an AAS. In section 4, I simulate the theoretical model to 
                                                 
26 The literature shows that introducing a subsidy can be optimal for society. Suppose individuals have 
less information about the future than the government and therefore individuals find it risky to start an 
education. Because the government has more information it intervenes (e.g. subsidy to education). The 
intervention removes individual uncertainty indirectly. Thus the individuals make educational choices 
that are optimal for society (Manski 1989; Dynarski 1999) 
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show that a subsidy influences all people’s education decisions and that a proper control 
group is difficult to find. Section 5 discusses the implications of using the difference-in-
differences estimator as a possible empirical strategy. Section 6 describes the rich 
Danish register panel data. The empirical results of the effect of an AAS on the 
attendance rate into vocational education are analysed in section 7. Section 8 concludes.   
 
2. Institutional framework 
This section describes the generous Danish educational system showing that non-
educated people in Denmark have several financially supported education options for 
increasing skills. I put different educational financing possibilities into perspective 
through an example comparing a carpenter in a traditional apprenticeship with a 
carpenter in an apprenticeship with AAS and an economist taking further education. 
In Denmark the share of skilled adults has increased drastically over the 
last decade. In 1995 around 60 percent of the adult population between 25-64 years of 
age had an upper secondary education and about 25 percent of the population between 
25-34 years of age had no education (OECD 1997). By 1999 the share of Danish adults 
with an upper secondary education increased to 80 percent, while less than 15 percent of 
these 25 to 34 years of age had no education (OECD 2001). Thus, Denmark became 
part of a select group of countries (the Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland and the US) with the highest skilled adult population. The higher skill level 
in the Danish population is a result of more people taking vocational and further 
education. In 1997 about 118.000 were registered in vocational education (including 
apprentices and apprentices with an AAS) and 173.000 students were taking a short or 
long term further education. In 2004, vocational education and further education 
increased to about 121.000 and 202.000, respectively (Statistical Yearbook 2006). 
 Although Denmark didn’t have the highest skilled adult population in 
1995, the government spent more than 6,5 percent of GDP on educational institutions. 
The share of government spending was one of the highest among OECD countries and 
still is today (OECD 2006). Furthermore, expenditure per student increased by 10 
percent simultaneously with the increase in skill level among the Danish adult 
population from 1995-1999. 
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Overall, the Danish educational system is very generous. Tuition at Danish 
public and most private educational institutions is free for Danish students and for all 
EU/EEA27 students, as well as for students participating in exchange programmes.28 
Nearly all trainees and students receive either a wage decided by a union agreement or a 
student state grant at some point during their education. Although there are multiple 
education possibilities in Denmark, for simplicity this paper will categorize education in 
three groups chosen to illustrate the differences in individual opportunities for financing 
education: apprenticeship (vocational education), apprenticeship with an AAS 
(vocational education) and further education. 
The normal procedure for starting an apprenticeship is to apply at a 
vocational institution. For some education types the enrollment acceptance rate is every 
5 weeks; for other types it is 10 weeks, depending on the availability. The education is 
divided in two parts. The first part is the introduction, consisting of course work, which 
lasts for a maximum of 20 weeks. The second part, the main education, takes place 
primarily at a workplace (if the apprentice finds a spot) and for a short period every year 
in an educational institution. An apprenticeship takes 3,5 years on average. Depending 
on the vocational field, the shortest education period is 2,5 years and the longest is 5,5 
years.29 The workplace pays the apprentice a wage agreed upon by the unions. When 
the apprentice is at school, although he or she still receives a wage, the employer is 
reimbursed from the Employers Reimbursement Fund during the schooling period. The 
wage increases dramatically over the education period even though the wage normally 
does not reach the minimum wage level.  
Although the traditional apprenticeship system has been functioning for 
many years, subsidized adult apprenticeship only began in 1997. As mentioned earlier, 
AAS is offered by the authorities primarily to unskilled unemployed and employed 
people over 25 years old who want to take a vocational education in a bottleneck 
industry. The idea is to subsidize the employers so that the apprentices receive a regular 
wage, not a student wage. The aim is to create a win-win situation in which the 
employer gets a more qualified employee and the employee receives better future wages 
                                                 
27 European Economic Area 
28 From 2006 all other students have to pay a tuition fee 
29 Including the basic education that takes between 5 and 20 weeks 
 115
and employment possibilities − with neither the employer nor the student suffering 
economically.30  
In 1997, the first AAS to an employer hiring a previously unemployed 
apprentice was 40 DKK (Danish kroner) per hour. The AAS for hiring employed 
apprentices was 35 DKK per hour. The employer received the AAS for the first 2.5 
years of employing the apprentice. Furthermore, the employer received a higher 
reimbursement when the subsidized apprentice attended school than when an ordinary 
apprentice attended school. In 1998 and 1999 minor changes were made to the 
regulation about complaints and details in the wage bargaining agreement. In 2003, the 
AAS was changed so that all employers received a wage subsidy of 35 DKK an hour no 
matter which kind of apprentice they employed. In 2005 a minor change mandated the 
Danish Labor Market Board to pinpoint the bottleneck industries.  
An apprentice with or without an AAS obviously is very dependent on the 
current labor market situation and the availability of apprenticeship openings. An AAS 
application may possibly be rejected even if a workplace offers an apprentice a spot in a 
bottleneck industry. Table 8 shows that even though certain educational fields were 
specified as bottleneck areas in Greater Copenhagen in 2004, some of the apprentices 
did not have an AAS in these fields. The reason why not all apprentices over 25 years of 
age in bottleneck industries receive an AAS is that the local labor market authorities 
evaluate each individual application at the time they receive it. Thus, the labor market 
situation in which an apprentice negotiates a contract with a workplace might differ 
from when the authorities evaluate an application. Additionally, if someone in an 
apprenticeship program has no workplace connection in certain bottleneck industries, 
AAS application will be denied. Despite these rejections, however the majority of 
applications are accepted (e.g. Greater Copenhagen Area accepted about 65 percent of 
the applications between 1997 and 2004). 
 Although the AAS was a new initiative in 1997, in the early 1990s the 
unskilled workers unions were already encouraging their members to start an 
apprenticeship even without a subsidy. The motivation derived from the fact that a lot of 
members were working as unskilled workers in fields that were transforming into 
skilled labor occupations. Thus, the unions helped their members analyze their abilities 
                                                 
30 The consequences for the state are debatable (i.e. it is not necessarily a socially optimal solution to 
subsidize apprenticeships). The debate is not included in this paper. 
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and skills, and found ways to help them begin further vocational education in the 
workplace. Additionally, the unions helped their members negotiate a reasonable wage 
during their studies. The unions also worked to get the employees’ work experience to 
count in the education and thus shorten the educational period. Due to the union efforts, 
even in the early 1990s, the attendance rate among older people with work experience 
was expected to increase. But these union initiatives didn’t stop in 1997. Therefore, one 
might think that these initiatives, and not the AAS, caused the increase in the vocational 
education attendance rate for people over 25 years old. If this is true, then the overall 
effect of an AAS would be overestimated. However, because the union initiatives have 
no age restriction, I expect that both 24-year-olds (not eligible for an AAS) and 25-year-
olds (eligible for an AAS) are affected equally by these initiatives.    
In early 1996, the unions knew about the upcoming AAS reform. They 
heavily promoted the reform to their members and to workplaces. Additionally, the 
unemployment offices informed the unemployed about the introduction of the new 
AAS. Thus workplaces, the unskilled employed, and the unemployed were well 
informed about the generous AAS. Although all the people eligible for a subsidy 
appeared well informed, there still existed a delay in applications and acceptances. For 
example, the Greater Copenhagen Area authority received its first application on April 
21, 1997, and the application was not approved until June 19, 1997. Furthermore, the 
area received nearly four times as many applications in 1998 as in 1997. This paper 
evaluates the effect of AAS in 1998 because it is the first year with no obvious 
application and approval delays.    
Compared to the apprenticeship system (with and without AAS) the 
structure and the financing of further education are very different. First of all, students 
apply once a year for further education and the enrolment occurs either once or twice a 
year. Every Danish resident over the age of 18 is entitled to public support for his or her 
further education. The support for students' living costs is awarded by the State 
Educational Grant and Loan Scheme. The subsidy system is managed by the State 
Educational Grant and Loan Scheme Agency in collaboration with educational 
institutions and is under the supervision of the Danish Ministry of Education.31 Every 
student enrolled in a higher education course is entitled to a number of monthly grants 
                                                 
31 The annual budget amounts to over 11 billion DKK, around 0.8 per cent of GNP. 
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corresponding to the prescribed duration of the chosen study, plus 12 months.32 In 
combination with student grants, students are offered supplementary state loans with 
very favourable interest rates.33 
To illustrate the financial differences among educations, I compare the 
financial situation of a Danish carpenter apprentice with and without an AAS and a 
Danish economics student (see table 2). Each column represents an average apprentice 
or student. The example in Table 2 shows that it is very beneficial for a person to 
postpone apprenticeship until he or she is 25. The reason is that taking an apprenticeship 
with an AAS increases the apprentice’s pay for the entire education period to nearly 40 
percent. Compared to the economics student, the apprentice with an AAS earns double 
in a shorter period. Thus, the carpenter apprentice with an AAS is financially better off 
than a carpenter apprentice without AAS or an economics student. In this example, even 
the employer is financially better off by hiring a carpenter apprentice with an AAS 
rather than a traditional apprentice. Furthermore, the employer might see an advantage 
in having a more mature apprentice (more than 25 years of age) who can finish his or 
her education more quickly due to work experience. 
Overall, this example shows that during an education period an 
apprenticeship with an AAS is beneficial for the apprentice and his or her employer. 
However, choosing an education demands taking three other factors into account. First, 
the return on education is important. The example makes clear that the starting wage for 
an economist is dramatically higher than the starting wage for a carpenter. Second, the 
opportunity cost of postponing education due to the AAS can be quite extensive and can 
reduce life time earnings. Third, the personal cost of becoming a carpenter instead of an 
economist might be very extensive depending on a person’s aptitudes. Taking a choice 
against one’s aptitudes could reduce the lifetime earnings of a carpenter. The financial 
and personal costs and the lifetime earnings are included in the theoretical human 
capital model that follows.   
  
                                                 
32 Within a maximum of 70 monthly grants students can change from one course to another. Further 
extension is possible due to sickness or childbirth. Students living at home with their parents or working 
extensively have reduced grants. 
33 The grants take up 2/3 of the total support and loans 1/3. The interest rate for the loans is set by 
Parliament. Students must start paying back state loans no later than one year after the end of the year in 
which they graduate or give up their studies. The loan must be repaid within 15 years. About half of all 
students make use of state loans. 
 118
3. The theoretical model for subsidized adult apprenticeship 
By extending the traditional human capital theory (Becker 1962), this section shows the 
expected theoretical effect of introducing an AAS in Denmark. In Becker’s traditional 
human capital framework, an individual maximizes discounted lifetime earnings net of 
schooling cost. Then the optimal choice of schooling occurs when the marginal cost of 
schooling equals the marginal benefit of schooling. Introducing a schooling subsidy 
reduces the cost of schooling, thereby increasing the demand for schooling. 
Extending the human capital framework by introducing a subsidy to only 
one type of education and not to others makes the schooling decision framework more 
complicated. The basis for the model is that an AAS is given to non-educated 
individuals over 25 years of age taking an apprenticeship. The theoretical model 
assumes that individuals have information about the AAS from day one, meaning that 
they decide on education paths from day one.34 Thus the model is static. Furthermore, 
all workers are assumed to receive jobs that match their skills. Although, Albrecht et al. 
(2006) point out that assuming all workers can get jobs is not realistic. Therefore this 
model is applied strictly for illustrative purposes. Thus, no need exists here for 
complicating the set-up of the model.  
In this extended model, a person’s life is divided into six discrete time 
periods that fit the real education-work life decision framework (i.e. t=1 18-24 years of 
age; t=2 25-31 years of age; t=3 32-38 years of age; t=4 39-45 years of age; t=5 46-52 
years of age; t=6 53-59 years of age).  The assumption is that a person who takes an 
education in the first time period of his or her career has five time periods in which to 
receive the return of the educational skills he or she obtained in the first period. If the 
person instead takes an education in the second time period, it is assumed that he or she 
has only four time periods in which to receive the return of the obtained educational 
skills. More specifically, the assumption is that the first period, 1=t , it is possible to 
work or study but without an AAS. In the second period, 2=t , it is possible to work or 
study and receive an AAS while being an apprentice. From the third to the sixth period, 
6,5,4,3=t  it is only possible to work. Assuming at least four periods of work following 
                                                 
34 This assumption is in contrast to recent dynamic human capital literature, which includes dynamics in 
the wage setting (i.e. the schooling decisions change over the lifecycle) (Wolpin & Keane 1997). 
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education is necessary in a model for the Danish labor market with high unskilled 
wages, because else no one would study.  
Individual i can choose among five occupational alternatives: take an 
apprenticeship, svs, attend further education, sfs, work as an unskilled employee, ens, 
work as an employee with vocational skills, evs, or work in high-skilled job, efs.35 It is 
not possible to combine the different occupation alternatives in same time period, and 
not all alternatives are available at each period. Diagram 1 illustrates the different 
choices an individual can take at different time periods. The diagram shows that five 
different lifetime paths existing this extended human capital model. A person can obtain 
a job requiring vocational or further educational skills only if that person has previously 
taken the specific education. In other words, a person can only receive a vocational 
skilled wage if he or she has taken an apprenticeship in one of the previous periods. 
The individual’s maximization problem is to choose the lifetime path that 
maximizes lifetime income. Suppose , , 1k t id =  when individual i chooses occupation k in 
period t . The lifetime reward (benefits minus costs), Ri, for individual i can be written 
as 
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In this simple model the work and education reward is clearly separated because only 
the cost of education is a function of individual characteristics. For simplicity the 
reward of working ( 1, =tkd when , ,ns vs fsk e e e= ) is only a function of the wage related 
to a certain education level. 36 Thus the wage equation is a function of a constant term, 
see equation (2). 
 
(2)  k kR w=    when , ,ns vs fsk e e e=  
 
                                                 
35 Unemployment is not included as a state. But in this model they could be a small group under the group 
working as non-skilled.  
36 Traditional human capital theory: Wage is a function of skill accumulation and years of experience in a 
certain occupation (often in a quadratic form) 
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The reward of attending school ( , 1k td = when ,vs fsk s s= ) is extended from the 
traditional human capital investment idea by including a fixed direct cost of schooling 
and an indirect cost of schooling. The direct cost is student fees, kc , which do not 
change over time. The direct cost is reduced if the student can receive an AAS. In this 
case the AAS, ,k taid , is both age- and education-specific. Thus only apprentices who 
start in the second time period (above 25 years of age) receive a subsidy. Therefore only 
02, >vsaid .37 The indirect cost is divided into two parts. The first part captures an 
individual’s initial aptitude for a certain education, which is education and individual 
specific, ikic ,1 . The second part of the indirect cost captures the individual’s readiness 
for starting school, which is time- and individual-specific, ,2t iic . Thus, if an individual’s 
ability for studying varies with respect to the education stream, then the cost of studying 
different types of education varies, too. A key assumption is that the cost of education 
varies with time based on the idea that costs change when people mature or change 
social and economic status over time. For example, a person could mature over the 
years − thereby reducing the cost of studying − and then decide to take an education 
over a number of years. Then the reward of attending education for individual i in 
period t can be written: 
 
(3)  ittktkkitk icicaidcR ,,,,, 21 +++−=  when k=vs ,fs 
 
In Denmark one can think of 0ve fec c= <  because all students receive a fixed subsidy to 
live on  while studying. Therefore the cost might be negative. Now it is possible to 
express an individual’s choice of education over a lifetime by the following value 
function: 
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37 The students have to have an agreement with a workplace; this restriction is not taking into account in 
the simple framework. 
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More specifically, an individual i’s education-employment choice has to maximize the 
utility over life time. This means that the individual has a static optimization problem 
and thereby has to decide between the values discounted by δ of the five lifetime paths 
illustrated in diagram 1.  
 This analysis focuses on the optimization problem where the pathway 
including apprenticeship with an AAS is compared with the other four pathways, 
because this paper looks at the effect of an AAS. First, an analysis of the amount of 
subsidy that is necessary to make an individual indifferent between taking an 
apprenticeship with AAS or taking no education at all: 
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Similar to the traditional human capital framework, this simple extended model shows 
that an individual is indifferent to taking an apprenticeship with an AAS or taking no 
education if the return to a vocational education is equal to the opportunity cost of 
taking a vocational education. Clearly the small wage differences between no schooling 
and apprenticeship and the high costs of apprenticeship increase the amount of AAS 
necessary for making an individual choose apprenticeship over no education at all. 
Second, an individual is indifferent to taking an apprenticeship as an adult 
with an AAS and taking an apprenticeship without an AAS  earlier in the lifetime path  
when: 
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This result indicates that if the costs of vocational education increase a lot over the 
lifetime, then the AAS for delayed education has to be comparably large for an 
individual to delay education rather than starting vocational education early. 
Furthermore, the higher the unskilled wage, the less money through an AAS is 
necessary for making an individual choose delayed apprenticeship − the opposite from 
the scenario of subsidized apprenticeship with no education at all.   
The third scenario in which an individual is indifferent to taking an 
apprenticeship with an AAS or taking further education at an early age is the following: 
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If the return to further education is relatively high and the cost concerning further 
education is relatively small, then the AAS has to be relatively high to make the 
individual indifferent to apprenticeship with an AAS or taking further education early in 
life. 
This discussion leads to the final scenario, in which the individual is 
indifferent to delayed apprenticeship with an AAS or delayed further education. 
 
 
 123
(8) 
fsiifsfsns
vsvsiivsvsns
wiciccw
waidiciccw
)()21(
)()21(
5432
,2,
5432
2,,2,
δδδδδ
δδδδδ
++++−−−+=
+++++−−−+
  
<=> ifsivsfsvsvsfsvs icicccwwaid ,,
432****
2, 11))(( −+−+−+++= δδδδ  
=> 
⎩⎨
⎧=
vsvsvsvsvsns
fsfsfsfsfsns
tk eeeese
eeeese
d
,,,,,
,,,,,****
,  if   ****
2,2,
****
2,2,
vcvc
vcvc
aidaid
aidaid
>
≤
  
 
Clearly, if the return to further education is relatively large compared to the return to 
vocational education, then the AAS has to be very large to make the individual 
indifferent to a lifetime path including an apprenticeship with an AAS or a lifetime path 
including delayed further education. 
The discussion of the different scenarios makes evident that an 
introduction of an AAS affects the choice among all the different educational paths. The 
AAS actually increase the demand for attending apprenticeships, given an income 
effect, a substitution effect or a postponement effect.  
An income effect is defined as the increase in demand for apprenticeships 
among the non-educated due to the indirect increase in the return to vocational 
education. The return increases because the AAS reduces the cost of taking the 
education, not because the wage of vocational skills increases. In this setting the income 
effect occurs when the introduction of an AAS makes a non-educated individual 
become an apprentice. The Danish authorities seem to have introduced the AAS 
because they believed that the income effect would be strong among the non-educated, 
thereby increasing their demand for vocational skills.     
Another effect that has to be considered is the substitution effect. The 
substitution effect is defined as the increase in demand for subsidized apprenticeships 
among those who otherwise take further education. Again, the return of a delayed 
apprenticeship increases because the AAS reduces the cost of vocational education 
while the cost of further education remains the same. Thus, a person who previously 
wanted to delay further education prefers taking a delayed apprenticeship with an AAS 
instead. Actually, the person substitutes a further education with an apprenticeship at 
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the expense of a decreased demand for further education. The substitution effect 
increases the demand for vocational education.  
Finally the introduction of an AAS can result in a postponement effect. 
The postponement effect is defined as the increase in demand for delayed 
apprenticeships with an AAS among young people who normally would have started 
education earlier in their life (i.e. before 25). The young person receives a higher return 
by postponing his or her studies because the AAS decreases the cost of taking an 
apprenticeship later. Thus, at the expense of a decreased demand for education among 
young people, the demand for vocational education increases among adults as a result of 
the postponement effect.  
This analysis of the extended human capital model makes clear that the 
introduction of an AAS increases the attendance rate to vocational education among 
adults more than 25 years of age. The goal of the AAS is exactly to increase the demand 
for vocational skills. The problem is that the analysis also shows that the increased 
demand for vocational skills among adults is to some extent the result of a decreased 
demand for other education types. This result contradicts the general goal of trying to 
improve the overall skill of the workforce. The size of the partial effect and the total 
effect of introducing an AAS is better illustrated in a simulated theoretical model using 
“real” life numbers from Denmark. This is the focus of the next section. 
 
4. A simulation of the introduction of the Danish AAS 
The effect of an AAS can be difficult to analyze empirically because the total effect 
consists of different partial effects. Simulating the previous theoretical model with and 
without an AAS allows us to illustrate some of the different effects that occur. Thus, the 
simulated model can illustrate the increase in demand for vocational education due to 
substitution, income and postponement effects.  
In the extended human capital model just described in section 3, 
individuals’ heterogeneous preferences, costs and abilities are captured in the cost setup. 
As is common in the literature, this paper does not contain any information about each 
individual’s cost function with respect to a certain education. Instead, I create and use 
different possible cost functions in the simulated model. Two cost scenarios illustrate 
the effect of an AAS on the educational attendance rate. In both cost scenarios the 
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assumption is that the costs of education, c , vary across j educations and t time periods 
as follows:  
 
(9 )  itjitjitjc ,,,,,, βα +=   where  fsvsj ,=  2,1=t  
 
where the costs are a function of an individual’s initial aptitude for a certain education, 
α , and time cost for taking a certain education, β . Thus, α and β are comparable to 
1ic and ic2 in the theoretical model just described. The first simulation assumes that the 
costs of studying vary independently within and across education streams and time in 
the following way:  
 
(9a)  ivsivsivsc ,1,,1,,1, βα +=   
(9b)  ivsivsivsc ,2,,2,,2, βα +=   
(9c)  ifsifsifsc ,1,,1,,1, βα +=   
(9d)  ifsifsifsc ,2,,2,,2, βα +=   
 
The independence assumption means that the aptitude-cost of an apprenticeship in the 
first time period is uncorrelated with the aptitude-cost of an apprenticeship in the second 
period. Furthermore, the cost of delaying the apprenticeship is uncorrelated with the 
cost of delaying further education. Even though the assumptions are simple, the 
simulated model predictions follow the results from the theoretical model described in 
section 3.  
The second cost scenario assumes that costs vary across education streams 
and time but not within education and time:  
 
(10a)  iivsivsc ,1,,1 βα +=   
(10b)  iivsivsc ,2,,2 βα +=   
(10c)  iifsifsc ,1,,1 βα +=   
(10d)  iifsifsc ,2,,2 βα +=   
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In other words, it is assumed that a person who has high vocational aptitude when 
young also has high vocational aptitude as an adult. The same is true for the cost of 
time. Thus if it is costly to postpone vocational education, it is also costly to postpone 
further education. The second cost scenario might seem more realistic than the first, and 
the simulated models predictions will show the expected results as well.   
  As an illustration the changes in the educational distribution caused by 
introducing an AAS in Denmark, the simulated model includes some realistic numbers. 
Table 3 presents the actual wages and educational distribution from 1996 applied in the 
simulation. Table 3 shows that the non-educated are on average paid the least, and that 
employees with further education are paid the most. Employees with vocational skills in 
Denmark have on average not even earned 20 percent more per hour than non-educated 
employees. Table 3 also shows that approximately 37 percent of 30-year-olds have 
taken a vocational education before they turn 25, whereas not even 4 percent take one 
after they turn 25.  However, among 30-year-olds who take a further education, the 
percentages are 20 and 7, respectively. Among 30-year-olds, more than 30 percent had 
no education at all.    
  As mentioned earlier, information on individuals’ cost functions are 
missing. To make up for missing information, I create the two cost scenarios to fit the 
distributional education in 1996. Table 3 presents the distributional assumptions 
concerning the cost function in the two scenarios. For simplicity, the discount rate is 
assumed to be constant, but it is possible that it varies across persons and over time. 
Finally, I use the hourly wages and costs in Table 3 to calibrate wages and costs for the 
aggregated six time periods described in section 3.  
It is expected that the educational distribution in table 3 changes when an 
AAS is introduced into the simulated model, because that is the prediction of the 
theoretical model in section 3. It is also expected that the size of the educational changes 
depends on the size of AAS. In the carpenter apprenticeship example in section 2, 
apprenticeship income during an apprenticeship increases by approximately 40 percent 
when an AAS is introduced. The income increase can also be interpreted as a cost 
reduction of 40 percent during studies. Therefore the model is simulated with an AAS 
that on average reduces costs by 40 percent. An AAS that reduces costs by 40 percent is 
very extensive, so the effect is expected to be extensive too. To test the consistency of 
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the results, I simulate the model using an AAS that reduces education costs on average 
only by 10 percent. Finally I simulate the model where an AAS that reduces costs by 40 
percent is introduced after the first period. Thus, only the people who did not study in 
the first period can change their educational choice due to the sudden introduction of an 
AAS.  
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the simulation results, which show quite clearly 
that an AAS increases the attendance rate to vocational education among the adults 
regardless of cost structure. The elasticity of the demand for adult vocational education 
with respect to an AAS depends on the cost assumption and the time at which an AAS 
is introduced. For the independent cost scenario the elasticity is 1,32 when an AAS is 
introduced before period 1 and 0,41 when an AAS is introduced in period 1. The latter 
elasticity is the short-term effect and the first elasticity is the long-term effect. For the 
scenario with dependent costs, attendance is more elastic with an elasticity of 1,92. The 
large effect is mainly due to all the people who prefer to delay their apprenticeship 
when an AAS will later be possible. 
Table 5 shows the mobility changes between educational paths when an 
AAS reduces the education cost by 40 percent in a scenario with dependent costs. Not 
surprisingly, all the people who choose a delayed apprenticeship without an AAS also 
choose a delayed apprenticeship with an AAS.  Likewise interesting is that the new 
group of people choosing an adult apprenticeship with an AAS include not only the 
non-educated. Some of the new starters are people who previously would have chosen 
further education in the same period, further education in the previous period or 
vocational education in the previous period. Thus, the simulation results show that 
introducing a subsidy will make all individuals re-evaluate their education decision. 
Although one might argue that the results are due to the simulation of a simple static 
model, the results for  the educational distribution changes in the whole population 
when introducing a subsidy are in line with Wolpin’s & Keane’s (1997) dynamic setting 
results. 
In the scenarios with dependent and independent costs, the increase in the 
vocational attendance rate among adults can be divided into the income effect, the 
substitution effect and the postponement effect. In the dependent cost setting 12 percent 
of the increase is due to the income effect, where people prefer apprenticeship with an 
 128
AAS to no education. Eighty five percent of the increase is due to the postponement 
effect, where people postpone their vocational or further education. Finally, 3 percent of 
the increase is caused by the substitution effect, because people substitute delayed 
further education with AAS apprenticeships.  
The simple exercise of simulating the theoretical model with an AAS 
illustrates two factors. First, the simulation results show that an AAS increases the 
attendance rate into vocational education among adults exactly as in the theoretical 
model. This result is not surprising, because the simulated model is set up as the 
theoretical model so an educational cost reduction is expected to increase the demand 
for education. 
Second, the results show that the demand increase for delayed 
apprenticeship results from people deciding to start an apprenticeship, delay education, 
or change education. In other words, the “new attendees” come from all the different 
lifecycle educational pathways. This result is important for conducting an empirical 
AAS evaluation, because it illustrates the challenge of finding an obvious control group 
when the whole population is affected by AAS. This aspect is discussed further in the 
following sections on the empirical model and the empirical data at hand. 
 
5. The challenges of an empirical evaluation model 
The results of the simulated model show that an AAS influences the educational choices 
in the whole population. Therefore, the best empirical strategy for evaluating the total 
effect of an AAS is to split the population group into two, and to treat one half with an 
AAS and not the other half. Observing the two presumably homogeneous groups before 
and after the introduction of an AAS illustrates the true effect of an AAS if every other 
important factor is constant or on average has developed equally for the two groups. 
Thus a straightforward difference-in-difference estimator can find the effect of an AAS 
as follows: 
 
(11)  )()( 0101
control
t
control
t
treat
t
treat
t attendattendattendattendeffect ==== −−−=  
 
Where tattend  is the vocational attendance rate among the treated (eligible for an AAS) 
or the controlled (not eligible for an AAS) at time t . Time period 0 is before the 
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introduction of an AAS and time period 1 follows the introduction of an AAS. This 
simple experimental method is not possible in this paper because the AAS was 
introduced in 1997 to everyone in the population over 25 years of age who fulfilled the 
conditions for receiving an AAS. Thus the empirical evaluation has to focus on partial 
effects, not on the whole “true” effect of an AAS in the Danish population. Even 
though the apprenticeship system is quite extensive in countries such as Denmark, 
Germany, Switzerland and Austria, Denmark is the only country to introduce an AAS. 
Therefore, no international studies have evaluated the effect of a subsidy on adult 
apprenticeships. In Addition, no empirical model is commonly used to evaluate 
apprenticeship subsidies.  
In contrast, there are a great many studies evaluating the effect of different 
student aid programs on college attendance in the US. Some of the early studies by 
Manski and Wise (1983) focus on cross-sectional variation in aid and individual 
characteristics. These studies are vulnerable to bias induced by correlation between aid 
and unobserved propensity to attend college. Most of the first studies find no effect of 
aid on college attendance for young people. More recent studies such as Angrist (1993) 
focus on the GI Bill (veteran benefits) and find a positive effect on school completion 
by exploiting the change in benefit over time. More recently, Dynarski (1999) examined 
the effect of a shift in the federal financial aid policy. By using the exogenous shift in 
aid and eligibility of social security student benefits (death, disability or retirement of a 
parent), Dynarski finds a positive effect of aid on school attendance using a difference-
in-differences estimator.  
Inspired by the work of Dynarski and others, I use a difference-in-
differences estimator to evaluate the effect of an AAS within a minor group of the 
Danish population, because the Danish data include both the period in which the 
exogenous change of an AAS occurs and comparable age groups around the age of 25. 
The data is a panel of a 10 percent sample of the Danish population over 16 years of age 
from 1995 to 2004. This data is described in detail in section 6. The age-specific 
eligibility means that an AAS applicant has to be at least 25 years of age. Both the age 
groups above and below 25 years of age are represented in the Danish data, which 
include information on AAS applicants and non-applicants before and after 1997, where 
the AAS was introduced. Combining these facts makes it possible to identify the effect 
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of an AAS, because comparing the unskilled 25-year-olds who are eligible for an AAS 
with the ineligible unskilled 24-year-olds from 1996 to 1998 is possible. I use 1998 
instead of 1997 because, as previously mentioned, in 1998 the AAS was fully 
introduced. One could argue that comparing all age groups above and below 25 years of 
age would capture the AAS effect better. Unfortunately, such a comparison would 
jeopardize the identification strategy, which relies on comparable age groups.  
Assuming no difference in covariates and time trends among the treatment 
group (25-year-olds) as well as the control group (24-year-olds) means that the effect of 
an AAS can be estimated by the following simple difference-in-differences estimation: 
 
(12) iiiiii yearageyearageattendvs ελδβα ++++= 9825)98*25(  
 
Where iattendvs is 1 if individual i starts an apprenticeship while iage25 and 
iyear98 are dummies for eligibility for an AAS and the year for the full introduction of 
the subsidy, respectively. The effect of the AAS eligibility is captured byβ . Equation 
(12) can be estimated by both OLS and probability models, depending on the 
assumption of a linear trend or a non-linear trend. 
 Suppose now that the covariates and time trends among the treatment and 
control groups are different. If so, then the AAS effect is not unambiguous and might 
indicate a heterogeneous time trend. Therefore, it is wise to include factors that pick up 
the different time trends in the difference-in-differences estimation.  
 
(13) iiiiiii Xyearageyearageattendvs εγλδβα +++++= 9825)98*25(  
 
Controlling for different sources of heterogeneous time trends, X, improves the β  
estimate. In other words, taking the individuals heterogeneous costs into account is 
important. These costs can vary due to observable characteristics and non-observable 
characteristics. An observable characteristic could be family situation, whereas an 
unobservable characteristic could be the ability to study. This paper takes only 
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observable characteristics into account.38 The β still captures the estimated effect of an 
AAS among the 24-year-olds and 25-year-olds. As it is a reduced form estimate, the β  
is the total effect within the selected group, and the estimate is therefore the sum of the 
income effect, postponement effect, and substitution effect.  
Although the treatment and control group in this analysis are narrowly 
defined, it is precisely among this group that one would expect to find a positive effect 
of an adult subsidy, since the 24-year-olds and the 25-year-olds are so similar. If an 
AAS doesn’t increase the vocational attendance rate in this population it is difficult to 
claim that the AAS has an overall positive effect in society. To sum up, the difference-
in-differences estimator used for this paper is chosen because it is the most sensible 
method for the rich data available.    
  
6. Data and descriptive statistics on Danish education 
The rich data at hand is a major reason why it is possible to use a difference-in-
difference estimator to evaluate the effect of an AAS. The data, which comprises three 
data sources, is very informative about individual educational decisions.  
The first source of data is register panel data from Statistics Denmark, 
including a 10 percent random sample of the population aged 16 years and over from 
1995 to 2004. The data includes very detailed information on socio-economic individual 
characteristics, such as age, family status, educational skills, personal income, and 
unemployment history. All variables are measured annually except for the 
unemployment history variables. The unemployment and activation histories are 
reported as spells. The precise unemployment histories and occupation status allow us 
to identify precisely when individuals start apprenticeships or other education forms. 
The panel structure allows us to look at the population and the educational structure 
before the introduction of the AAS. Thus we can follow the individual’s later 
educational choices. The panel data period is dictated by two incidences: First, it is 
important to have post and ex post data for 1997, when the AAS was introduced. 
Second, as the most reliable occupation information exists after 1995, I decided not to 
use information pre-dating 1995 (i.e. the unemployment information is best after 1995). 
                                                 
38Previous studies have attempted to take observable and unobservable heterogeneity into account as well 
(Grilliches 1977, Dynarski 1999, Angrist 1993, Manski & Wise 1983) 
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The second source of data includes records on all apprenticeships 
receiving an AAS from 1997 to 2005. The AAS is recorded in the DREAM register and 
collected by the National Labor Market Authority. The weekly observations are 
transformed into continuous spells to control for the length of the apprenticeships. The 
purpose of using this data is threefold. First, the data maps out an exact picture of all 
apprentices receiving an AAS from 1997 to 2005. Second, the data illustrates the 
relationship between application and approval rates in the Greater Copenhagen Area. 
Finally, the most important use of the DREAM register is to point out the apprentices 
with an AAS in the 10 percent population data because the population data does not 
have reliable information about the AAS before 2001. Thus, the DREAM register is 
both a complement and a support to the population register data.  
The third data source is “The Databank of Statistics Denmark”. From this 
data I obtained the macro-climate and education attendance rates (especially before 
1995). Furthermore, the data helps to illustrate the comparability of the control group 
and treatment group for the difference-in-differences estimator.  
 
Educational distribution and AAS in Denmark   
In Denmark the educational distribution has changed from 1996 to 2004. Figures 5 and 
6 show the educational distribution among 30-year-olds over time with respect to 
gender. The figures also illustrate when 30-year-olds start taking vocational or further 
education. The figures clearly show that the skill level improves over time among 30-
year-olds, even though from 1996 to 2004 relatively few 30-years-olds started a 
vocational education before turning 25. In contrast relatively more 30-years-olds started 
a vocational education after turning 25. Finally, the percentage of students in further 
education increases for all age groups.  
As a comparison to Figures 5 and 6, the overall picture among cohorts of 
the non-educated is that the vocational attendance rates decrease over a lifetime (see 
figures 7, 8, 9 and 10). A closer look gives the impression that dividing the cohorts in 
two groups is possible. One group is all the young people under 25 years of age in 1997 
(cohort 1973 +). The second group of cohorts is the unskilled over 25 years of age in 
1997, who in theory are eligible for an AAS. For the unskilled men under 25 years old 
in 1997, the attendance rate either increases or stops decreasing when they turn 25. For 
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the second cohort group, two tendencies occur. One tendency is that a decreasing 
attendance rate in 1997 is followed by an increasing rate in 1998 and a decreasing rate 
thereafter. The other tendency is an increased attendance rate in 1997 and 1998, 
followed by a decreasing rate thereafter. Both tendencies support the view that 1998 is 
the year when the AAS was fully implemented. For unskilled women, the figures are 
similar, except for small differences with respect to the 1975 and 1968 cohorts. No 
obvious reason for these exceptions exists. 
If we now look more specifically at the AAS apprenticeships, Figure 11 
and Figure 12 show that most men in an AAS apprenticeship participate in education 
periods within the fields of building and construction and iron steel and metal 
production.39 The women were mostly in trade and office and food and domestic 
production. In addition, the entry into health increases for women, whereas the entry 
into building and construction decreases. Among men the attendance rate for entry into 
iron, steel and metal decreases. The distributional share is to some extent in line with 
the bottleneck list for subsidized educational fields (see appendix A).  
A look at the AAS population by region shows that some differences 
occur, but in general the building and construction, iron, steel and metal production 
fields are the most subsidized for men (see table 6). For women, although the regional 
differences are bigger, the trade and office and food and domestic production fields are 
the most subsidized, whereas the building and construction fields are only popular in 
some regions (see table 7). Overall, a lot of regions subsidize many different 
educational fields. Only education, health, and services − which are typically female 
vocational education fields − are not subsidized. The lists of bottleneck areas from the 
Greater Copenhagen Area and the other regions in 2006 (from appendix A) support the 
impression that a lot of apprenticeship fields are subsidized. More specifically, the most 
populated areas (such as Greater Copenhagen, Århus, Fyn, Frederiksborg and Roskilde) 
are the regions with the most bottleneck areas.  
 Comparing apprentices with an AAS against apprentices without an AAS 
reveals some interesting characteristics. Table 1 shows that far from all apprentices over 
25 years of age in the Greater Copenhagen Area receive an AAS, despite the fact their 
                                                 
39 The information on field of education is taken from the year of entry and the year after entry. The 
entries for 2004 have a different distribution because there are many missing entries in the educational 
field. Thus the entries for 2004 are excluded.   
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educational fields are on the bottleneck list.40 Compared to the theoretical set-up, where 
all adult apprenticeships are subsidized, the empirical data show that not all apprentices 
in bottleneck fields are subsidized. The unions and unemployment offices give several 
reasons for cases in which AAS is not received. First, caseworkers stress that lack of 
information about an otherwise favorable AAS can not explain why people enter a 
bottleneck education field without an AAS. Second, caseworkers point out that the lists 
of bottleneck areas are guidelines that change every three month. Therefore, within a 
person’s application period, the list of subsidized fields could have changed. Third, 
caseworkers stress that in most cases the students in subsidized education fields can 
receive an AAS only if all the apprentices in the region have workplace connections. 
Finally caseworkers stress that the regional authorities have a budget limiting the 
number of students who can receive an AAS. Thus a denied application could simply be 
the result of a lack of financial resources.  
Furthermore, one might expect that most employers and students make an 
agreement on apprenticeship with an AAS before the application is finally accepted. If 
they receive a rejection for the reasons just mentioned they probably still continue with 
the agreement without the AAS. Additionally, many of the applicants already work at 
the workplace where they make the educational agreement. Thus, the employees and 
employers are both mentally and economically already involved, and therefore they 
continue the educational agreement even without an AAS.   
It is obvious that the subsidized apprentices are on average older than 
apprentices without an AAS because of the age restriction in the AAS regulation. Figure 
13 illustrates the difference in age distribution among the subsidized and the non-
subsidized apprentices. The descriptive statistics in Table 8 show the differences 
between the newly started apprentices with and without an AAS. The majority of 
subsidized apprentices are between 25-30 years of age, and a large proportion is older 
when starting an apprenticeship with AAS. Instead, among the non-subsidized 
apprentices, almost 85 percent of men and 65 percent of women are under 25 years old 
when they enroll. Due to the big differences in age distribution between apprentices 
with an AAS and those without an AAS, one would expect to observe other 
socioeconomic differences as well. 
                                                 
40 Even more detailed educational categories show the same result. 
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Table 8 clearly shows socioeconomic differences exist between the two 
apprentice groups. There is an overrepresentation of men among the subsidized 
apprentices compared to the non-subsidized apprentices. Furthermore, it is common for 
persons in couples with children and without children to take a vocational education 
with an AAS. However, among the traditional apprentices, more than 50 percent of men 
and 40 percent of women are single. Surprisingly, no ethnic differences are apparent.  
The apprentices work in all regions in Denmark and are distributed 
similarly with respect to gender and AAS. The major educational fields that the non-
subsidized men enter include office and trade, building and construction and iron, steel, 
and metal. The majority of subsidized men mainly work in sectors like building and 
construction and iron, steel, and metal. In contrast, the non-subsidized women enter 
apprenticeships in fields such as trade and office and health, whereas the subsidized 
women are more diverse. The latter probably results from the authorities not including 
typically female educational fields on the bottleneck list.  
The previous occupation of a new apprentice also differs among 
subsidized and non-subsidized men and women. The majority of all apprentices with an 
AAS are wage earners, but among the non-subsidized apprentices, a lot begin 
apprenticing directly after school. Therefore, both men and women who receive AAS 
have on average a previous income or wage significantly higher than the non-subsidized 
apprentices. Furthermore and not surprisingly the subsidized apprentices have 
remarkably longer work experience than the non-subsidized apprentices.  
 
Control group versus treatment group 
The difference-in-differences estimator explained in section 5 is appropriate for 
evaluating the AAS if a suitable control group and treatment group exists. Due to the 
age restriction, comparing people over 25 years of age with people under 25 years of 
age that have the same characteristics makes good sense. As previously illustrated, 
because age is correlated with a lot of other characteristics, those above and those below 
25 is comparable as long as the actual ages are not too far apart (e.g. comparing the 24- 
and 25-year-olds, not comparing the 20- and 35-year-olds). The reason is that two age 
groups such as 20-year-olds and 35-year-olds are different with respect to family status, 
work experience, health conditions, etc. Most importantly, 35-year-olds have been 
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influenced by more than the 20-year-olds with respect to different exogenous business 
cycle shocks and changes in legal regulations. Thus comparing two similar age groups 
is a better idea. 
Therefore, I narrow the control group and treatment group tremendously, 
using the 24-year-olds as a control group for the 25-year-old treatment group. 
Furthermore, employees who already have a vocational education are excluded because 
they do not have an obvious economic incentive for choosing a new vocational 
education. By contrast, the people who most likely are receiving an educational subsidy 
already are expected to have some economic incentive to start a new education because 
they receive a higher wage. They are therefore included in the sample. However, those 
who already had an apprenticeship position before the introduction of AAS are not 
included. Actually a maximum of 2.5 percent of the new apprentices were involved in 
other kinds of education the year before they became apprentices (see table 8). 
The assumption that the unskilled 24-year-olds are a good control group 
for the unskilled 25-year-olds is valid if the two groups are identical with respect to 
attendance rates before the AAS was introduced and if they react in the same way to 
macro-shocks. Figures 14 and 15 demonstrate that apprentices attendance rates among 
24- and 25-year-old men is split into two time periods: before and after the introduction 
of the AAS. The first period is 1991-1996, when the two age group attendance rates are 
parallel. In the second period, from 1997-2003, the attendance rates generally went in 
opposite directions − except for 2000 and 2003. Given the similar trend in attendance 
rates in the period before 1997, the 24-year-olds seem like a good control group for the 
25-year-olds who are eligible for an AAS.  
For the women, the vocational attendance rates among the relevant age 
groups are split into three time periods. In the first period, from 1991-1993, the 
attendance rate increases for the 24-year-olds whereas the rate decreases among the 25-
year-olds. In the second period, from 1994-1997, the attendance rates are parallel for the 
two age groups. The last period, from 1998-2003, is characterized by the attendance 
rates going in opposite directions. The picture among women is more ambiguous than 
for the men because the rates do not exactly follow each other through the whole period 
before the 1997 introduction of the AAS. Furthermore, the difference in attendance rates 
after 1997 is puzzling, because both rates increased in 1997 (although relatively more 
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for the 25-year-olds). Thereafter, the attendance rate among the 25-year-olds actually 
decreases. Later the attendance rate increases again but relatively less than among the 
24-year-old women. In this paper, the 24-year-olds are still used as a possible control 
group to the 25-year-olds women because the attendance rates of the two age groups are 
parallel before 1997. Obviously, the difference-in-differences estimation results for 
women is expected to be different from men because of the unexpected development in 
attendance rates after 1997 and the gender skewness in subsidized bottleneck fields. 
Therefore a slight skepticism about the results for women is advised because the 
identification criterion is to a certain extent questionable for women.   
As section 5 describes, taking an individual’s heterogeneous observable 
characteristics and non-observable characteristics into account can be important because 
these characteristics can influence the cost of taking a vocational education. Thus, the 
personal characteristics can be correlated with the vocational education attendance rate. 
Tables 9 and 10 show that on average the 24- and 25-year-olds starting apprenticeships 
do not differ significantly with respect to socioeconomic characteristics before the 
introduction of the AAS. Moreover, after the introduction of the AAS, there is no 
significant difference between them, although both the 25-year-old and the 24-year-old 
new apprentices seem to be exposed to a minor time trend from 1996 to 1998. Tables 9 
and 10 to some extent support the assumption, that the 24-year-olds are a good control 
group for the 25-year-olds.  
Even though the difference-in-differences estimator is a well-recognized 
estimator in the evaluation literature, we have to use it cautiously in evaluating the 
AAS. The reason is that the control group becomes the treatment group as well. To be 
more specific, when the 24-year-olds know they might be able to get a subsidy when 
they turn 25, some will behave accordingly, by delaying their apprenticeship for one 
year. The incidence of delayed studies might explain why a decrease in attendance rates 
among the 24-year-old men is observed right after 1997. In previous literature, this 
incidence is called the Ashenfelder’s dip (Ashenfelder 1978). Therefore, a positive 
effect of AAS might not result from an increase in the apprenticeship attendance rates 
among the 25-year-olds, but rather from a decline in attendance rates among the 24-
year-olds. This effect is referred to as the postponement effect in sections 4 and 5 of this 
paper. In other educational evaluations, geographical areas are often used as a control 
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group. Again, the problem of the control group becoming the treatment group exists, 
unless it is assumed that the people living in the control region can not move to the 
treated region. The same problem exists if an educational subsidy depends on household 
income, because people can work less and reduce their income to qualify for an 
educational subsidy. If they do so, they would end up in the treatment group. Thus, 
many studies suffer from the postponement effect, a condition important to keep in 
mind when interpreting the results.  
 
Data sample for estimations 
Even though the data at hand is rich in information about the entire Danish population, 
this paper uses only a minor sample for the final estimation. This choice is due to the 
importance of having a trustworthy control group and treatment group for the 
difference-in-differences estimation method. As previously argued, the unskilled 24-
year-olds not already taking an apprenticeship make a good control group for the 
treatment group consisting of the unskilled 25-year-olds not yet apprenticed. The 
immediate analysis comes from looking at the effect from 1996 to 1998 among the 
unskilled 24- and 25-year-olds. For the men the immediate effect is estimated by the 
difference-in-differences method with 7687 observations. The sample for women has 
9006 observations. For the delayed effect, all years are used. Thus, the sample for the 
men consists of 27571 observations and for the women there are 32787 observations.   
 To sum up, the rich Danish panel data on the non-educated 24-year-olds 
and the 25-year-olds and the exogenous introduction of the AAS in 1997 make it 
possible to evaluate the effect of the AAS by a difference-in-difference estimator for 
men and women. Section 7 describes the results. 
 
7. Empirical results on the effect of an AAS 
Using the difference-in-differences estimator from section 5 this section illustrates the 
effect of an AAS on the probability of attending apprenticeship. The discussion of the 
results and the use of methods concentrate around the results for men. The reason is that 
the difference-in-differences method seems more suitable for men than for women, 
given the preponderance of typical male-dominated education fields pinpointed for AAS 
subsidies.  
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The immediate effect of an AAS 
Tables 11 and 13 present the results of the difference-in-differences estimator, 
illustrating the immediate effect of the AAS on the attendance rate. Table 11 shows the 
average probability of attending an apprenticeship as a 24-year-old and as a 25-year-old 
in 1996 and 1998. Among the unskilled 24-year-old men, 3.28 percent started an 
apprenticeship in 1996 before the AAS was introduced. The attendance rate increased a 
little in 1998 to 3.34 percent. By contrast, among the unskilled the attendance rate 
among 25-year-old men increased dramatically from 1.82 in 1996 to 4.39 in 1998. Here 
the 25-year-olds are eligible for an AAS in 1998 because they fulfill the age restriction, 
whereas the 24-year-olds are not. If there were no time trends and changes in 
socioeconomic factors, then the effect of the AAS would be the difference between the 
attendance rates over time between the 24-year-olds and the 25-year-olds. The 
difference for men is 2.51 percent, which is quite high considering the original 
attendance rate of 1.82 percent.  
 The difference-in-differences estimate can also be estimated through a 
simple OLS equation, as illustrated in equation 12 (see column 1 in table 13). The OLS 
estimate − 2.51 percent for the men − is highly significant. If the time trends among the 
24-year-olds and the 25-year-olds are different, then the effect is a time trend instead of 
an AAS effect. I therefore include variables that pick up the time trends in the 
difference-in-differences estimation (see column 2 and 3 in table 13). The AAS still 
increases the probability of attending apprenticeship by 2.54 percent. Thus, including 
the socioeconomic variables does not change the subsidy effect, but it does increase the 
adjusted R2.  
The outcome variable regarding apprenticeship attendance is discrete 
rather than continuous, making a probit model more appropriate. Table 13 states the 
marginal effect of the probit model in column 4. The AAS effect of 2.7 percent is a bit 
bigger than the effect from the OLS estimates, but not significantly different. Although, 
the estimated subsidy effect does not change significantly, the adjusted R2 increase 
significantly when the probit model is used. Thus the probit model fits the attendance 
decision better.  
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The first results for the immediate effect of an AAS for the unskilled 25-
year-old men’s attendance rate in 1998 compared to 1996 are significantly high as 
expected. The results are in line with Figures 3 and 8, where the 25-year-old men’s 
attendance rate increased in 1998.   
 
The delayed effect of an AAS 
As Figure 8 shows, the apprentice attendance rate among unskilled men over 25 
increases in 1998 and decreases thereafter. Therefore, one might expect the delayed 
effect of an AAS to be negative. The delayed effect of the AAS is thus estimated by the 
difference-in-differences estimator (see table 15-18). Table 15 shows the results for the 
effect of the AAS in 2002, whereas Table 17 illustrates the results for all years.  
 The 2002 result shows that the AAS effect is between 0.005-0.008 percent 
and insignificant. Thus, the vocational attendance rate among the unskilled 25-year-olds 
does not increase significantly compared to the attendance rate in 1996, before the 
introduction of AAS. Very small and insignificant AAS effects are also found for all 
other years after 1998 (see table 17). Once again, the probit models have the highest 
adjusted R2. Therefore the difference-in-differences results from the probit models are 
the most reliable. 
 
Gender differences regarding AAS 
The results for men show that among unskilled 25-year-old men the effect of an AAS is 
strong and significant in 1998 but insignificant over the years. By contrast for the 
unskilled 25-year-old women the results in Tables 12, 14, 16, and 18 show that the AAS 
effect is very small and insignificant in all years. 
 It is not surprising that an AAS affects men and women differently. As 
discussed in section 2, the majority of educational fields that are on the regional 
bottleneck lists are   traditionally male dominated. Therefore, many women probably do 
not see the AAS as being as attractive as the men do because these women want to 
study in educational fields not on the list. 
 Given the scarcity of typically female educational fields on the bottleneck 
lists, the difference-in-differences estimation method is of questionable value for 
women. One might think that the eligibility criterion needs to be narrowed if the 
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difference-in-differences method should be correctly used. Unfortunately, with the data 
at hand, creating better eligibility criteria is not possible. Instead, the conclusion is that 
the AAS has no measurable effect among the unskilled 25-year-old women.      
 
The interpretation of the covariates in the attendance rate results 
The results of the previous subsection clarify that the AAS has an immediate positive 
effect in 1998 among men but not in the rest of the observed time periods. Due to the 
generosity of the AAS, the high effect in 1998 is not surprising. The finding that men 
who are out of the labor force or studying (but not apprentices) have less risk of 
entering a vocational education than men working as wage earners or men who are self-
employed is not surprising either. As an apprentice has to have an agreement with an 
employer to obtain an AAS, this agreement is easier to get for those who already have 
an employer. Therefore, the wage earners have a higher probability of entering an 
apprenticeship. The fact that a high income reduces the risk of becoming an apprentice 
is understandable because of the reduced economic incentive for starting an education.  
Less easy to explain is the finding that long work experience increases the 
likelihood of becoming an apprentice. As long work experience is normally correlated 
with higher wages, the incentive to study would therefore be expected to be reduced. 
However, the group of people under analysis comprises unskilled and relatively young 
men. If an unskilled 25-year-old man has a lot of work experience, he might have 
already reached the top level of what an unskilled wage earner can earn. Therefore, the 
only way he can earn more money is to increase his skills. An unskilled man with many 
years of work experience might also have decreased his work ability through the effect 
of years of hard physical work. Therefore, he would need to get new skills to find 
another job with less physical pressure. Thus, the economic incentive to get an AAS 
apprenticeship exists among young unskilled people who take lifetime income into 
account. 
Personal characteristics such as ethnicity and family background are 
apparently not significantly important in the schooling decision among the unskilled 
young men. However, a few geographical areas have a significant, but small positive 
effect on the vocational education attendance rate compared to the Greater Copenhagen 
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Area, a finding that of course is to some extent correlated with the labor market 
situation in these areas. 
For the women, the probability of getting an apprenticeship increases if 
they have the same characteristics as the young men just described. Additionally, 
unemployed women have a reduced likelihood of becoming an apprentice compared to 
female wage earners.  
 
The income, substitution and postpone effect regarding AAS 
Although in section 3 and 4, the effect of an AAS was split into substitution, income 
and postponement effects, the results of the difference-in-differences estimations can 
not be split into these three different effects. The effects are summed up in the total 
empirical effect of an AAS.  
The increase in the attendance rate among unskilled 25-year-old men can 
result from 24-year-olds postponing their education because of their expectation of a 
future AAS or from the companies where the 24-year-olds work advising them to wait 
until they are 25-year-old. This postponement effect is expected to occur among all age 
groups below 25 years of age, but the effect should be the strongest among the 24-year-
olds because they lose a maximum of one year of salary as a skilled employee by 
delaying their apprenticeship for one year, while the younger age groups lose more.  
The substitution effect occurs when the 25-year-olds decide to take an 
apprenticeship instead of further education due to the AAS. Comparing apprenticeships 
and further education is very difficult for a number of reasons. For example, the 
aptitudes necessary for being a good carpenter are very different from those necessary 
for being a good economist. Thus, the possibility of switching education might not be 
possible, as the human capital theory predicted. Furthermore, Table 2 shows taking an 
apprenticeship even without a subsidy is financially a better idea than taking a further 
education during the study period. Therefore, one would think that strong preferences 
for further education and future income is more important than the income one receives 
while studying, in deciding on further education. Thus introducing an AAS is not 
expected to influence most young people who prefer further education without a 
subsidy.   
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 The income effect exists if unskilled 25-year-olds who decide not to take 
an education due to high education costs suddenly decide to take an apprenticeship due 
to an AAS. This effect seems very possible, especially among the 25-year-olds, because 
they have had enough work experience as unskilled workers to see that education might 
be necessary for sustaining a future income. Additionally, if they decide to take an 
education under favorable economic conditions, they still have plenty of years to 
receive a better income from working as a skilled employee. 
 Even though it is not possible to separate the three effects of the AAS 
results, I have argued that the income effect and the postponement effect probably occur 
within the two age groups analyzed for 1998. However, because the AAS had no effect 
after 1998 it might be the case that none of the three effects occur after 1998.  
 
Sensitivity analysis and elasticity with respect to AAS 
The AAS effect from these results is true for the narrowly defined treatment and control 
group. As shown in the simple human capital simulation model in section 4, the whole 
population’s education decisions are affected by the AAS. Unfortunately, the results of 
the AAS can not be transferred to the whole population immediately. Instead, I expand 
the control group to 23- and 24-year-olds and the treatment group to 25- and 26-year-
olds. Tables 19 and 20 show the results. As expected, there is an immediate effect of the 
AAS in 1998 for men but not over the rest of the period. Interestingly the effect is 
smaller than the effect found among only 25-year-olds − a finding also expected 
because the older one gets, the less economic incentive one has for getting an education. 
Thus the 26-year-olds reduce the effect of an AAS. Furthermore the 23-year-olds have a 
higher cost than the 24-year-olds in postponing their education, which again reduces the 
effect of an AAS.  
Because all people over 25 in theory could start an apprenticeship with an 
AAS if they wanted to, the control and treatment group includes students. As Table 8 
shows few people start an education and then switch to an apprenticeship with a new 
subsidy. The analysis is therefore conducted on the unskilled 24- and 25-year-olds who 
have not participated in any studies in the previous year. The results in Tables 21 and 22 
illustrate an even bigger effect of the AAS among men in 1998 as opposed to earlier 
than among men already studying in another educational field. 
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In the literature, when education subsidies are evaluated, researchers 
compare either elasticities or US$ 1000 increases or reductions. In this paper, the 
elasticity and a US$ 1000 change is only worth looking at for unskilled 25-year-old men 
in 1998 because for women and for all other years the AAS effect was insignificant.  
Although the elasticity with respect to the AAS can be calculated in 
different ways, this paper uses the average numbers illustrated in Table 23. The average 
numbers from Table 23 show that the vocational attendance rate among 25-year-old 
unskilled men is highly elastic to an AAS. Thus, the elasticity is 4.64.41 However the 
AAS is also quite extensive in Denmark. On average the AAS increased the 
apprenticeship income by 32 percent or US$ 23880 in the subsample of 24- and 25-
year-olds. Given the estimated AAS result, a US$ 1000 increase would increase the 
vocational education attendance rate among unskilled 25-year-old men by 0.11 
percent.42 This percentage is quite low compared to other educational subsidy effects 
found in the literature (e.g. Dynarski 1999; Manski and Wise 1983; Angrist 1993). 
As mentioned earlier, previous studies on subsidizing education have 
mainly looked at college attendance in the US. It is therefore very difficult to compare 
previous results with the results of this paper especially because the previous subsidies 
often have been reserved for certain social classes or for people with previous military 
experience. Still compared to other studies, this paper shows that the effect of an AAS 
has an immediate high and significant effect on unskilled men. However, the amount of 
AAS is also quite extensive compared to subsidies given in other countries. Compared 
to other international education evaluations, it is puzzling that this study finds no 
measurable effect of the very generous AAS subsidy after 1998. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper posed the question whether the AAS improves the aggregate education level 
in the population. By simulating an extended human capital model, this paper shows 
that all population groups reconsider their education decision when an AAS is 
introduced. The simulation results show that the level of vocational skills among adults 
increases with an AAS. However, because substitution, income and postponement 
effects occur when the subsidy is introduced, the increase in vocational skills among 
                                                 
41 e= (147,8/31,84) 
42 Increase = (2,69/23880)*1000) = 0,11 confidence interval 0,03-0,20 
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adults (i.e. more than 25 years of age) is to some extent caused by a decrease of skills in 
other population groups.  
Even though the simulation illustrates the difficulty of finding an optimal 
empirical strategy capable of evaluating the total effect of an AAS, because of the 
absence of an obvious control group, this paper makes a partial empirical evaluation. 
Using the difference-in-difference estimator this paper examines the effect of the AAS 
among the unskilled who delayed studying. The rich panel data and the exogenous shift 
in the AAS in 1997 as well as the specific age-eligibility criteria make the evaluation 
possible.  
The empirical results show that the AAS had a clear positive effect on 
vocational education attendance rates among non-educated 25-year-old men in 1998. 
However, 25-year-old women were not affected by the subsidy. Additionally the AAS 
had no significant effect on the vocational education attendance rate after 1998, 
regardless of gender. The immediate elasticity of attendance with respect to AAS for 
men was very high and significant in 1998. 
The results are important for Denmark and for other countries that want to 
invest in improving the skills of their adult workforce. First, they need to know that a 
generous AAS suitable for a certain population group (e.g. non-educated men over 25 
years old) increases the skill level immediately within the specific population group. 
Second, they should be aware of the fact that there seems to be no long run effect of the 
very generous AAS. Thus, an economic incentive (e.g. an AAS) for a specific education 
(e.g. vocational education) might not permanently improve the skill level of the 
population as a whole.   
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Appendix A 
 
Number of bottleneck areas within the major industry categories in Danish 
regions, 2006 4th quarter. 
 St.K. Fred.b. Rosk. Vestsj. Storstr. Bornh. Fyn 
Office& Trade 2 2 0 2 1 1 2 
Building & 
construction 18 18 12 12 8 10 12 
Industrial engin. & 
other 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Service 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Food & domestic 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 
agricultural & 
fishing 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Transportation 2 1 0 0 0 4 4 
Health 2 3 4 1 3 4 1 
 
 
 Sønderj.* Ribe* Vejle Ringk. Århus Viborg* Nordj.*
Office& Trade 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Building & 
construction 7 8 15 13 13 4 5 
Iron,steel & metal 0 1 1 9 5 3 1 
Industrial engin. & 
other 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Service 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 
Food & domestic 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 
agricultural & 
fishing 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 
Transportation 0 1 3 4 4 0 1 
Health    1 1 0 0 
Note: No detailed list available 
 
Source: Regional AF HomePages: www. af.dk. 
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New subsidized apprentices devided into industries in 1997 & 2005 
 1997 2005 
  
Men 
Pct
Women 
Pct
Men 
Pct
Women 
Pct
Total 100 100 100 100
Educational 0 0 0,62 2,47
Office and trade                            24,7 39,98 18,77 32,13
Building and construction 20,31 2,1 29,33 4,66
Iron,steel and metal                                   24,85 1,63 23,43 3,49
Graphics 1,15 0,61 2,19 0,8
Industrial engin. And other                 1,07 2,14 1,77 1,79
Service 0,47 3,25 1,7 7,93
Food and domestic                  7,48 10,3 7,89 9,88
agricultural and fishing                             12,03 4,72 6,44 4,26
Transportation 5,43 0,41 5,05 0,56
Health 2,5 34,86 2,77 32,03
Safety/security              0 0 0,04 0,01
Source: Dream register on AAS 1997-2005 
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Diagram 1: Educational pathways 
 
 t=1  t=2  t=3,4,5,6 
 nse  -> nse  -> nse  
  -> vss  ->                -> vse  
  -> fss  ->                     ↑      fse  
 vss  -> vse  -> __________↑        ↑ 
 fss  -> fse  -> _______________↑ 
 
Alternative illustration  
Path Reward at 1=t  Reward at 2=t    
Discounted:δ 
Reward at 
3,4,5,6t =  
Discounted: δ2 +δ3 
+δ4+δ5  
Unskilled 
nsw  nsw  nsw  
Apprentice (<25) 
, 1,1 2vs vs i ic ic ic− − −  vsw  vsw  
Apprentice with 
AAS (>25) ns
w  , 2, ,21 2vs vs i i vsc ic ic aid− − − +  vsw  
Further education 
(<25) , 1,
1 2fs fs i ic ic ic− − −  fsw  fsw  
Further education 
(>25) ns
w  , 2,1 2fs fs i ic ic ic− − −  fsw  
Source: Weatherall (2007) 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Persons participating in subsidized apprenticeship from 1997-2004.  
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Figure 2: Persons starting apprenticeship out of the population between 25-39 
years of age from 1996-2004.  
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P
er
ce
nt Men
Women
 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Figure 3. New male apprentices among people not already in education or have not 
finished an education by age from 1996-2004.  
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Figure 4. New female apprentices among people not already in education or have 
not finished an education by age from 1996-2004.  
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Figure 5. Educational distribution in Denmark for men over 30 years of age from 
1996-2004 
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Figure 6. Educational distribution in Denmark for women over 30 years of age 
from 1996-2004  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P
er
ce
nt
No edu
Apprenticeship <25
Apprenticeship >25
Further edu <25
Further edu >25
 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Figure 7. Cohort 1973-1975 vocational attendance rates for men from 1996-2004 
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Figur 8. Cohort 1967-1972 vocational attendance rates for men from 1996-2004  
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 
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Figure 9. Cohort 1973-1975 vocational attendance rates for women from 1996-2004 
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Figur 10. Cohort 1967-1972 vocational attendance rates for women from 1996-
2004  
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
 
 156
Figure 11. Subsidized apprenticeship by educational field for men from 1997-2003 
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Figure 12. Subsidized apprenticeship by educational field for women from 1997-
2003 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
pc
t
Educational Office and trade                                
Building and construction Iron,steel and metal                                   
Graphics Industrial engineering and other                          
Service Food and domestic                         
agricultural and fishing                                 T ransportation
Health Other (Safety/security)                                        
 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
 
 157
Figure 13. AAS Age distribution 
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Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Figur 14. Attendance rate for men between 24-25 years of age from 1991-2003 
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Source: Statistics Denmark Data Bank (1991-2003) 
 
Figur 15. Attendance rate for women between 24-25 years of age from 1991-2003 
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Source: Statistics Denmark Data Bank (1991-2003) 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Pct. of new apprenticeships for adults over 25 years of age that is 
subsidized/ not subsidized in Greater Copenhagen 2004. 
New starters Not ”bottleneck” ”bottleneck” “bottleneck” (main category) No info on edu.field Pct 
Apprenticeship 22,16 75,62 2,22 0 100
Apprenticeship with AAS 8,86 60,76 2,53 27,85 100
Observations 87 321 10 22 440
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Table 2: Student pay and apprentice pay in gross values for 2006 
 Carpenter Carpenter with 
AAS 
Economist 
Average length 3,5 years 3,5 years 5 years 
Hourly pay*  101,40 Dkr  
1. period (26 weeks)** 49,55 Dkr   
2. period (52 weeks) 59,90 Dkr   
3. period (52 weeks) 68,20 Dkr   
4. period (52 weeks) 82,30 Dkr   
Average monthly pay (37,5h pr week) 10.919 Dkr 15.210 Dkr 4.852 Dkr 
Average pay for the whole education period 458.591 
Dkr 
638.820 Dkr 291.120 Dkr 
Hourly minimum wage when education finished 
* 
101,40 Dkr 101,40 Dkr 153,60 Dkr 
Average reimbursement pr m pr trainee in 
school* 
8.500 Dkr 14.640 Dkr  
Hourly subsidy to employer (max 2,5 years)  35 Dkr  
Minimum age 16 years 25 years 18 years 
Other conditions  only local 
bottlenecks 
industries 
Extra funding 
12m   
Average employer cost taking subsidy (2,5 years) 
and reimbursement (6 m of schooling) into 
account 
407.591 
Dkr 
393.480 Dkr  
** 26 is set by the author. Schooling time is between 6 and 11 month including introduction courses. The introduction course is not 
subsidized, thus in that period the vocational trainee and the adult vocational trainee are paid the same. Thus the introduction period 
is not included in this example. 
Source: Vocational education: Carpenter, Dansk Byggeri Bygningsoverenskomst. 
Further education: Economist, DJØF, Monthly wage (basistrin 3) in the public sector 
inclusive pension 23033,50/(37,5*4) 
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Table 3. Relationship between “real life” numbers and scenarios with different 
costs/no subsidy 
Important parameters Related “real life” 
numbers for 
1996* 
Scenario with 
independent costs 
Scenario with 
dependent cost 
no education 160 Dkr/hour 160 Dkr/hour 160 Dkr/hour 
voc.education 190 Dkr/hour 190 Dkr/hour 190 Dkr/hour 
Wage 
fur.education 260 Dkr/hour 260 Dkr/hour 260 Dkr/hour 
Discount rate   0,9 0,9 
voc. period 1  N(0,170) N(40,700)+N(0,90) 
voc. period 2  N(40,70) N(40,700)+N(70,70) 
fur. period 1  N(220,30) N(290,340)+N(0,90) 
Educational 
cost¨ 
Distribution 
fur. period 2  N(260,90) N(290,340)+N(70,70) 
No education 32,68 pct 33,41 pct 31,77 pct 
voc. period 1 36,93 pct 36,17 pct 35,72 pct 
voc. period 2 3,27 pct 3,33 pct 4,44 pct 
fur. period 1 20,37 pct 20,51 pct 25,94 pct 
Educational 
distribution 
fur. period 2 6,75 pct 6,59 pct 2,14 pct 
* Wage: hourly average wage from private sector 2000 (because no number available from 1996). The relative relationship between 
has not changed drasticly. Educational distribution: Is the education distribution among the 30 years old in 1996.  
Source: Statistics Denmark Data Bank (1991-2003) & Weatherall(2007) 
 
 
 Table 4. The result of an adult vocational education subsidy in different cost 
scenarios 
Education Independent cost, full info t=0 Independent  
cost, info t=1 
Dependent cost, full info t=0 
 No 
subsidy 
Subsidy 
10pct 
Subsidy 
40pct 
Subsidy 40pct No 
subsidy 
Subsidy 
10pct 
Subsidy 
40pct 
No edu 33,41 33,18 32,27 32,92 31,77 31,68 31,36 
Vocational 
period1 
36,17 36,13 36,02 36,17 35,72 35,17 32,90 
Vocational 
period2 
3,33 3,73 5,09 3,87 4,44 5,13 7,85 
Further 
period1 
20,51 20,41 20,14 20,51 25,94 25,92 25,84 
Further 
period2 
6,59 6,56 6,48 6,53 2,14 2,10 2,05 
no. obs 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 
Source: Weatherall (2007) 
 
Table 5.  The “mobility” changes due to a subsidy in a scenario with dependent 
costs 
          Subsidy 40pct 
 
no subsidy 
no edu voc period1 Voc period2 Fur period1 fur period2 Total obs 
No edu 98,71 0 1,29 0 0 9530 
voc period1 0 92,12 7,88 0 0 10715 
voc period2 0 0 100,00 0 0 1332 
Fur period1 0 0 0,40 99,60 0 7782 
Fur period2 0 0 4,06 0 95,94 641 
Total pct 31,36 32,90 7,85 25,84 2,05      30000 
100 
Source: Weatherall (2007) 
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Table 6. Subsidized apprenticeship by region and educational field for men in 1998 
 education off. & tra. build. & const. iron etc. graph. Indu. eng. 
Stor Kbh 0 8,59 45,4 17,79 1,23 0 
Frederiksborg 0 6,82 44,7 20,45 0,76 0,76 
Roskilde 0 12,09 45,05 12,09 2,2 0 
Vestsjælland 0 10,71 40,71 25,71 1,43 0 
Storstrøm 0 4,82 40,96 21,08 1,81 0,6 
Bornholm 0 5,56 22,22 27,78 0 0 
Fyn 0 11,36 39,55 25,45 1,36 0,45 
Sønderjylland 0 7,1 34,91 36,09 1,18 0 
Ribe 0 4,48 32,09 37,31 2,24 1,49 
Vejle 0 5,06 28,09 42,7 2,81 0,56 
Ringkøbing 0 0 43,68 36,21 0 0 
Århus 0 6,18 41,01 35,39 1,69 0 
Viborg 0 0,89 55,36 34,82 0 0 
Nordjylland 0 9,43 40,38 29,81 2,26 1,13 
Kbh & Fredriksb 0 15,51 43,67 11,84 2,45 0,82 
 
Continued 
 service food & dom. agri. & fish. transport health other 
Stor Kbh 0 2,45 9,2 7,98 0,61 6,75 
Frederiksborg 0 6,82 6,82 1,52 0 11,36 
Roskilde 0 4,4 10,99 2,2 0 10,99 
Vestsjælland 0 2,14 5 6,43 0 7,86 
Storstrøm 0 4,82 1,81 18,67 0 5,42 
Bornholm 0 27,78 0 0 0 16,67 
Fyn 1,36 6,36 1,82 6,36 0 5,91 
Sønderjylland 0 2,96 0 6,51 0 11,24 
Ribe 0 3,73 0,75 5,97 0 11,94 
Vejle 0 6,18 1,12 1,12 0 12,36 
Ringkøbing 0 5,17 2,87 3,45 0 8,62 
Århus 0,28 4,49 3,09 1,69 0 6,18 
Viborg 0 3,57 0 1,79 0 3,57 
Nordjylland 0 6,42 2,26 0 0 8,3 
Kbh & Fredriksb 0,41 7,76 3,27 8,16 0,41 5,71 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 7. Subsidized apprenticeship by region and educational field for women in 
1998 
 education off. & tra. build. & const. iron etc. graph. Ind. eng. 
Stor Kbh 0 59,42 7,25 1,45 0 4,35 
Frederiksborg 0 48,08 7,69 5,77 5,77 5,77 
Roskilde 0 59,52 7,14 0 0 0 
Vestsjælland 0 59,02 4,92 6,56 4,92 1,64 
Storstrøm 0 40,58 7,25 10,14 0 1,45 
Bornholm 0 38,24 5,88 0 0 0 
Fyn 0 43,1 14,66 10,34 0,86 2,59 
Sønderjylland 0 42,5 16,25 7,5 1,25 0 
Ribe 0 17,02 27,66 2,13 4,26 10,64 
Vejle 0 33,82 14,71 23,53 0 1,47 
Ringkøbing 0 0 42,42 15,15 0 6,06 
Århus 0 41,48 17,78 8,89 2,22 1,48 
Viborg 0 23,08 30,77 12,82 0 5,13 
Nordjylland 0 57,36 11,63 5,43 1,55 0 
Kbh & Fredriksb 0 53,17 3,17 0 2,38 2,38 
 
continued 
 service food & dom. agri. & fish. transport health other 
Stor Kbh 2,9 11,59 2,9 2,9 1,45 5,8 
Frederiksborg 0 19,23 1,92 1,92 3,85 0 
Roskilde 2,38 14,29 4,76 2,38 2,38 7,14 
Vestsjælland 0 4,92 1,64 3,28 4,92 8,2 
Storstrøm 0 14,49 5,8 8,7 4,35 7,25 
Bornholm 0 2,94 0 0 0 52,94 
Fyn 0,86 11,21 1,72 2,59 8,62 3,45 
Sønderjylland 1,25 18,75 1,25 1,25 2,5 7,5 
Ribe 0 34,04 0 2,13 0 2,13 
Vejle 4,41 8,82 2,94 0 4,41 5,88 
Ringkøbing 0 24,24 0 0 6,06 6,06 
Århus 0,74 10,37 4,44 0 0,74 11,85 
Viborg 0 12,82 5,13 0 0 10,26 
Nordjylland 0 12,4 1,55 0 3,1 6,98 
Kbh & Fredriksb 3,17 17,46 4,76 0 7,14 6,35 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics for subsidized and non-subsidized apprenticeships 
between 1997-2004 
    Men Women 
    Not subsidized Subsidized Not subsidized Subsidized 
Years 1997 16,5 13,15 15,62 7,4
 1998 15,53 23,37 16,02 15,89
 1999 14,94 18,65 14,61 17,81
 2000 14,23 10,6 14,63 15,89
 2001 14,82 12,9 14,36 16,99
 2002 11,26 10,47 12,6 11,78
  2003 12,72 10,86 12,15 14,25
Age <25 years 84,81 0 64,44 0
 25-31 years 9,05 54,15 14,82 52,6
 32-51 years 5,9 44,83 19,21 45,75
  51+ years 0,25 1,02 1,53 1,64
Family Status Single 52,51 41 39,06 18,63
 Single parent 6,48 1,02 10,49 15,62
 Couple 7,06 22,61 19,82 22,47
 Couple with children 32,77 35,38 29,57 43,29
  Child not at home 1,18 0 1,06 0
Ethnicity Danish 93,53 94 94,08 95,89
  Immigrant 6,47 6 5,92 4,11
Education prev. y. No education 98,34 97,19 97,59 97,53
 Short further edu 0,49 0,89 0,42 0
 Middle further edu 1,02 1,4 1,86 2,19
  Long further edu 0,14 0,51 0,13 0,27
Occupation prev. y. Employer & self emp. 0,54 2,43 0,3 0,27
 Wage earner 51,99 72,54 53,73 53,15
 Unemployed 1,38 9,83 2,49 18,36
 Out of labour market 3,1 10,73 7,87 18,08
  Student (basic) 42,98 4,47 35,61 10,14
Geographical area Stor Kbh 9,22 6,77 9,26 6,58
 Frederiksborg 5,52 4,34 5,34 2,74
 Roskilde 4,22 2,68 4,04 1,37
 Vestsjælland 5,93 4,09 6,64 6,03
 Storstrøm 5,56 5,62 5,22 6,58
 Bornholm 0,98 0,77 0,94 0,27
 Fyn 10,35 9,96 9,51 13,7
 Sønderjylland 5,47 3,07 5,16 5,21
 Ribe 4,81 4,6 4,89 4,93
 Vejle 7,03 7,28 7,09 10,96
 Ringkøbing 6,22 10,34 5,76 6,03
 Århus 11,79 14,94 12,33 11,51
 Viborg 4,99 6 5,01 4,11
 Nordjylland 10,22 9,32 9,29 11,23
  Kbh & Frederiksberg 7,71 10,22 9,52 8,77
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Educational field Education 0,49 0 3,5 0
 Office & Trade 25,51 5,75 43,17 33,7
 Building & construction 27,4 39,21 2,81 12,33
 Iron, steel & metal 25,88 27,33 1,87 11,78
 Graphic 1,57 0,89 1 0,55
 Industry engineer 1,19 0,64 2,18 1,37
 Service 0,5 0,38 4,42 1,37
 Food & domestic prod 7,55 6,26 9,33 18,9
 Agricultural & fishing 4,47 1,92 2,82 1,92
 Transport 4,07 6,51 0,49 2,74
 Health 1,36 0 28,41 7,4
  Other 0 11,11 0 7,95
Years of experience Mean 1,566011 8,08046 2,817961 6,131507
  Sta.dev. 3,060407 5,309107 4,264548 4,585479
Previous a-income Mean 62960,58 169144 81701,09 129772,8
  Sta.dev. 60627,47 87462,99 62408,58 66007,52
Wage prev. y. Mean 51498,57 135634,6 54486,2 69377,44
  Sta.dev. 57479,94 104835,8 53658,7 81106,13
Note: A-income is total taxable income 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 9. New apprenticeship, men 24 -25 years of age from 1996-1998. 
Men   1996 1998 
    24 years 25 years 24 years 25 years 
Family status Single 71,64 68,57 73,44 59,49 
 Single parent 0 0 0 1,27 
 Couple 23,88 20 25 31,65 
  Couple with children 4,48 11,43 1,56 7,59 
Ethnicity Danish 98,51 97,14 96,88 91,14 
  Immigrant 1,49 2,86 3,12 8,86 
Education prev. y. No education 95,52 91,43 93,75 92,41 
 Short further edu 0 0 1,56 1,27 
 Middle further edu 4,48 8,57 4,69 5,06 
  Long further edu 0 0 0 1,27 
Occupation prev. y. Employer & self emp. 0 0 1,56 0 
 Wage earner 76,12 80 65,62 78,48 
 Unemployed 7,46 8,57 3,12 2,53 
 Out of labour market 1,49 2,86 7,81 1,27 
  Student (basic) 14,93 8,57 21,88 17,72 
Geographical area Stor Kbh 7,46 2,86 4,69 7,59 
 Frederiksborg 2,99 2,86 7,81 3,8 
 Roskilde 7,46 2,86 1,56 1,27 
 Vestsjælland 5,97 0 6,25 3,8 
 Storstrøm 5,97 2,86 6,25 6,33 
 Bornholm 0 2,86 0 1,27 
 Fyn 13,43 11,43 9,38 5,06 
 Sønderjylland 7,46 2,86 4,69 2,53 
 Ribe 5,97 8,57 4,69 1,27 
 Vejle 7,46 8,57 9,38 8,86 
 Ringkøbing 2,99 2,86 4,69 2,53 
 Århus 10,45 22,86 12,5 20,25 
 Viborg 2,99 5,71 0 2,53 
 Nordjylland 4,48 11,43 15,62 13,92 
  Kbh & Frederiksberg 14,93 11,43 12,5 18,99 
Educational field Education 0 0 0 1,27 
 Office & Trade 53,73 48,57 35,94 35,44 
 Building & construction 14,93 14,29 25 17,72 
 Iron, steel & metal 10,45 20 14,06 18,99 
 Graphic 0 0 3,12 1,27 
 Industry engineer 4,48 2,86 0 2,53 
 Service 1,49 0 0 0 
 Food & domestic prod 4,48 2,86 7,81 8,86 
 Agricultural & fishing 7,46 5,71 7,81 7,59 
 Transport 1,49 5,71 4,69 2,53 
 Health 1,49 0 1,56 2,53 
  Other 0 0 0 1,27 
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Years of experience Mean 2,223881 2,971429 2,46875 2,835443 
  Sta.dev. 1,485494 2,00713 1,563155 1,897572 
Previous a-income Mean 107699,4 120800,3 104023,3 131881,7 
  Sta.dev. 38314,68 36548,38 35147,11 63666,04 
Wage prev. y. Mean 83713,22 93343 71662,56 111091,8 
  Sta.dev. 51569,28 53202,62 51040,7 77530,22 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 10. New apprenticeship, men 24 -25 years of age from 1996-1998. 
Women   1996 1998 
    24 years 25 years 24 years 25 years 
Family status Single 53,57 45,28 45,45 42,25 
 Single parent 5,95 13,21 5,05 11,27 
 Couple 39,29 33,96 37,37 30,99 
  Couple with children 1,19 7,55 12,12 15,49 
Ethnicity Danish 97,62 100 91,92 92,96 
  Immigrant 2,38 0 8,08 7,04 
Education prev. y. No education 95,24 92,45 89,9 90,14 
 Short further edu 0 0 0 0 
 Middle further edu 3,57 7,55 8,08 9,86 
  Long further edu 1,19 0 2,02 0 
Occupation prev. y. Employer & self emp. 0 0 1,01 0 
 Wage earner 80,95 75,47 68,69 73,24 
 Unemployed 2,38 3,77 4,04 2,82 
 Out of labour market 0 0 2,02 1,41 
  Student (basic) 16,67 20,75 24,24 22,54 
Geographical area Stor Kbh 5,95 5,66 8,08 7,04 
 Frederiksborg 7,14 7,55 2,02 2,82 
 Roskilde 3,57 13,21 9,09 5,63 
 Vestsjælland 1,19 1,89 5,05 7,04 
 Storstrøm 3,57 5,66 3,03 5,63 
 Bornholm 2,38 0 2,02 0 
 Fyn 2,38 7,55 8,08 9,86 
 Sønderjylland 4,76 7,55 4,04 2,82 
 Ribe 5,95 3,77 5,05 1,41 
 Vejle 8,33 5,66 4,04 1,41 
 Ringkøbing 7,14 5,66 1,01 5,63 
 Århus 16,67 7,55 18,18 21,13 
 Viborg 2,38 1,89 3,03 1,41 
 Nordjylland 10,71 11,32 10,1 12,68 
  Kbh & Frederiksberg 17,86 15,09 17,17 15,49 
Educational field Education 0 0 0 7,04 
 Office & Trade 54,76 28,3 35,35 36,62 
 Building & construction 1,19 1,89 3,03 1,41 
 Iron, steel & metal 0 1,89 2,02 1,41 
 Graphic 1,19 1,89 5,05 0 
 Industry engineer 3,57 7,55 3,03 4,23 
 Service 5,95 1,89 7,07 2,82 
 Food & domestic prod 4,76 9,43 12,12 11,27 
 Agricultural & fishing 1,19 5,66 3,03 2,82 
 Transport 0 0 0 1,41 
 Health 27,38 41,51 29,29 30,99 
  Other 0 0 0 0 
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Years of experience Mean 2,095238 2,132075 1,818182 2,239437 
  Sta.dev. 1,266996 1,569392 1,146099 1,448791 
Previous a-income Mean 97311,6 107711,1 97952,44 108297 
  Sta.dev. 25987,61 33561,27 29926,6 38945,75 
Wage prev. y. Mean 75031,99 73007,19 69720,43 72918,28 
  Sta.dev. 36780,52 45476,57 43659,8 51522,98 
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Table 11. Difference in differences for men 
  1996 1998 Difference
24 years apprentices 3,28 3,34 -0,06
25 years apprentices 1,82 4,39 -2,57
Difference 1,46 -1,05 2,51
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 &  Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Table 12. Difference in differences for women 
  1996 1998 Difference
24 years 
apprentices 3,46 4,31 -0,85
25 years 
apprentices 2,45 3,34 -0,89
Difference 1,01 0,97 0,04
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 13. Difference in differences for men from 1996-1998 
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) D in d cov & t. cov (probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
24 years ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
25 years 0,0005879 0,0055769  -0,0158113 0,0055863 *** -0,0149715 0,0056249 *** -0,0150963 0,00502 *** 
1996 ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
1998 -0,0145621 0,0055739 *** 0,0018565 0,0055759  -0,0223738 0,0271131  -0,0332218 0,02705  
25*1998 0,0251003 0,0080137 *** 0,0259448 0,0079689 *** 0,023974 0,008107 *** 0,0268847 0,0101 *** 
Dane    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Immigrant    -0,0001108 0,0089459  -0,0058848 0,0141781  -0,0080738 0,01129  
Single     ref.  ref.   ref.  
Couple    0,0091865 0,0051536 * 0,0062644 0,0071957  0,0071078 0,00688  
Couple & children    -0,004177 0,0102781  -0,0068957 0,0143223  -0,0079689 0,01129  
Wage earner    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Unemployed    -0,0061882 0,0095603  -0,0077221 0,0112495  -0,0032727 0,00804  
Out of lab.force    -0,0460124 0,006795 *** -0,0437695 0,0096671 *** -0,0304015 0,0035 *** 
Student    -0,0291484 0,0064151 *** -0,0363918 0,0091612 *** -0,0236731 0,0039 *** 
Prev. Income    -3,33E-07 4,37E-08 *** -3,23E-07 6,27E-08 *** -3,06E-06 0 *** 
Work experience    0,0051421 0,0014916 *** 0,0030367 0,0020277  0,003641 0,00175 ** 
Great Copenhagen    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Frederiksborg    0,0178869 0,0118698  0,0046492 0,0162942  0,0063495 0,01946  
Roskilde    0,0161829 0,0130347  0,0332117 0,0177354 * 0,046358 0,0341  
Vestsjælland    0,0226543 0,0119518 * 0,0133357 0,0160924  0,0191672 0,02429  
Storstrøm    0,0358411 0,0119935 *** 0,0231024 0,0164596  0,030593 0,02714  
Fyn    0,0147991 0,0092522  0,019921 0,0126278  0,0282458 0,02058  
Sønderjylland    0,0278612 0,0129654 ** 0,035562 0,0179327 ** 0,0524949 0,03671  
Ribe    0,0251263 0,0127808 ** 0,0402032 0,0175072 ** 0,0588555 0,03747  
Vejle    0,0343108 0,010767 *** 0,0282679 0,0150694 * 0,0497836 0,03113  
Ringkøbing    0,0114406 0,0125148  0,0092371 0,0167823  0,0158452 0,02467  
Århus    0,0126842 0,0081489  0,0108735 0,0114319  0,0162544 0,01544  
Viborg    0,0112186 0,0136014  0,0212565 0,018347  0,0316425 0,03126  
Nordjylland    0,0193987 0,0091062 ** 0,0063266 0,0127589  0,009294 0,01602  
Cph & Frederiksb.    -0,0012223 0,0075388  0,0004115 0,0106184  -0,0000798 0,01087  
continued
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continued 
Immigrant*1998     0,0115363 0,0183218  0,0134271 0,01794  
Couple*1998     0,0062056 0,0103222  0,0008671 0,00801  
Couple&child*1998     0,0038266 0,0206072  0,0079338 0,02449  
Unemployed*1998     0,0019803 0,0218295  0,0000393 0,01604  
Out of lab.for.*1998     -0,0043624 0,013627  0,0270547 0,02968  
Student*1998     0,0143017 0,0128546  0,0284736 0,01792  
Prev. Income*1998     -2,92E-08 8,78E-08  1,02E-06 0  
Work exp.*1998     0,0048666 0,0030091  0,0015305 0,00238  
Frederiksborg*1998     0,0285624 0,0238098  0,0204681 0,03407  
Roskilde*1998     -0,0370296 0,0261763  -0,0184944 0,00593 *** 
Vestsjælland*1998     0,0213447 0,0240852  0,0096121 0,02636  
Storstrøm*1998     0,0271544 0,0240436  0,0068894 0,02284  
Fyn*1998     -0,0125398 0,0185794  -0,0107976 0,00964  
Sønderjylland*1998     -0,016635 0,0259807  -0,0126853 0,01024  
Ribe*1998     -0,0326307 0,0256463  -0,0165827 0,00699 ** 
Vejle*1998     0,0124747 0,0215521  -0,0050859 0,01377  
Ringkøbing*1998     0,0043777 0,0252415  -0,0027477 0,01929  
Århus*1998     0,0044117 0,0163253  -0,0012818 0,01378  
Viborg*1998     -0,0227753 0,0273579  -0,015055 0,00962  
Nordjylland*1998     0,0266463 0,0182327  0,0157197 0,02402  
Cph & Fred.*1998     -0,0028496 0,0151055  -0,0005159 0,01398  
Constant 0,0327628 0,0038803 *** 0,0608346 0,0091847 *** 0,0670165 0,012235 ***   
Obs 7687     7687    7687     7687    
Adj R2 0,0022     0,0146    0,0149     0,0777    
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 &Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 14. Difference in differences for women from 1996-1998. 
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) D in d cov & t. cov (probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
24 years ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
25 years 0,0084981 0,0052821  -0,0098945 0,005357 * -0,0095025 0,0053883 * -0,0030283 0,00173 * 
1996         
1998 -0,0100908 0,0053669 * 0,0087732 0,0052644 * -0,0082374 0,0269884  -0,0090105 0,01016  
25*1998 0,0003339 0,0076554  0,0011039 0,0075933  0,0004126 0,0076817  0,0005737 0,00241  
Dane    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Immigrant    0,0064988 0,0082241  -0,0050312 0,0119181  -0,0035855 0,0038  
Single     ref.  ref.   ref.  
Couple    0,0068794 0,0043708  0,001874 0,0060845  0,0001624 0,00185  
Couple & children    0,0093798 0,0066378  -0,0001936 0,0093187  -0,0011192 0,00327  
Wage earner    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Unemployed    -0,0265183 0,0092483 *** -0,0321726 0,0108503 *** -0,006371 0,00152 *** 
Out of lab.force    -0,0598068 0,006046 *** -0,0549118 0,0084287 *** -0,0819374 0,00457 *** 
Student    -0,0368977 0,005843 *** -0,0387061 0,0083676 *** -0,0081825 0,00176 *** 
Prev. Income    -3,89E-07 5,65E-08 *** -3,84E-07 7,94E-08 *** -1,03E-06 0 *** 
Work experience    0,0041906 0,0016653 ** 0,0040834 0,0022802 * 0,0014993 0,00072 ** 
Great Copenhagen    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Frederiksborg    0,0085899 0,0117287  0,0314613 0,0160121 ** 0,0158107 0,01213  
Roskilde    0,0565103 0,0128472 *** 0,0429169 0,0168873 ** 0,0247019 0,01619  
Vestsjælland    0,0082491 0,0118986  -0,0019805 0,0170704  -0,0015329 0,00563  
Storstrøm    0,0259607 0,0119768 ** 0,0282769 0,0162862 * 0,0155521 0,01262  
Fyn    -0,0061267 0,0089675  -0,0058802 0,0124367  -0,0018507 0,00391  
Sønderjylland    0,0161985 0,0123024  0,0291645 0,0167683 * 0,0140544 0,01201  
Ribe    0,0128281 0,0123314  0,0259373 0,0169329  0,0143173 0,0124  
Vejle    0,0009565 0,010545  0,0167754 0,0142796  0,0079066 0,00818  
Ringkøbing    0,0044254 0,0115453  0,0216558 0,0156824  0,0095522 0,00939  
Århus    0,0060518 0,0082986  0,002523 0,0112724  0,0013875 0,00439  
Viborg    -0,0042741 0,0128683  -0,0001925 0,0178102  0,0002452 0,0064  
Nordjylland    0,0139661 0,0093507  0,0213083 0,0129516 * 0,010659 0,00833  
Cph & Frederiksb.    -0,009727 0,0077508  -0,0004264 0,0106968  0,0003988 0,00389  
Continued 
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Immigrant*1998     0,0218507 0,0164753  0,0101422 0,00674  
Couple*1998     0,0109523 0,0087489  0,0036134 0,00328  
Couple&child*1998     0,0196577 0,0132855  0,009901 0,0088  
Unemployed*1998     0,0329645 0,0213698  0,0195701 0,01834  
Out of lab.for.*1998     -0,0104216 0,0120999  0,9212091 0,00681 *** 
Student*1998     0,003583 0,0117023  0,0030111 0,00416  
Prev. Income*1998     -5,00E-09 1,13E-07  2,09E-07 0  
Work exp.*1998     -8,65E-06 0,0033469  -0,0003651 0,00098  
Frederiksborg*1998     -0,0495631 0,0235271  -0,0070406 0,00138 *** 
Roskilde*1998     0,0344527 0,0260415  -0,0003108 0,00631  
Vestsjælland*1998     0,0174384 0,0238707  0,0077061 0,01453  
Storstrøm*1998     -0,004726 0,0240392  -0,0033895 0,00413  
Fyn*1998     -0,0013849 0,0179738  8,04E-05 0,00601  
Sønderjylland*1998     -0,0286383 0,0246729  -0,0054559 0,00255 ** 
Ribe*1998     -0,0278775 0,0247135  -0,0058266 0,00227 *** 
Vejle*1998     -0,0357881 0,0211889 * -0,0065029 0,00177 *** 
Ringkøbing*1998     -0,0376717 0,0231728  -0,0061946 0,00196 *** 
Århus*1998     0,0078085 0,0166542  0,00102 0,00569  
Viborg*1998     -0,0099733 0,0257692  -0,0027854 0,00567  
Nordjylland*1998     -0,015298 0,0187423  -0,00462 0,0028 * 
Cph & Fred.*1998     -0,0184819 0,0155479  -0,0045699 0,0031  
Constant 0,0346392 0,0036832 *** 0,0820905 0,0100286 *** 0,0798105 0,0134352 ***   
Obs 9006     9006    9006     9006    
Adj R2 0,001     0,0189    0,02     0,0832    
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 15. Difference in differences for men from 1996-2002. 
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) D in d cov & t. cov (probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
24 years ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
25 years 0,002031 0,0055148  -0,0161921 0,0052179 *** -0,0149715 0,0052436 *** -0,0123349 0,00413 *** 
1996 ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
2002 -0,0145621 0,0052036 *** 0,0065126 0,0055501  -0,0296625 0,0260353  -0,0255189 0,0203  
25*2002 0,0048236 0,0080089  0,0065267 0,0079646  0,0043918 0,00806  0,0053854 0,00708  
Dane    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Immigrant    0,0011719 0,0086954  -0,0058848 0,0132169  -0,0065734 0,00912  
Single     ref.  ref.   ref.  
Couple    -0,0011388 0,0051614  0,0062644 0,0067078  0,005862 0,00571  
Couple with children   -0,003963 0,0103692  -0,0068957 0,0133513  -0,0064802 0,0091  
Wage earner    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Unemployed    -0,0000392 0,0097373  -0,0077221 0,0104868  -0,0026747 0,00657  
Out of labor force    -0,0439967 0,0068433 *** -0,0437695 0,0090117 *** -0,0240327 0,00295 *** 
Student    -0,0273208 0,0061431 *** -0,0363918 0,0085401 *** -0,0196862 0,00349 *** 
Prev. Income    -2,68E-07 3,95E-08 *** -3,23E-07 5,85E-08 *** -2,10E-06 0 *** 
Work experience    0,0045661 0,001453 *** 0,0030367 0,0018903  0,002985 0,00144 ** 
Great Copenhagen    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Frederiksborg    0,0097038 0,0116963  0,0046492 0,0151896  0,0052311 0,0161  
Roskilde    0,0390919 0,0130734 *** 0,0332117 0,0165331 ** 0,0391272 0,02943  
Vestsjælland    0,0020407 0,0118248  0,0133357 0,0150014  0,0160491 0,02069  
Storstrøm    0,0270644 0,0123233 ** 0,0231024 0,0153437  0,0256627 0,02319  
Fyn    0,0183198 0,0090488 ** 0,019921 0,0117717 * 0,0235167 0,01738  
Sønderjylland    0,0590319 0,0130402 *** 0,035562 0,016717 ** 0,0444529 0,03184  
Ribe    0,027417 0,0128248 ** 0,0402032 0,0163203 ** 0,0499673 0,03263  
Vejle    0,0311602 0,0108818 *** 0,0282679 0,0140478 ** 0,0421665 0,02701  
Ringkøbing    0,0110875 0,0118337  0,0092371 0,0156446  0,0131144 0,02059  
Århus    0,0106615 0,0079225  0,0108735 0,0106569  0,013387 0,01278  
Viborg    0,016957 0,0133208  0,0212565 0,0171032  0,026476 0,0266  
Nordjylland    0,0003834 0,0090169  0,0063266 0,0118939  0,0076721 0,01332  
Cph & Frederiksberg   0,0016732 0,0073692  0,0004115 0,0098985  -0,0000654 0,00891  
continued
 174
continued 
Immigrant*2002     0,0124855 0,0175876  0,0125503 0,01536  
Couple*2002     -0,0163734 0,0105129  -0,0096441 0,0047 ** 
Couple&child*2002     0,0080174 0,0212489  0,012085 0,02697  
Unemployed*2002     0,0488422 0,0306335  0,0266466 0,03412  
Out of labor force*2002    -0,0017229 0,0138661  -0,0063753 0,01399  
Student*2002     0,0186064 0,0123102  0,0192228 0,01514  
Prev. Income*2002     8,69E-08 7,99E-08  9,04E-07 0  
Work experience*2002    0,0050223 0,0030397 * 0,0033823 0,00225  
Frederiksborg*2002     0,0120071 0,0238189  0,0101457 0,02672  
Roskilde*2002     0,0187132 0,0271003  0,006458 0,02245  
Vestsjælland*2002     -0,0305911 0,0244616    
Storstrøm*2002     0,012856 0,0259346  0,0099153 0,02517  
Fyn*2002     -0,0037635 0,0184258  -0,0040702 0,01151  
Sønderjylland*2002     0,0631111 0,0267594 ** 0,0222954 0,03233  
Ribe*2002     -0,0321893 0,0264677  -0,0137273 0,00606  
Vejle*2002     0,0077589 0,0222622  -0,003264 0,0132  
Ringkøbing*2002     0,0045689 0,0239094  -0,0005222 0,01824  
Århus*2002     -0,0011835 0,0159449  -0,0024637 0,01157  
Viborg*2002     -0,0081845 0,0273081  -0,0056149 0,01498  
Nordjylland*2002     -0,0145372 0,0182362  -0,0105398 0,00831  
Cph & Frederiksberg*2002    0,002438 0,0148332  0,0043356 0,01459  
Constant 0,0327628 0,0036225 *** 0,0558864 0,0087519 *** 0,0670165 0,0114055 ***   
Obs 6877     6877    6877     6784    
Adj R2 0,0013     0,0156    0,0168     0,0944    
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 16. Difference in differences for women from 1996-2002. 
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) D in d cov & t. cov (probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
24 years ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
25 years 0,0022089 0,0054141  -0,0101358 0,0051238 ** -0,0095025 0,0051488 * -0,0024195 0,00141 * 
1996 ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
2002 -0,0100908 0,0051193 ** 0,0039545 0,0054583  -0,0490407 0,0274273 * -0,0137315 0,00918  
25*2002 0,0005817 0,0078334  -0,0003588 0,0077794  -0,0021465 0,007878  -0,0007178 0,00192  
Dane    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Immigrant    0,0078135 0,0082773  -0,0050312 0,0113883  -0,0028438 0,003  
Single     ref.  ref.   ref.  
Couple    0,0012832 0,0043984  0,001874 0,005814  0,0001298 0,00148  
Couple with children   0,004869 0,0069826  -0,0001936 0,0089045  -0,0008909 0,00259  
Wage earner    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Unemployed    -0,0324463 0,0098727 *** -0,0321726 0,0103679 *** -0,0049644 0,00129 *** 
Out of labor force    -0,0526453 0,0063324 *** -0,0549118 0,008054 *** -0,0560031 0,00372 *** 
Student    -0,0285598 0,0057353 *** -0,0387061 0,0079956 *** -0,0067063 0,00167 *** 
Prev. Income    -3,19E-07 5,46E-08 *** -3,84E-07 7,59E-08 *** -1,01E-06 0 *** 
Work experience    0,0048782 0,0017028 *** 0,0040834 0,0021788 * 0,0011978 0,00059 ** 
Great Copenhagen    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Frederiksborg    0,034881 0,0119406 *** 0,0314613 0,0153002 ** 0,0129328 0,01017  
Roskilde    0,0500606 0,0127602 *** 0,0429169 0,0161366 *** 0,0203216 0,01372  
Vestsjælland    0,0045376 0,0123079  -0,0019805 0,0163115  -0,0012199 0,00447  
Storstrøm    0,0234166 0,0122767 * 0,0282769 0,0155622 * 0,0127246 0,01058  
Fyn    0,0007115 0,0091096  -0,0058802 0,0118838  -0,0014715 0,0031  
Sønderjylland    0,0154316 0,0128158  0,0291645 0,0160228 * 0,0114939 0,01005  
Ribe    0,0334755 0,0125233 *** 0,0259373 0,0161801  0,0116903 0,01035  
Vejle    0,0221439 0,0107657 ** 0,0167754 0,0136448  0,0064073 0,00674  
Ringkøbing    0,0139852 0,0115525  0,0216558 0,0149852  0,0077437 0,00774  
Århus    0,0022176 0,008224  0,002523 0,0107713  0,0011089 0,00352  
Viborg    0,0103851 0,0128898  -0,0001925 0,0170184  0,000196 0,00511  
Nordjylland    0,0113703 0,0093976  0,0213083 0,0123758 * 0,0086529 0,00691  
Cph & Frederiksberg   -0,0005953 0,007716  -0,0004264 0,0102213  0,0003187 0,00311  
continued
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Immigrant*2002     0,0258679 0,0166213  0,0087541 0,00558  
Couple*2002     -0,0006971 0,0089136  0,0003532 0,00229  
Couple&child*2002     0,0151666 0,0144299  0,0087602 0,00856  
Unemployed*2002     -0,0171087 0,0422147    
Out of labor force*2002    0,0055721 0,0131079  0,9214622 0,00916 *** 
Student*2002     0,0208199 0,0114977 * 0,0058121 0,00471  
Prev. Income*2002     1,25E-07 1,10E-07  3,04E-07 0  
Work experience*2002    0,0019318 0,0035304  0,0004231 0,0009  
Frederiksborg*2002     0,0080686 0,024512  0,0007661 0,00641  
Roskilde*2002     0,0204864 0,0264461  0,0001797 0,00594  
Vestsjælland*2002     0,0154037 0,0248895  0,006337 0,01364  
Storstrøm*2002     -0,0127478 0,0253781  -0,0023032 0,00427  
Fyn*2002     0,0173459 0,0185306  0,0064949 0,00979  
Sønderjylland*2002     -0,0377762 0,0268022  -0,0053173 0,00155 *** 
Ribe*2002     0,0196423 0,0255658  0,0025138 0,00813  
Vejle*2002     0,0160005 0,0222775  0,0026651 0,00759  
Ringkøbing*2002     -0,017156 0,0235787  -0,0035935 0,00297  
Århus*2002     0,0008478 0,0167042  -0,0000461 0,00464  
Viborg*2002     0,0252543 0,0260784  0,0083942 0,01458  
Nordjylland*2002     -0,0210029 0,019044  -0,0038962 0,00236 * 
Cph & Frederiksberg*2002    0,0015721 0,0156507  0,0004146 0,00463  
Constant 0,0346392 0,0035133 *** 0,0677051 0,0099073 *** 0,0798105 0,0128379 ***   
Obs 7994     7994    7994     7976    
Adj R2 0,0005     0,016    0,0161     0,0916    
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 &Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 17. Difference in differences for men from 1996-2003. 
  Dif in dif (ols) Dif in dif with cov (ols) Dif in dif with cov (probit) 
  Coef Stand. Err   Coef Stand. Err   Coef Stand. Err   
24 years ref.  ref.  ref.   
25 years -0,0145621 0,0055467 *** -0,0153408 0,0055332 *** -0,0160366 0,00536 *** 
1996 ref.  ref.  ref.   
1997 0,0037298 0,0055103  0,0039384 0,0054892  0,0038297 0,00501  
1998 0,0005879 0,0055496  0,0022568 0,005533  0,0025596 0,00499  
1999 0,0032497 0,0055519  0,0053715 0,005538  0,0046132 0,00517  
2000 0,0010761 0,0057183  0,0037778 0,0057098  0,0045853 0,00536  
2001 0,0074216 0,0059157  0,0100707 0,0059049 * 0,0094071 0,00599  
2002 0,002031 0,0058784  0,0060039 0,0058714  0,0055556 0,00567  
2003 0,0052731 0,0059997  -0,0254107 0,0064917 *** -0,0190016 0,00271 *** 
25*1997 0,0005414 0,0079078  0,0015035 0,0078733  0,0032196 0,00798  
25*1998 0,0251003 0,0079745 *** 0,0254089 0,0079365 *** 0,0334358 0,01314 ** 
25*1999 0,0096055 0,0079935  0,0111425 0,0079586  0,0162124 0,01037  
25*2000 0,0011661 0,008116  0,0023706 0,0080817  0,0023376 0,0081  
25*2001 0,0088164 0,0083843  0,010637 0,0083477  0,0149137 0,01042  
25*2002 0,0048236 0,008537  0,0060155 0,0084985  0,0088604 0,00982  
25*2003 0,0001537 0,0085464  -0,000387 0,0085084  0,0019137 0,00816  
Dane   ref.  ref.   
Immigrant   -0,0000299 0,0042546  -0,000205 0,0039  
Single    ref.  ref.   
Couple   -0,0032788 0,0027416  -0,002818 0,00223  
Couple with children   -0,011663 0,0056258 ** -0,0102077 0,00386 *** 
Wage earner   ref.  ref.   
Unemployed   -0,0018899 0,0058638  -0,000422 0,00473  
Out of labor force   -0,0416576 0,0036573 *** -0,0290865 0,00141 *** 
Student   -0,0201521 0,0032362 *** -0,0148072 0,00194 *** 
Prev. Income   -2,46E-07 2,08E-08 *** -2,05E-06 0 *** 
Work experience   0,00457 0,0007748 *** 0,004512 0,00066 *** 
Great Copenhagen   ref.  ref.   
Frederiksborg   0,0156164 0,0063463 ** 0,01571 0,00763 ** 
Roskilde   0,0224486 0,0070881 *** 0,0227628 0,00933 ** 
Vestsjælland   0,0181875 0,0065366 *** 0,0199447 0,00852 ** 
Storstrøm   0,0189506 0,0065952 *** 0,0186613 0,00831 ** 
Fyn   0,0077603 0,004866  0,0074801 0,00512  
Sønderjylland   0,0230695 0,0070268 *** 0,0239736 0,00942 ** 
Ribe   0,0099943 0,0069097  0,0095001 0,00755  
Vejle   0,0154719 0,0057872 *** 0,0150868 0,00696 ** 
Ringkøbing   0,0098816 0,0065072  0,0098517 0,00719  
Århus   0,0025645 0,0042428  0,0030146 0,00407  
Viborg   0,0160391 0,0072571 ** 0,017115 0,00895 * 
Nordjylland   0,0050377 0,0048255  0,0050217 0,00485  
Cph & Frederiksberg   -0,0052789 0,0039124  -0,0046445 0,00336  
Constant 0,0327628 0,0038613 *** 0,0578278 0,0057464 ***    
Obs 27571    27571    27571     
Adj R2 0,0012    0,011    0,0503     
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 &Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 18. Difference in differences for women from 1996-2003. 
  Dif in dif (ols) Dif in dif with cov (ols) Dif in dif with cov (probit) 
  Coef Stand. Err   Coef Stand. Err   Coef Stand. Err   
24 years ref.  ref.  ref.   
25 years -0,0100908 0,0052866  -0,0108064 0,005266 ** -0,009377 0,00454 ** 
1996 ref.  ref.  ref.   
1997 0,0054125 0,0051875  0,0057362 0,0051612  0,0051781 0,00458  
1998 0,0084981 0,0052031  0,008343 0,0051815  0,0072338 0,00474  
1999 0,0032816 0,0051734  0,0040009 0,0051537  0,0039979 0,00451  
2000 -0,0009758 0,005382  0,0002162 0,0053648  0,00165 0,00451  
2001 0,0008966 0,0055576  0,0010743 0,0055409  0,0023174 0,00469  
2002 0,0022089 0,005591  0,0036737 0,0055793  0,0049066 0,005  
2003 0,005931 0,0055375  -0,0217798 0,0061235 *** -0,0184783 0,00251 *** 
25*1997 -0,0063108 0,0074793  -0,006082 0,0074375  -0,0046519 0,00546  
25*1998 0,0003339 0,0075409  0,0010903 0,007497  0,0023758 0,00659  
25*1999 0,0010937 0,0075289  0,000623 0,0074863  0,0012727 0,00654  
25*2000 0,0078362 0,0076482  0,0080319 0,0076048  0,0081242 0,00787  
25*2001 -0,0005246 0,0079119  0,0010121 0,0078659  0,0016097 0,00699  
25*2002 0,0005817 0,0080893  -0,0000237 0,0080421  -0,0001977 0,00672  
25*2003 -0,00089 0,0080452  -0,0002078 0,0080002  0,0008363 0,00676  
Dane   ref.  ref.   
Immigrant   -0,0026201 0,0040205  -0,0036179 0,00346  
Single    ref.  ref.   
Couple   -0,0022928 0,0022454  -0,0018118 0,00175  
Couple with children   0,0126674 0,0035806 *** 0,0132074 0,00398 *** 
Wage earner   ref.  ref.   
Unemployed   -0,0237761 0,0056314 *** -0,0130689 0,00275 *** 
Out of labor force   -0,0496615 0,0032446 *** -0,0359184 0,0013 *** 
Student   -0,0227747 0,002834 *** -0,0167712 0,00172 *** 
Prev. Income   -2,17E-07 2,45E-08 *** -2,05E-06 0 *** 
Work experience   0,0036322 0,0008491 *** 0,0038704 0,00069 *** 
Great Copenhagen   ref.  ref.   
Frederiksborg   0,0058866 0,0061775  0,0060741 0,00582  
Roskilde   0,0294097 0,0070073 *** 0,0253741 0,00884 *** 
Vestsjælland   0,0110574 0,0062781 * 0,0113704 0,00664 * 
Storstrøm   0,0202966 0,0063301 *** 0,0195269 0,00759 *** 
Fyn   -0,0020987 0,0047398  -0,001183 0,00385  
Sønderjylland   0,0126841 0,0065998 * 0,0105973 0,00676  
Ribe   0,0127009 0,0064593 ** 0,0103929 0,00656  
Vejle   0,0115736 0,0055407 ** 0,0106356 0,0057 * 
Ringkøbing   0,0063895 0,0060104  0,0044841 0,00542  
Århus   0,0008445 0,0042955  0,000887 0,00363  
Viborg   0,0011929 0,0067711  0,0013239 0,00575  
Nordjylland   0,0014982 0,0048562  0,0015131 0,00416  
Cph & Frederiksberg   -0,0118183 0,003999 *** -0,0092961 0,00293 *** 
Constant 0,0346392 0,0036281 *** 0,0653414 0,0058782 ***    
Obs 32787    32787    32787     
Adj R2 0,0006    0,0127    0,0588     
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 19. Difference in differences for between 23-26 years of age from 1996-1998.  
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) D in d cov & t. cov (probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
24 years ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
25 years 0,0037347 0,0039752  -0,0199999 0,004167 *** -0,0177095 0,0042733 *** -0,0186235 0,004 *** 
1996 ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
1998 -0,0195749 0,004063 *** 0,0049879 0,0039672  -0,0128528 0,0192951  -0,0317006 0,01952  
25*1998 0,0177983 0,0058093 *** 0,0186932 0,0057777 *** 0,0142074 0,006088 *** 0,0192316 0,00711 *** 
Dane    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Immigrant    -0,0067836 0,0064744  -0,011735 0,0096274  -0,0145997 0,0064 ** 
Single     ref.  ref.   ref.  
Couple    0,0069235 0,0038296 * -0,0022253 0,005394  -0,0014708 0,00479  
Couple & children    -0,003187 0,0070372  -0,006384 0,009632  -0,0073137 0,0084  
Wage earner    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Unemployed    -0,0128663 0,0068634 * -0,0112771 0,0081712  -0,0058675 0,00596  
Out of lab.force    -0,0448089 0,0049104 *** -0,0443552 0,0070171 *** -0,031462 0,00272 *** 
Student    -0,0255396 0,0046978 *** -0,0292842 0,0067188 *** -0,0199368 0,00329 *** 
Prev. Income    -3,33E-07 3,16E-08 *** -3,20E-07 4,48E-08 *** -3,06E-06 0 *** 
Work experience    0,0050309 0,0010411 *** 0,0033777 0,0014162 ** 0,0043003 0,0013 *** 
Great Copenhagen    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Frederiksborg    0,0213701 0,0083523 ** 0,0189184 0,0115027 * 0,0218983 0,01525  
Roskilde    0,0136411 0,0096368  0,0168925 0,0132454  0,0171842 0,01688  
Vestsjælland    0,0214953 0,0085793 ** 0,0237037 0,0117118 ** 0,0262609 0,01704  
Storstrøm    0,0276385 0,0085549 *** 0,0156136 0,0118774  0,0150032 0,01455  
Fyn    0,0059094 0,0066823  0,005132 0,0091829  0,0054191 0,00949  
Sønderjylland    0,0220633 0,0090977 ** 0,0274488 0,012505 ** 0,0335005 0,01952 * 
Ribe    0,0067787 0,0091034  0,0091697 0,0126285  0,0097586 0,01458  
Vejle    0,0179972 0,0078518 ** 0,0175932 0,0109177  0,0243576 0,0156  
Ringkøbing    0,0070171 0,0087827  0,0050524 0,0119091  0,0057884 0,01301  
Århus    0,002905 0,0058975  -0,0002755 0,0082179  0,0005977 0,00773  
Viborg    -0,0044067 0,0096574  0,0039576 0,0132132  0,0047215 0,01403  
Nordjylland    0,0029108 0,0066302  -0,0035245 0,0091934  -0,0022262 0,00825  
Cph & Frederiksb.    -0,0099446 0,0054911 * -0,0051451 0,0076917  -0,0053468 0,00664  
continued
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Immigrant*1998     0,009629 0,0130206  0,0172027 0,01389  
Couple*1998     0,0182287 0,0076644 ** 0,014316 0,0087 * 
Couple&child*1998     0,0060299 0,014121  0,0105454 0,01804  
Unemployed*1998     -0,0067933 0,0152805  -0,0056067 0,01061  
Out of lab.for.*1998     -0,0014848 0,0098358  0,0250945 0,01921  
Student*1998     0,0070493 0,0094025  0,0138991 0,01004  
Prev. Income*1998     -3,17E-08 6,33E-08  1,00E-06 0 * 
Work exp.*1998     0,0038068 0,0020947 * 0,0009196 0,00176  
Frederiksborg*1998     0,0055285 0,0167362  -0,0018296 0,01205  
Roskilde*1998     -0,006561 0,0193085  -0,0061778 0,01226  
Vestsjælland*1998     -0,0044134 0,0172135  -0,0056126 0,01098  
Storstrøm*1998     0,0252078 0,0171247  0,0109536 0,01766  
Fyn*1998     0,0019205 0,0133894  -0,0007197 0,01095  
Sønderjylland*1998     -0,0115496 0,018234  -0,0108062 0,00892  
Ribe*1998     -0,005043 0,0182269  -0,0051033 0,01263  
Vejle*1998     0,0010382 0,0157169  -0,0065449 0,00986  
Ringkøbing*1998     0,0042416 0,0176427  0,0000603 0,0148  
Århus*1998     0,0069193 0,0118097  0,0049424 0,01147  
Viborg*1998     -0,0175251 0,0193639  -0,0135141 0,00964  
Nordjylland*1998     0,0131427 0,0132731  0,0102706 0,01489  
Cph & Fred.*1998     -0,0086894 0,0109949  -0,0058853 0,0084  
Constant 0,0365472 0,0027784 *** 0,0729766 0,006547 *** 0,076949 0,0087303 ***   
Obs 15290     15290    15290     15290    
Adj R2 0,0025     0,0149    0,015     0,0662    
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 20. Difference in differences for women between 23-26 years of age from 
1996-1998.  
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) D in d cov & t. cov (probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
24 years ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
25 years 0,0088415 0,0039153 ** -0,0187154 0,0041538 *** -0,0177061 0,0042373 *** -0,0164157 0,0037 *** 
1996 ref.   ref.  ref.   ref.  
1998 -0,0185785 0,0040932 *** 0,0088444 0,0038955 ** 0,0203999 0,0201664  -0,0052455 0,01883  
25*1998 0,0035899 0,0057786  0,0049051 0,0057342  0,0027985 0,005968  0,0058907 0,00549  
Dane    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Immigrant    -0,0078134 0,0062066  -0,0082557 0,0091601  -0,0140766 0,00719 ** 
Single     ref.  ref.   ref.  
Couple    -0,0011627 0,0033314  -0,0034415 0,0046967  -0,0031712 0,00376  
Couple & children    0,0129888 0,0049393 *** 0,0041375 0,006978  0,004893 0,00735  
Wage earner    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Unemployed    -0,0282747 0,0070826 *** -0,0280525 0,008294 *** -0,0166949 0,0041 *** 
Out of lab.force    -0,0620341 0,0044685 *** -0,0587497 0,0062822 *** -0,0442002 0,00307 *** 
Student    -0,042882 0,0044419 *** -0,0460016 0,0064032 *** -0,0267618 0,00318 *** 
Prev. Income    -4,15E-07 4,17E-08 *** -4,56E-07 6,09E-08 *** -4,02E-06 0 *** 
Work experience    0,0044022 0,0012146 *** 0,0046643 0,0016674 *** 0,0050402 0,00142 *** 
Great Copenhagen    ref.  ref.   ref.  
Frederiksborg    -0,0087936 0,008687  0,0097535 0,0121597  0,0096463 0,01288  
Roskilde    0,02855 0,009619 *** 0,0299537 0,0131612 ** 0,03178 0,01848 * 
Vestsjælland    0,0030888 0,0088185  0,0086092 0,0123834  0,0103356 0,01391  
Storstrøm    0,0244899 0,0089553 *** 0,024199 0,0126488 * 0,025729 0,0168  
Fyn    -0,0123678 0,0068255 * -0,0051431 0,0095867  -0,0037071 0,00813  
Sønderjylland    0,0067855 0,0092352  0,0270859 0,0129618 ** 0,0283461 0,01754  
Ribe    0,000434 0,0091465  0,0160265 0,0127871  0,018724 0,01546  
Vejle    -0,0006662 0,0078832  0,0102441 0,0110004  0,0113674 0,01208  
Ringkøbing    0,0028132 0,0085947  0,0225889 0,0119479 * 0,0222691 0,01492  
Århus    -0,0096997 0,0062482  -0,0029837 0,0087202  -0,0032988 0,0074  
Viborg    0,0068492 0,0095002  0,0227058 0,0131184 * 0,0238041 0,01687  
Nordjylland    -0,0046308 0,007066  0,0030196 0,0098968  0,0038824 0,00956  
Cph & Frederiksb.    -0,0217872 0,005853 *** -0,0047202 0,0082386  -0,0038462 0,00703  
continued
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continued 
Immigrant*1998     0,0009841 0,0124595  0,0106114 0,01394  
Couple*1998     0,0045854 0,0066648  0,0045118 0,00581  
Couple&child*1998     0,0177152 0,0098827 * 0,0135314 0,01135  
Unemployed*1998     0,0069528 0,0163209  0,0120204 0,01732  
Out of lab.for.*1998     -0,0066286 0,0089432  0,0249224 0,01738  
Student*1998     0,0056774 0,0088956  0,0101496 0,00843  
Prev. Income*1998     7,34E-08 8,38E-08  1,04E-06 0 * 
Work exp.*1998     -0,0004894 0,0024389  -0,001673 0,00195  
Frederiksborg*1998     -0,0385191 0,0173783 ** -0,0187171 0,00588 *** 
Roskilde*1998     -0,0024624 0,0192877  -0,0084956 0,01005  
Vestsjælland*1998     -0,0118391 0,0176434  -0,0084481 0,0104  
Storstrøm*1998     -0,0013691 0,0179215  -0,0070407 0,01029  
Fyn*1998     -0,0156716 0,0136587  -0,0079984 0,00889  
Sønderjylland*1998     -0,0418797 0,0184753 ** -0,0190758 0,00555 *** 
Ribe*1998     -0,0328076 0,0183 * -0,0178805 0,00616 *** 
Vejle*1998     -0,0233341 0,0157773  -0,0137937 0,00723 * 
Ringkøbing*1998     -0,0414115 0,0172031 ** -0,0188201 0,00537 *** 
Århus*1998     -0,0144308 0,0125021  -0,0062309 0,00855  
Viborg*1998     -0,0338171 0,0190246 * -0,01743 0,00644 *** 
Nordjylland*1998     -0,0165783 0,0141383  -0,0101556 0,008  
Cph & Fred.*1998     -0,03433 0,0117143 *** -0,0190117 0,00554 *** 
Constant 0,0420237 0,0027535 *** 0,1063789 0,0074648 *** 0,1011044 0,0102316 ***   
Obs 17932     17932    17932     17932    
Adj R2 0,0024     0,0203    0,0206     0,0763    
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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Table 21. Difference in differences for unskilled men from 1996-1998. 
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) D in d cov & t. cov (probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
25*1998 0,0368532 0,011492 *** 0,0394337 0,0113076 *** 0,0386336 0,0116229 *** 0,0352807 0,01359 *** 
Adj R2 0,0037     0,0378    0,0373     0,1292    
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Table 22. Difference in differences for unskilled women from 1996-1998. 
  D in d (ols) D in d cov (ols) D in d cov & time cov (ols) 
D in d cov & t. cov 
(probit) 
  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.  Coef St.err.   Coef. St.err.  
25*1998 0,0018973 0,0117872  0,0015598 0,0114965  0,0016218 0,0117359  -0,0000238 0,00127  
Adj R2 0,0013   0,0531   0,0538   0,1802     
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 & Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
 
Table 23. Averages applied for calculating elasticities. 
  
Yearly ave. 
wage DkK 
Ave. edu.  
Income (3,5 y) Entrance rate 95% conf.inte 
New voc.train. 25y 1996 121269 424442   
New adult voc. Train. 25 y 1998 159886 559601   
Wage difference Dkr 38617 135159   
Wage difference in pct 31,84 31,84   
Voc. Train. 25y 1996   1,82  
Estimated increase  25y 1998   2,69 0,71-4,67 
Entrance difference in pct     147,8  39,01-256,59 
Exchange rate 1000US$ (2007) 5664   
Source: Statistics Denmark register panel data from 1995 to 2004 &  Dream register on 
AAS 1997-2005 
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